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Abstract
In wireless communication networks, many protocols (e.g., IEEE 802.11 a/b/g Medium Access
Control (MAC) protocols) have been designed assuming that users are compliant with the protocol
rules. Unfortunately, a self-interested and strategic user might manipulate the protocol to obtain a
personal advantage at the expense of the other users. This would lead to socially inefficient outcomes.
In this thesis we address the problem of designing protocols that are able to avoid or limit the
inefficiencies occurring when the users act selfishly and strategically. To do so, we exploit the tools
offered by Game Theory (GT), the branch of mathematics that models and analyzes the interaction
between strategic decision makers.
The dissertation covers aspects related to wireless communications at different levels. We start
analyzing the downlink radio resource allocation issue of a cellular network based on Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA). We propose a suboptimal game theoretic algorithm
able to preserve the modularity of the system and to trade–off between sum–rate throughput and
fairness among the users of the network.
Successively, we address the problem of promoting cooperation in wireless relay networks. To
give the incentive for the users of a network to relay the packets sent by other users, we consider a
dynamic scheduling in which cooperative users are rewarded with more channel access opportunities.
Infrastructure sharing is another form of cooperation that might be exploit to meet the increasing
rate demands and quality of service requirements in wireless networks. We analyze a scenario where
two wireless multi–hop networks are willing to share some of their nodes – acting as relays – in or-
der to gain benefits in terms of lower packet delivery delay and reduced loss probability. Bayesian
Network analysis is exploited to compute the correlation between local parameters and overall perfor-
mance, whereas the selection of the nodes to share is made by means of a game theoretic approach.
Afterwards, our analysis focuses on channel access policies in wireless ad–hoc networks. We
design schemes based on pricing and intervention to give incentives for the users to access the channel
efficiently.
xviii Abstract
Finally, we consider another important issue that arises when the users are strategic and selfish:
when asked to report relevant information, the users might lie, if it is in their individual interest to do
so. For a class of environments that includes many resource allocation problems in communication
networks, we provide tools to design an efficient system, in which the users have the incentive to
report truthfully and to follow the instructions, despite the fact that they are self–interested. We then
apply our framework and results to design a flow control management system.
Sommario
Nelle reti di comunicazione wireless, molti protocolli (ad esempio, i protocolli di accesso al
mezzo IEEE 802.11 a/b/g) sono stati progettati assumendo che gli utenti rispettino le regole. Purtroppo
un utente, guidato da interessi personali, potrebbe manipolare il protocollo per ottenere un beneficio
a discapito degli altri utenti. Di conseguenza, la rete wireless sarebbe sfruttata in maniera inefficiente
da un punto di vista sociale.
Questa tesi si occupa della progettazione di protocolli in grado di prevenire le inefficienze dovute
al comportamento egoistico e strategico degli utenti. Per raggiungere questo scopo, vengono sfruttati
gli strumenti offerti dalla teoria dei giochi, la scienza matematica che modella e analizza l’interazione
tra soggetti che possono prendere delle decisioni in maniera autonoma.
La tesi copre aspetti legati alla gestione delle comunicazioni wireless a differenti livelli. Si inizia
analizzando l’allocazione delle risorse radio, in fase di downlink, di una rete cellulare basata sulla tec-
nologia di accesso al mezzo di multiplazione a divisione di frequenza ortogonale (OFDMA). Viene
proposto un algoritmo sub–ottimo basato sulla teoria dei giochi che permette di preservare la mod-
ularità del sistema ed é in grado di trovare un compromesso tra la massimizzazione del throughput
totale e un livello equo delle prestazioni degli utenti.
Successivamente, si analizza il problema di incentivare la cooperazione nelle reti wireless in cui
gli utenti agiscono opportunisticamente da relay. Per incentivare gli utenti della rete a inoltrare i
pacchetti spediti da altri utenti viene adottato uno scheduling dinamico, in cui gli utenti cooperativi
sono premiati aumentando le loro opportunità di accesso al mezzo.
La condivisione dell’infrastruttura é un’altra forma di cooperazione che potrebbe essere sfruttata
per soddisfare la crescente esigenza di rate e qualità di servizio nelle reti wireless. A tal fine, si
considera uno scenario in cui due reti wireless multi–hop sono disposte a condividere alcuni nodi, che
agiscono da relay per entrambe le reti. Un’analisi basata sulle reti Bayesiane permette di stimare le
prestazioni globali da alcuni parametri locali, mentre un’analisi basata sulla teoria dei giochi permette
di selezionare in modo opportuno i nodi da condividere.
xx Sommario
In seguito, la nostra analisi si concentra sulle politiche di accesso al mezzo in reti wireless ad–hoc.
Viene progettato un protocollo basato sugli schemi di pricing e intervention per incentivare gli utenti
ad utilizzare il canale wireless efficientemente.
Infine, si considera un altro importante problema che sorge nel momento in cui gli utenti sono
egoisti e strategici: quando viene richiesto di riportare delle informazioni rilevanti, gli utenti potreb-
bero mentire, se ció fosse nel loro interesse. Partendo da uno scenario generico, comprendente molte
problematiche associate all’allocazione di risorse nelle reti di comunicazione, vengono forniti degli
strumenti per progettare un sistema efficiente, in cui gli utenti sono incentivati a comunicare le infor-
mazioni veritiere e seguire le istruzioni del protocollo. Tali strumenti e risultati vengono applicati per
progettare un sistema di controllo della congestione in una rete di comunicazione.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Mobile communications have grown exponentially over the last two decades, and will continue
to grow: Cisco projected a 18-fold increase of global mobile data traffic between the end of 2011
and 2016 and over 10 billion mobile-connected devices in 2016 [1]. While this exceptional pace of
growth is exciting, it also presents a whole new set of challenges. To meet the increasingly high rate
demands and quality of service requirements, future wireless networks must be reliable, able to inter-
operate and to manage dynamically and efficiently a large set of devices. As a consequence, wireless
communication networks are migrating towards more distributed approaches, shifting network intel-
ligence from the core network towards the edges of the network. This transformation is supported
by the increase of mobile terminals computation capabilities and leads to more scalable, flexible and
reliable networks, decreasing the information exchange and removing the single point of failure of
completely centralized approaches.
Distributed algorithms, in which each device of the wireless network is capable of independently
adapting its operation based on the current environment, have been studied extensively. Most of these
works assume that devices comply with the rules of the algorithm. However, the distribution of the
decision making process leads to a new fundamental issue: what happens if the algorithm used by a
device is manipulated to pursue a personal benefit? In centralized approaches, such deviations from a
prescribed protocol are not authorized and can be detected, because every action is dictated by a cen-
tral entity. In decentralized approaches, each device has some degree of freedom in setting parameters
or changing the mode of operation. By exploiting such leeway, a device might be programmed, by
the manufacturer or by the final user, to accomplish a certain objective, at the cost of overall network
performance.1 As a consequence, there is the necessity to design systems able to cope with selfish
1In [2] the 802.11 MAC protocol of a commercial Broadcom chipset is replaced with a state machine execution engine
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users.
To reach this goal wireless engineers need novel analytical approaches to study modern wire-
less networks, which exploit the tools offered by game theory. Game theory is a branch of applied
mathematics that models the interaction among decision makers, each of them pursuing a personal ob-
jective, defines the solution concepts of such interaction and, based on them, provides analytical tools
to predict the outcomes. The ability to model independent decision makers, whose actions potentially
affect all other decision makers, renders game theory particularly attractive to analyze networking
issues. The earlier applications of game theory to wireless networks problems were limited to the
analysis of the impact of user selfishness on the performance of existing distributed algorithm. Only
recently have they been used in a constructive way: to design distributed protocols.
In this dissertation we present some contributions on the design of efficient game-theoretic schemes
in wireless networks. This research field can be divided into two main branches. In the first one, de-
vices connected to a wireless network are assumed to pursue the objectives assigned by the protocol.
Game theory is used to predict the outcomes for different sets of objectives and to design the objec-
tives that allow to achieve the most efficient outcomes. Notice that, in this case, devices are compliant
with the protocol rules, in that they accept passively the designed objectives, which may differ from
the objectives of the users that operate the devices. Such an approach may help to design distributed
algorithms, demonstrating and predicting the convergence of such algorithms, but does not answer
the initial question, i.e., what happens if the algorithm used by a device is manipulated to pursue a
personal benefit?
In the second branch, the devices connected to a wireless network are assumed to follow personal
objectives, which are aligned with the objectives of the users that operate the devices. In this case
game theory is used to design algorithms that are able to achieve efficient outcomes, despite the fact
that devices seek to optimize their personal objectives. Such an approach allows to design proto-
cols that provide the incentive to follow the rules: it will be in the self-interest of each user not to
manipulate the algorithm.
Except for Chapter 3, in which we follow the first approach, in this thesis we follow the second
approach, i.e., we assume that devices are autonomous decision makers that pursue their own interest,
and we design incentive schemes to drive the outcome of the system toward an efficient point, covering
aspects related to wireless communications at different levels.
which allows to program and use the desired MAC protocol. Such a capability of modifying protocols results in our
concerns for self-interested users in future wireless networks.
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1.1 Game Theory in Wireless Networks
The application of game theory to the modeling and analysis of wireless communication net-
works has received considerable attention in recent years, and has led to numerous tutorials [3–5]
and books [6, 7] outlining game-theoretic concepts and their usage in wireless networks. Wireless
communication networks are full of scenarios that can be modeled as games, examples are
• resource allocation [8–12]: sharing of the networks resources, such as channels, bandwidths
and time slots
• power control [13–16]: adjustment of the transmission power
• relay network [17–22]: opportunistic packet forwarding
• flow/congestion control [23–29]: adjustment of the rate to the available bandwidth of the net-
work
• network routing [30–33]: selection of paths with certain desirable properties
All these scenarios have in common the following features: (1) there is a set of users, (2) each
user takes some actions based on a certain objective, and (3) the achievement of the objective depends
on the actions taken by every users. As an example, in a flow control scenario each user connected
to a network may decide to modulate its transmission rate to achieve a desired trade-off between its
experienced throughput and delay. However, the delay depends on the total congestion of the network,
which in turn depends on the transmission rates adopted by every user. Thus, the best action for a
user depends on the actions adopted by the others, and it is not trivial to foresee the outcome of this
interaction: game-theoretic tools must be exploited to do it.
The earlier applications of game theory to wireless networks problems were limited to the com-
putation of the outcome of the interaction among selfish users adopting the existing schemes. This
analysis provides insights on how robust the considered scheme is in presence of selfish users. Un-
fortunately, the operation of the network by selfish users usually leads to substantial inefficiencies,
because the considered scheme has not been designed with this issue in mind. For example, [9–12]
shows that the IEEE 802.11, the slotted Aloha and the CSMA/CA MAC protocols can lead to inef-
ficient outcomes, if not to a network collapse. [31] demonstrates that the total latency of the routes
chosen by selfish network users is at most 43 times the minimum possible total latency if the latency
cost of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, but for general cost function the total latency
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can be arbitrarily larger than the minimum possible. [34] shows that most congestion control schemes
used, such as TCP, encourage a behavior that leads to congestion.
As a consequence, game theory was later applied by wireless engineers to design schemes able
to cope with users who behave selfishly. In these schemes incentives for the users to adopt efficient
actions are provided For example, pricing scheme that charge the users for their resource usage are
used by [35–39] to design efficient slotted-Aloha like random access protocols, and by [30, 40, 41] to
design efficient flow control management systems. Intervention schemes, in which a device provides
the incentive for the users to adopt efficient actions by threating punishments, are applied to situations
of medium access control [12, 42] and power control [16]. In [43, 44] efficient outcomes in power
control problems are obtained introducing hierarchy in the scheme, allowing some users to move
before others, and this is further advanced in [45] by considering a repeated interaction in which
cooperation among users is obtained by punishing deviating users in subsequent stages.
1.2 Organization and Contributions of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis work is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: we introduce some important concepts, notations and tools of game theory that are extensively
used in the dissertation. This chapter provides a useful background information for the remain-
ing part of the thesis, in particular for the reader who is not familiar with game theory.
Chapter 3: we propose a novel approach, based on game theory, for radio resource allocation in the down-
link of cellular networks using OFDMA. The reference technology is the LTE of the 3GPP
UTRAN. The main contribution is to identify a model for the allocation objectives, and how to
approach them in a tunable manner. The resource management issue is framed in the context
of spectrum sharing, where multiple entities agree on utilizing the radio access channel simul-
taneously. A trade-off between sum-rate throughput and fairness among the users is identified
and addressed through game theory, i.e., moving the operation of the system towards a stable
Pareto efficient point. Such a methodology can be implemented with low complexity while
ensuring the modularity of the overall system. Numerical results are also shown, to exemplify
the validity of the proposed approach.
Chapter 4: we apply game theory to constructively derive practical network management policies for wire-
less relay networks. We focus on the problem of medium sharing and opportunistic packet
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forwarding in wireless relay networks, and we show how, by properly modeling the agents in-
volved in such a scenario, and enabling simple but effective incentives towards cooperation for
the users, we obtain a resource allocation scheme which is meaningful from both perspectives
of game theory and network engineering. Such a result is achieved by introducing throughput
redistribution as a way to transfer utilities, which enables cooperation among the users.
Chapter 5: we analyze a scenario where two wireless ad hoc networks are willing to share some of their
nodes, acting as relays, in order to gain benefits in terms of lower packet delivery delay and
reduced loss probability. Bayesian Network analysis is exploited to compute the correlation
between local parameters and overall performance, whereas the selection of the nodes to share
is made by means of a game theoretic approach. Our results are then validated through use
of a system level simulator, which shows that an accurate selection of the shared nodes can
significantly increase the performance gain with respect to a random selection scheme.
Chapter 6: we consider a number of users who compete to gain access to a channel, a slotted-Aloha like
random access protocol and two incentive schemes: pricing and intervention. We provide some
criteria for the designer of the protocol to choose one scheme between them and to design the
best policy for the selected scheme, depending on the system parameters. Our results show that
intervention can achieve the maximum efficiency in the perfect monitoring scenario. In the im-
perfect monitoring scenario, instead, the performance of the system depends on the information
held by the different entities and, in some cases, there exists a threshold for the number of users
such that, for a number of users lower than the threshold, intervention outperforms pricing,
whereas, for a number of users higher than the threshold pricing outperforms intervention.
Chapter 7: we study the interaction between a designer and a group of strategic and self-interested users
who possess information the designer does not have. Because the users are strategic and self-
interested, they will act to their own advantage, which will often be different from the interest of
the designer, even if the designer is benevolent and seeks to maximize (some measure of) social
welfare. In the settings we consider, the designer and the users can communicate (perhaps with
noise), the designer can observe the actions of the users (perhaps with error) and the designer
can commit to (plans of) actions – interventions – of its own. The designer’s problem is to
construct and implement a mechanism that provides incentives for the users to communicate
and act in such a way as to further the interest of the designer – despite the fact that they are
strategic and self-interested and possess private information. To address the designer’s problem
we propose a general and flexible framework that applies to many scenarios. In an important
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class of environments, we find conditions under which the designer can obtain its benchmark
optimum – the utility that could be obtained if it had all information and could command the
actions of the users – and conditions under which it cannot. More broadly we are able to
characterize the solution to the designer’s problem, even when it does not yield the benchmark
optimum. Because the optimal mechanism may be difficult to construct and implement, we also
propose a simpler and more readily-implemented mechanism that, while falling short of the
optimum, still yields the designer a "good" result. We then apply our framework and results to
design a flow control management system, in both the complete and the incomplete information
scenarios. Illustrative results show that the considered schemes can considerably improve the
efficiency of the network.
Chapter 8: concludes the thesis with some remarks.
Chapter 2
Game Theory Preliminaries
This chapter introduces some important concepts, notations and tools of game theory. This is
not meant to be a comprehensive and in-depth guide of game theory, for which we refer the inter-
ested reader to standard books such as [46–50], rather we lay the mathematical groundwork for the
subsequent sections. The reader who is already familiar with game theory may want to skip this
chapter.
2.1 Basic Concepts
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that attempts to capture rational behaviors in
strategic situations – called games – in which an individual’s success in making choices depends
on the choices of others. This interdependence causes each individual – called player – to consider
the other player’s possible decisions – or strategies – in formulating his own strategy. Traditional
applications of game theory assume that players are self-interested and strategic, meaning that they
pursue a personal objective and they are aware of all consequences of their actions, and seek to
find equilibria in these games: a sets of strategies in which players are unlikely to change their
behavior. Many equilibrium concepts have been developed in an attempt to capture this idea. These
equilibrium concepts, although they often overlap or coincide, are motivated differently depending on
the considered scenario and on the game formulation. In the following sections we describe the game
formulations, and the corresponding equilibrium concepts, that are of interest for this dissertation.
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2.2 Static Games with Complete Information
In the most straightforward game formulation, each player selects a single action from a set of
feasible actions, and each player evaluates the resulting outcome through a utility function quantify-
ing the goodness coming from the adopted actions. If the players play the actions simultaneously
(alternatively, one can think that they play the actions in different instants, but without knowledge of
the actions played by the others), the game is said to be static. If the action sets and the utilities of all
players are common knowledge among the players, the game is said to be with complete information.
Formally, a static game with complete information Γ can be represented by the tuple
Γ = (N,A, {Ui}
n
i=1)
in which N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, labeled from 1 to n, A = A1 × . . . × An is the set
of action profiles, Ai is the set of actions player i can take, and Ui is player i’s utility function – or
utility for short. We write (ai, a−i) for the action profile in which player i chooses action ai ∈ Ai
and other players choose the action profile a−i ∈ A−i = A1 × . . . × Ai−1 × Ai+1 . . . × An; this
is a common notation to specify a characteristic associated to all players except for player i, we use
similar notations throughout the thesis. The utility Ui : A→ < depends on the actions of all players,
thus each player seeking to maximize his own utility has to consider the other player’s possible actions
in selecting his own action.
We say that an action ai is weakly dominated by a′i (equivalently, a′i weakly dominates ai) if
player i’s utility playing a′i is greater than or equal to player i’s utility playing ai, for any actions of
the other players, i.e.,
Ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ Ui(ai, a−i) , ∀ a−i ∈ A−i
If the inequality is strict, then we say that ai is strictly dominated by a′i (equivalently, a′i strictly
dominates ai). If an action weakly (strictly) dominates every other action, we say that it is a weakly
(strictly) dominant action. It is quite obvious that a selfish and strategic player i would never adopt
an action ai which is strictly dominated by an action a′i, because action a′i alway guarantees him
a higher utility. Thus, from a practical point of view, action ai can be eliminated from the set Ai.
This procedure can be iterated and the same player i or other players can eliminate other strictly
dominated actions1. This procedure is called iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and
1Notice that, in doing so, a player j 6= i may discover that the action aj ∈ Aj is strictly dominated by another action
only after having eliminated action ai ∈ Ai. This implicitly extends the notion of common knowledge: not only do players
know the action sets and the utilities of the others, but they also know that all players are self-interested and strategic, and
all players know that all players know, etc.
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can be useful to obtain a "smaller" game or, in the rare cases in which only a single action profile is
left, to compute the most likely outcome of a game.
2.2.1 Nash equilibrium
We define the best response function hBRi (though correspondence would be a more suitable
name) of a player i as the set of player i’s actions that maximize player i’s utility for a given action
profile of the other players, i.e., hBRi (a−i) = argmaxai Ui(ai, a−i). We say that the action ai is a
best response to the actions profile a−i if ai ∈ hBRi (a−i).
Now we have the instruments to define one of the most important and best known concept of
game theory: the Nash Equilibrium (NE). A NE is an action profile that corresponds to the mutual
best response: for each player i, the action selected is a best response to the actions of all others.
Equivalently, a NE is an action profile where no individual player can benefit from unilateral devia-
tion, and for this reason it is said to be self–enforcing or strategically stable. Formally, aNE is a NE
if
Ui(a
NE
i , a
NE
−i ) ≥ Ui(ai, a
NE
−i ) , ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ ai ∈ Ai
The action profiles corresponding to the Nash equilibria are a consistent prediction of the outcome of
the game, in the sense that if all players predict that a NE will occur then no player has any incentive
to choose a different action. For this reason a NE is commonly regarded as a solution concept of a
game.
A Nash equilibrium may not exist, unless particular classes of games are considered2 , and there
can be multiple Nash equilibria in a game, resulting in the issue on how players coordinate to a
particular Nash equilibrium.
Another issue related to the NE (and to all equilibrium concepts we will define), which is of
particular importance for this dissertation, is its efficiency: usually a NE does not correspond to an
efficient outcome for a game. Pareto optimality is often used as a reference point for the efficiency
of an outcome. An action profile is Pareto optimal if there is no other action profile that makes every
player at least as well off while making at least one player better off. Formally, a = (a1, . . . , an) is
2In some contexts players are allowed to randomize their actions, i.e., each player i adopts an action ai ∈ Ai following
the strategy si ∈ ∆(Ai) which represents a probability distribution over the set Ai (if Ai has cardinality |Ai|, ∆(Ai)
denotes the |Ai| − 1 unit simplex). These types of strategies are commonly called mixed strategies. In this case, each
player is assumed to select a strategy that maximizes the expectation of his utility over the random action profile. For this
particular situation the Nash theorem [49], which is an application of the Kakutani fixed-point theorem [51] to the best
response functions, guarantees the existence of a NE.
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Pareto optimal if there exists no other action profile a′ = (a′1, . . . , a′n) such that Ui(a′) ≥ Ui(a)∀ i ∈
N and Uj(a′) > Uj(a) for some j ∈ N . In an attempt to quantify the inefficiency of a game, the
concept of Price of Anarchy has been introduced. After defining an efficiency measure for the players
utilities (natural candidates are sum of utilities, or minimum utility, or some other measure of fairness
among the utilities), the price of anarchy is defined as the ratio between the "worst" equilibrium and
the "best" action profile – worst and best with respect to the efficiency measure considered. Notice
that if the efficiency measure is increasing in each player utility, then the best action profile must be
Pareto optimal.
2.3 Bayesian Games
There are many familiar situations in which some of the players are not certain about the charac-
teristics of some of the other players. Bayesian games are designed for this purpose, to model static
games with incomplete information. In Bayesian games each player is assumed to maximize his ex-
pected utility with respect to the unknown parameters. This implicitly assumes that each player has a
prior belief about the characteristics of the other players.
Formally, a generic player i is characterized by an element of a set Ti of types; a player’s type
encodes all relevant information about the player, which will include the player’s utility function and
the influence the player’s type has on other players and on the designer. We write T = T1 × . . .× Tn
for the set of possible type profiles. Players know their own type; players and the designer know the
distribution of player types pi (a probability distribution on T ).3 If player i is of type ti then pi(· | ti)
is the conditional distribution of types of other players. We allow for the possibility that types are
correlated, which might be the case, for instance, if players have private information about the current
state of the world and not only about themselves.
Finally, we can formalize a Bayesian game Γ by the tuple
Γ = (N,A, T, pi, {Ui}
n
i=1)
in which N , A and Ui are the player set, action profile set and player i’s utility respectively. Player
i’s utility Ui : A× Ti → < depends on the actions of all players and on player i’s type.
We define a strategy for player i as a function gi : Ti → Ai that specifies which action to take,
conditional on the type of player i. We may think of the type as given to the player at the beginning
of the game, and the strategy tells which action he will adopt after being assigned a type. In general,
3We usually think of the distribution pi as common knowledge but this is not entirely necessary.
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a strategy for a player encodes all the strategic aspects of a game, while an action represents only a
particular move (these two concepts coincide only for a static game with complete information).
In a Bayesian game each player is assumed to maximize his expected (with respect to the types of
the other players) utility EUi, which is a function of the strategy of all players and on player i’s type.
Given a strategy profile g = (g1, . . . , gn) and a type ti, EUi is given by
EUi(g, ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i | ti)Ui(g(t), ti)
where g(t) = (g1(t), . . . , gn(t)).
An important solution concept for a Bayesian game is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE),
i.e., the Nash equilibrium applied to the expected utilities. A BNE is the strategy profile where no
individual player can benefit (in terms of expected utility) from unilateral deviation. Formally, gBNE
is a BNE if
EUi(g
BNE
i , g
BNE
−i , ti) ≥ EUi(gi, g
BNE
−i , ti) , ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ ti ∈ Ti, ∀ gi : Ti → Ai
2.4 Stackelberg Games
A natural extension of static games are dynamic games, in which players are allowed to take
actions sequentially. Before analyzing the dynamic games in general, we consider a simple dynamic
game: the Stackelberg game.
A Stackelberg game is a 2-player game in which players move alternatively: first player 1 – the
leader – then player 2 – the follower. As usual, both players are characterized by the action sets
A1 and A2 and the utilities U1 : A → < and U2 : A → <, A = A1 × A2. We assume that this
information is common knowledge among the players (i.e., complete information scenario), and we
assume that player 2 can observe the move of player 1 before selecting his own action (this property
is known as perfect information, we will formally define it in the next section). The strategy s1 for
player 1 coincides with the action he adopts, while the strategy s2 for players 2 describes which action
to adopt conditional on the action adopted by player 1, s2 : A1 → A2.
A Stackelberg game can conveniently be represented by a tree, as in Fig. 2.1, where the nodes
represent the players allowed to move in that stage of the game and the links represent the actions
the players can adopt. Following a particular path, i.e., given the actions adopted by the players, we
end up in a particular leaf of the three, represented by a pair of numbers, which specify the utilities
obtained by players 1 and 2 respectively.
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A possible solution concept of a Stackelberg game is represented by a NE. However, Nash Equi-
libria can also include unlikely outcomes. For instance, a NE of the Stackelberg game represented in
Fig. 2.1 is s1 = a1, s2(a1) = a2, and s2(a′1) = a2. Following this strategy player 1 and 2 obtain a
utility respectively of 1 and 2. It is easy to see that this is a NE because no player could gain from
deviating unilaterally: if player 1 changes his strategy (keeping fixed player 2’s strategy) he would
obtain a utility of 0; if player 2 changes his strategy (keeping fixed player 1’s strategy) he would
obtain a utility of 2 if s2(a1) = a2 (i.e., he only changes s2(a′1)), or 0 if s2(a1) = a′2. However,
this equilibrium is based on the threat that player 2 adopts action a2 if player 1 adopts action a′1. In
situations in which player 2 cannot commit to a particular strategy, this threat is not credible, and this
NE is unlikely to happen. In fact, player 1 can foresee that the strategy player 2 will probably adopt is
s2(a1) = a2 and s2(a′1) = a′2, and consequently select the action a′1 which is his best strategy given
the predicted strategy for player 2. The strategy profile obtained in this way, which is still a NE, is
called Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE).
A SE is a refinement of a NE in Stackelberg games, and is obtained by means of backward in-
duction: first the SE strategy of player 2, sSE2 , is computed maximizing U2 for each action of player
1, then the SE strategy of player 1, sSE1 , is obtained maximizing U1 given sSE2 . Since this proce-
dure requires a double maximization, the existence (but not the uniqueness) of the SE is guaranteed.
Stackelberg games are commonly extended to situations in which a player moves first and the others
move later. For the analysis of this type of games we refer the reader to the next section.
2.5 Dynamic Games
A dynamic game involves players moving sequentially. This means that we describe games taking
place through stages. Dynamic games can conveniently be represented by trees, similarly to Fig. 2.1.
We consider only dynamic games with complete information. If, in each stage of the game, the
acting player knows the history of the game, we say that the game is with perfect information. If
information is imperfect it means that some moves are simultaneous. For this reason we focus only
on perfect information games, possibly allowing for simultaneous actions in some of the stages.
In a dynamic game, a player’s strategy specifies the action to take in each stage, for each history
of play through previous stages. We can regard any stage of a dynamic game as a static game, chosen
among a number of possible alternatives (one per each game history!). However, the acting players
must take into account how their actions in that stage influence the evolution of the game. After t
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Figure 2.1. Representation of a Stackelberg game
stages, a subgame takes place from stage t + 1 onwards. The whole game can be considered as a
subgame of itself.
We say that a Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is subgame-perfect if the players’ strategies
constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement
of the NE that takes into account the credibility of the threats. It can be seen as an extension of the
SE to more complex dynamic games (the two equilibrium concepts coincide in Stackelberg games).
The backward induction procedure can be applied to compute a SPE: first a NE of the last stage
is computed, then given this a NE of the second-last stage is computed, etc. Since at each step a
NE computation is required, a SPE may not exists. However, if at each stage of the game only one
player is allowed to play, the NE computation simplifies in a maximization (like in the Stackelberg
game considered in the previous section), and the existence (but not the uniqueness) of the SPE is
guaranteed.
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2.6 Repeated Games
An interesting and well-understood class of dynamic games is that of repeated games. In a re-
peated game ΓR the players play the same stage game Γ repeatedly, and the player’s overall utility is
a weighted average of the utilities in each stage. Repeated play introduces in general new equilibrium
outcomes with respect to the stage game, because players can condition their play on the information
they have received in the past. In this way a player has to take into account the effect of his current
action on the other players’ future behavior.
There exist two distinct versions of repeated games: finitely repeated games and infinitely re-
peated games. In finitely repeated games the stage game is played for a fixed number of times. The
arithmetic mean of the utilities in each stage is usually adopted to quantify the overall utility of a
player at the end of the game. If the stage game has a unique NE it is easy to check, using the back-
ward induction, that the finitely repeated game has a unique SPE: to play the NE of the stage game
in every stage. In fact, in the last stage players will play the unique NE of the stage game. In the
second-last stage, given that in the last stage players will for sure play the unique NE, players will
play again the unique NE of the stage game. And so on. More interesting is the situation if the single
stage game has multiple Nash equilibria. In this case, for example, players can "agree" to play the
"best" NE in the last stage if in the second-last stage they have adopted an efficient action profile
(which might not be a NE of the stage game), to play the "worst" NE otherwise.
In infinitely repeated games the stage game is played infinitely. To quantify the utility URi of a
player i at the end of the game, the average utility URi = (1− δ) limT→+∞
∑T
t=1 δ
t−1U
(t)
i is usually
adopted, where U (t)i is the utility obtained by player i at stage t and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
The discount factor is introduced mainly for mathematical reasons, but it can be useful to capture
situations in which an imminent reward is better than a future reward, or in which each player can
exit from the game with a certain probability. For infinitely repeated games there exists an important
theorem, Friedman’s theorem (also known as folk theorem), which states what the players can obtain
with SPE strategies. We define a feasible utility as any convex combination of the utility obtainable
in the single stage game, and let (UNE1 , . . . , UNEn ) be the utility obtainable with a NE of the single
stage game. Let (U1, . . . , Un) be a feasible utility such that Ui > UNEi , ∀ i ∈ N . Friedman’s theorem
states that, if δ is close enough to 1, the infinitely repeated game has a SPE in which players obtain
utilities EU = (EU1, . . . , EUn) = (U1, . . . , Un). The intuition behind it is the adoption of a dynamic
strategy in which the players adopt by default, for a certain number of stages, a certain action profile,
and then change to another action profile, and so on. In this way any convex combination of the utility
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of the stage game can be obtained. As soon as a generic player i deviates from this "agreement", the
other players punish it by adopting the NE action profile of the stage game for a certain number of
stages. The condition Ui > UNEi guarantees that the final utility foreseen for player i is higher than
the utility player i would obtain during the punishment stages. The duration of the punishment can be
set so that the gain obtained during the deviating stage does not compensate the loss incurred during
the subsequent stages. Notice that a smaller δ makes the punishment less effective to deter deviations,
from which the condition that δ must be close enough to 1.
2.7 Coalitional Games
Cooperative game theory is a branch of game theory that provides analytical tools to study the
behavior of self-interested and strategic players when they try to find an "agreement" to cooperate.
The main area of cooperative games is represented by coalitional games [52], defined as a pair
(N, v), where N = 1, ..., n is a discrete set of players and v is a function that quantifies the value
of a coalition in a game. Each coalition S ⊆ N behaves as a single player, competing against other
coalitions in order to obtain a higher value of v. A coalitional game may have the following properties:
Property 1. (Characteristic form) The value of a coalition S depends only on who are the members
of that coalition, regardless of other coalitions
Property 2. (Transferable utility) The value of a coalition is a real number, representing the total
utility achieved by the coalition, and it can be arbitrarily divided among its members
For coalitional games satisfying properties 1 and 2, the value v : 2N → < is a function that assigns
to each coalition S the total utility achieved by it. The utility value can be arbitrarily divided among
the coalition members and the amount of utility that a player i ∈ S receives, xi, is the player’s payoff.
A payoff allocation is a vector x ∈ <|S| (where | S | is the cardinality of the set S) whose elements
are the payoffs of players belonging to the coalition; in other words, it represents a redistribution of
the total utility.
Another interesting property that a coalitional game may have is super-additivity, that for a game
with properties 1 and 2 assumes the following form:
Property 3. (Super-additivity)
v(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ v(S1) + v(S2) ∀S1, S2 ⊂ N s.t. S1 ∩ S2 = ∅
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The super-additivity property expresses in mathematical terms that formation of a larger coalition
is always beneficial. Hence, for those games where it holds, the players are encouraged to stick
together, forming the grand coalition N .
For a game having all properties listed before, the main aspects to analyze are:
• finding a redistribution of the total utility v(N) such that the grand coalition is stable, i.e., no
group of players has an incentive to leave the grand coalition
• finding fairness criteria for the redistribution of the total utility
• quantifying the gain that the grand coalition can obtain with respect to non cooperative behav-
iors
A payoff allocation is group rational if
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N) and it is individually rational if xi ≥
v({i}) ∀i, i.e., if every player does not obtain a lower utility by cooperating than by acting alone. A
payoff allocation having both properties is said to be an imputation.
The concept of core, C, is also very important. It is defined as the set of imputations that guarantee
that the grand coalition is stable, i.e., all payoff allocations where no group of players S ⊂ N have an
incentive to refuse the proposed payoff allocation, leaving the grand coalition and forming coalition
S instead. Mathematically,
C=
{
x s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = v(N) ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N
}
(2.1)
Indeed, the core may be empty, in which case the grand coalition is not stable. The existence of
the core ought to be checked case by case, possibly exploiting some categories of games where the
existence is guaranteed [47, Ch. 13].
Chapter 3
Exploiting Game Theory for Resource
Allocation in LTE Systems
In this chapter1 we propose a novel approach, based on game theory, for radio resource allocation
in the downlink of cellular networks using OFDMA. The reference technology is the LTE of the
3GPP UTRAN. The main contribution is to identify a model for the allocation objectives, and how
to approach them in a tunable manner. The resource management issue is framed in the context of
spectrum sharing, where multiple entities agree on utilizing the radio access channel simultaneously.
A trade-off between sum-rate throughput and fairness among the users is identified and addressed
through game theory, i.e., moving the operation of the system towards a stable Pareto efficient point.
Such a methodology can be implemented with low complexity while ensuring the modularity of the
overall system. Numerical results are also shown, to exemplify the validity of the proposed approach.
3.1 Introduction
Cellular wireless systems have been able to improve their transmission rates, so as to reach “high
speed” communication, thanks to the introduction of channel-aware radio resource allocation. This
means that packet scheduling and the corresponding assignment of physical layer resources are dy-
namically performed according to the channel conditions and Quality of Service (QoS) experienced
by the users.
1The material presented in this chapter has been published in:
[C1] L. Anchora, L. Badia, L. Canzian, and M. Zorzi, “A Characterization of Resource Allocation in LTE Systems Aimed
at Game Theoretical Approaches,” in Proc. IEEE CAMAD, Miami, FL, USA, Dec. 3-4, 2010
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An important scenario where this principle finds application is represented by the Long Term
Evolution (LTE) of Third Generation (3G) systems [53]. In this technology, the multiple access
scheme in the downlink uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA). Such a
technology exploits multiple orthogonal subcarriers which can be used to take advantage of multi-
user diversity [54]. However, given the key role played by the physical layer and the correlation of
channel quality, the principles of a fair scheduling of multiple users are difficult to harmonize with
the efficient resource allocation aiming at maximizing throughput.
In this chapter, along the lines of [55], we utilize a modular representation of the radio resource
management procedure which is split between two functional entities, i.e., a credit-based scheduler
and the actual resource allocator, operating at the transport layer and the medium access layer, re-
spectively. The scheduler determines which packets, taken from different flows, are candidates to
be served in the next allocation round. The resource allocator associates the packets with groups of
OFDMA subcarriers, also accessed in a time division fashion, so that the resources to allocate are
time/frequency resource blocks. In this choice, the resource allocator exploits a degree of freedom,
represented by the number of packets selected by the scheduler (larger than the number of slots).
The resulting allocation can be regulated according to a trade-off between two contrasting objec-
tives, i.e., that of throughput maximization, which is achieved by selecting the packets only according
to a channel quality rationale, and fairness among the flows, which requires to pursue equity among
the achieved rates. Indeed, this trade-off is reflected by the number of packets selected by the sched-
uler: when it is minimum, i.e., only the packets that fit the OFDMA frame are selected, all packets
are mandatorily allocated, and the resource allocator has no choice. Here the allocation is only de-
termined by the credit-based scheduler, which ensures fairness (the users with higher credits are
allocated). Conversely, if the number of selected packets is high, the resource allocator can restrict
the selection to the packets of the users with the best quality, entirely neglecting any fairness among
flows. Therefore, to solve the trade-off we present an original approach based on game theory which
tries to combine both objectives in an efficient yet easy to implement manner. The key idea is to
treat the scheduler and the resource allocator as two players of a non-cooperative game. The resulting
Nash equilibria are considered as possible solutions to the radio management problem, which exhibit
a low computational cost, yet, under certain conditions, satisfactory performance. After discussing
the proposed approach and its possible implementation, we also present some simple numerical eval-
uations for a two-person game which confirm the goodness of our approach and its ability to regulate
the trade-off in a Pareto efficient allocation point.
Note that the scheduler and the resource allocator are part of a system operated by the same entity,
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that has a unique objective. We remark that in this chapter game theory is used to obtain a non-optimal
but simple to implement algorithm, that preserves the modularity of the system. Conversely, in the
following chapters we will exploit game theory to analyze the interaction between entities having
different objectives.
The outline of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1.1 outlines related approaches
presented in the literature. Section 3.2 describes the properties of the LTE technology and discusses
the layered characterization we gave to the resource allocation procedure. Section 3.3 introduces
our proposal, whose rationale is based on game theory, which is used to determine a trade-off be-
tween throughput efficiency and fairness among the users. Supporting numerical results are shown in
Section 3.4 and we conclude in Section 3.5.
3.1.1 Related work
Adaptive multi-user multi-carrier allocation schemes based on instantaneous channel state in-
formation in OFDMA systems allow significant performance improvements in terms of allocation
efficiency. This happens thanks to the exploitation of the multiuser diversity principle, where subcar-
riers are preferably assigned to users experiencing favorable subchannel conditions and higher order
modulation can be used to transport more bits per OFDMA symbol.
In chapter we focus on the resource allocation optimization problem in OFDMA downlink sys-
tems with perfect channel state information at the base station. In the literature there is no unique
formulation for this type of problem. The most common formulation is the weighted sum rate maxi-
mization subject to some transmit-power constraints. For any fixed subchannel assignment, the opti-
mal solution is achieved by multilevel waterfilling [56] for the continuous rate case (channel capacity
is considered) and greedy or bisection allocation algorithms [57] for the integer-bit constellation case
(bit rate constrained to real modulation schemes). When equal weights are considered, the optimal
subchannel assignment is simply obtained by giving each subchannel to the user with the best gain
to noise ratio [56]. This is called the max-sum-capacity rule, which results in the most efficient use
of the resources in terms of throughput but can lead to unfairness and instability, especially for non-
symmetrical channel conditions and non-uniform traffic patterns [54]. However, in the general case,
finding the optimal subchannel assignment is a combinatorial problem whose complexity increases
exponentially with the number of subcarriers. To find an efficient suboptimal algorithm, [56] consid-
ers a convex relaxation method, allowing time sharing in each subchannel. In this way the problem
becomes convex and can be solved in polynomial time using interior-point methods. A further reduc-
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tion in computational complexity is achieved considering a constant power for the used subchannels.
In [58] a solution of the problem is efficiently computed using Lagrange dual decomposition and
considering that the duality gap is zero when the number of subcarriers tends to infinity. Previously
described works consider continuous rate adaptation. An additional constraint is added in [53] taking
into account that real communication systems rely on integer-bit constellations. Moreover, since LTE
is considered, the modulation and coding scheme for a given user has been considered fixed during
a scheduling period. Also in this case the problem is combinatorial and a sub-optimal algorithm has
been designed to reduce the computational complexity.
Another way of tackling the problem is power minimization subject to rate constraints for each
user. In [58], similar to the weighted sum rate maximization, the Lagrange dual decomposition
method has been proposed. In [59] an integer-bit constellation is considered and the power has been
assumed to be a convex and increasing function of the bit rate (most popular coding and modulation
schemes satisfy this condition). Due to the combinatorial nature of the problem, a convex relaxation
has been used to obtain a sub-optimal solution.
Another approach is proposed in [60] where a fairness constraint is taken into account: the small-
est capacity among all users is maximized, subject to a total transmit-power constraint. Variable bit
rate traffic is considered, but the formulation can be slightly modified to consider constant bit rate
traffic. This objective function can lead to inefficiencies if some users experience deeply faded sub-
channels. In [54], in order to support delay-sensitive applications, an approach that maximizes the
total utility with respect to mean queue delays is proposed. Also in these last works, suboptimal
solutions are computed due to the combinatorial nature of the problem. Finally, we cite the propor-
tional fair scheduling [54], that aims at maximizing the logarithm of the average data rates to trade
off spectrum efficiency and fairness among users.
To sum up, it is difficult to formulate the desired optimization goal and constraints for the multi-
user multi-carrier allocation problem, in particular when mixed traffic with different QoS require-
ments is considered. Also, the set selection nature of the sub-carrier allocation leads to a combinato-
rial problem that requires an exhaustive search, with exponentially increasing complexity. Simplified
approaches must be considered to design real time algorithms exploiting instantaneous subchannel
information. This motivates us to consider an approach that does not claim optimality with respect to
a subjective utility function, but rather is computationally lightweight and able to find a good trade-
off between aggregate performance (in terms of throughput/spectrum efficiency) and fairness among
flows.
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3.2 Overview of LTE and System Model
LTE is a set of improvements to the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
introduced in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Release 8 [61]. It represents efficient
packet-based radio access networks allowing high throughput, low latency and low operating costs.
Small enhancements have been introduced on LTE specifications in Release 9 [62]. The next step for
LTE evolution is LTE Advanced which is currently being standardized in Release 10 [63], the major
candidate technology for the so-called International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT)-Advanced.
Rel-8 LTE adopts OFDMA in the downlink for its robustness against multipath interference and
to allow a high spectral efficiency exploiting time and frequency dependent scheduling and Multiple
Input Multiple Output (MIMO) techniques. In the uplink, in order to maintain user orthogonality in
the frequency domain, a Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) is adopted.
Rel-8 LTE supports both Frequency Division Duplexing (FDD) and Time Division Duplexing (TDD)
and uses multiple transmission bandwidths (i.e., 1.4, 3, 5, 10, 15 and 20 MHz) and multiple modu-
lation schemes (i.e., QPSK, 16QAM and 64QAM) allowing peak rates of 300 Mb/s in downlink and
75 Mb/s in uplink.
We consider now the scheduling degree of freedom for the downlink of Rel-8 LTE. The basic unit
of resource is the resource block, which is made of 12 adjacent subcarriers (15 kHz of subcarrier spac-
ing) and has a duration of 0.5 ms (one slot), which correspond to 6 or 7 OFDM symbols depending
on the cyclic prefix length chosen (4.7 µs or 16.7 µs). The scheduling block is the smallest resource
unit that the scheduler can assign. It is made of two consecutive resource blocks, and therefore has
a duration of 1 ms (one subframe). During the duration of a scheduling period, which is equal to
the duration of a scheduling block (i.e., 1 ms), the modulation and coding scheme must be fixed for
each user in the non MIMO configuration. For the MIMO configuration, a maximum of two different
modulation and coding schemes can be used for data belonging to two different transport blocks [53].
LTE Advanced is a further evolution of LTE Release 8 and 9 which is supposed to meet the
requirements for IMT-Advanced and enhance them to future operator and user needs. It shall sup-
port a wider transmission bandwidth using both contiguous and non-contiguous carrier aggregation,
achieving flexible spectrum usage while maintaining backward compatibility with Rel-8. Moreover,
it shall enhance multi-antenna and Coordinated Multi-Point transmission/reception techniques. These
improvements are expected to allow peak rates of 1 Gb/s in downlink and 500 Mb/s in uplink.
Different radio resource management strategies are required for organizing and bringing together
multiple users and letting them receive data in an LTE system (note: we are considering the downlink,
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which is the only direction using OFDMA multiplexing). In particular, multiple flows directed to the
users are to be coordinated, so that a number of packets are selected for possible transmission from
each flow. In the following, this operation will be referred to as scheduling. However, according to
the above discussion, actual transmission requires to match the selected packets to a given resource
block in a channel-aware fashion. Thus, it is necessary to eventually select which resources to utilize
for the selected packets. Such an operation will be referred to as resource allocation.
The design of policies for resource management is intentionally left open in the standards to allow
developers to implement their own strategy of choice. However, in the following we adopt a two-fold
model where scheduling and resource allocation are managed by two different modules: a scheduler,
operating at the transport layer (thereby possibly distinguishing among different kinds of traffic) and
a resource allocator, which actually implements the Medium Access Control (MAC) sublayer. The
scheduler determines which packets must be passed to the allocator and their order according to an
internal scheduling policy. The allocator selects for transmission a subset of them with the aim of
maximizing the advantages of multiuser diversity. In this case only a loose cross-layer is introduced,
guaranteeing a certain modularity between scheduler and Radio Resource Allocator (RRA).
In particular, we call L the number of resource blocks that the resource allocator is entitled to
assign. This is subject to a constraint L ≤ Lmax, where Lmax is a maximum value which corresponds
to assigning every resource block. For simplicity, we consider that, to limit the interference caused to
the neighboring cells, L is set to a fixed value which is less than or equal to Lmax. The value assigned
to L is communicated to the scheduler by the resource allocator. Actually, this represents a form of
cross-layer interaction among the modules, which is intentionally kept to a minimum level, thereby
promoting modularity and tunability of the approach.
Upon knowing L, the scheduler determines a number D of packets to send to the resource allo-
cator, where in general D ≥ L. The exact choice of D influences the entire allocation. As a matter
of fact, if D = L, the resource allocator has no degree of freedom as to which packets to allocate
(while, obviously, it must allocate the packets to the best channels as perceived by the users). By
increasing D, the resource allocator can achieve a higher throughput by selecting only L packets out
of D, according to a channel-aware policy, although at the price of a possibly decreased fairness.
3.3 Proposed Game Theoretic Approach
The choice ofD determines a trade-off between the possible objectives of throughput and fairness.
We now present a game-theoretic approach to set D; we remark that the main point of our discussion
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does not lie in optimizing the performance of the resulting algorithm, which is left for future research.
Rather, our proposed methodology enables a dynamic setup of D without any need for a preliminary
evaluation, e.g., where D is set to some arbitrary value, of the possible equilibria of the system,
nor it is required to re-compute the system equilibria if the network and channel conditions change.
Instead, the choice of D is directly derived from the definitions of the contrasting utilities between
which a trade-off is sought (specifically, throughput and fairness). Together with the separation of the
resource management process into two functional entities (scheduler and RRA), this is key to achieve
a computationally efficient online allocation strategy.
In our formulation, the scheduler (player 1) and the RRA (player 2) are represented as players of
a game whose aim is the decision of the value for D. Both players make a proposal sj , with j = 1, 2,
respectively. The idea is that, if proposals s1 and s2 coincide, D is selected as their common value.
However, the choice of s1 and s2 is also done according to the utility of the proposer, i.e., the fairness
for the scheduler and the throughput for the RRA, respectively.
In the following, we introduce some assumptions for the sake of simplicity in the exposition.
We consider a network scenario with only two users (i.e., two flows); this is not to be confused
with the two “virtual” players of the game, i.e., the scheduler and the resource allocator. Besides, this
assumption is just made for ease of implementation in the simulator, but can be relaxed quite naturally
to scenarios with n > 2 users. We model the system as a static game with complete information, as
follows:
• the players are the scheduler and the RRA.
• their action spaces are the set of values of D that can be proposed, i.e. S1 = S2 = {L,L +
1, ..., 2L}.
• both utilities are 0 if the proposals s1 and s2 do not coincide, i.e., there is no agreement on the
value of D.
• when s1 = s2, the utilities are assigned to fairness F (s1, s2) for the scheduler, measured using
Jain’s index [64] (see Eq. 4.13 for a formal definition of the Jain’s index), and the throughput
T (s1, s2) for the RRA.
The last point is arbitrary, as other definitions can be used; the important requirement is that
F (s, s) and T (s, s) are decreasing and increasing in s, respectively. The game is represented in
Fig. 3.1 through a matrix whose cells contain pairs of real numbers (therefore called a bi-matrix),
representing the utilities obtained by the scheduler and th
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Resource Allocator
Scheduler
L L+1 .... 2L
L 1, Tmin 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
L+ 1 0, 0 ... 0, 0 0, 0
... 0, 0 0, 0 ... 0, 0
2L 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 12 , Tmax
Figure 3.1. Bi-matrix representation of the game
– different actions of the scheduler are represented by different rows and different actions of the RRA
are represented by different columns. The fairness is a decreasing function of D: its maximum value
is 1 while the minimum is 1/2 (i.e., 1/n where n is the number of flows). On the other hand, the
throughput is an increasing function of D varying in the range [Tmin, Tmax], where Tmin is achieved
when no degree of freedom is given to the allocator, while Tmax is obtained when the RRA has enough
freedom to allocate only the best L resources. Both maximum throughput and minimum fairness are
reached for D = 2L, under the assumption that there are always at least L packets available for
selection by the scheduler from each queue. All the strategies along the diagonal are Pareto efficient
Nash equilibria.
To determine a trade-off point, we propose an algorithm which tries to automatically estimate
an efficient value of D for each frame. The value is chosen considering the past proposals, thus we
change the model into a a repeated game with perfect information. The aim is to reach an acceptable
level for both utilities after a number of repetitions. Note that this proposed algorithm is just an
example and can be replaced by other analogous procedures.
1) Both scheduler and RRA randomly pick a value for D.
2) If the choices coincide, D is set and the game ends, otherwise a bargaining phase goes on until a
common point is chosen. Every time the players disagree, both get zero utility.
3) The goal of each round of the loop is moving towards the diagonal of the bi-matrix step-by-step.
Each player decides whether or not to change its previous proposal based on its level of satisfaction
(i.e., the ratio between the value actually achieved and the maximum achievable). The higher the
satisfaction, the higher the probability that a player changes its choice with a value more convenient
for the other. If S_D and RRA_D are the proposals for D made by the scheduler and the allocator,
respectively, and S_s and RRA_s the respective levels of satisfaction when the game is played, we
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select the changes as follows.
— If S_D > RRA_D, we are in the lower triangle of the matrix. We can move towards the diagonal
by going up (decrement of S_D), or right (increment of RRA_D), or in both directions. For both
players, these options lead to higher values in their own utility function to the detriment of the other’s,
thus the willingness to change should be a decreasing function of the respective satisfaction level.
Thus, we select
Prob{S_D up} = 1− S_s (3.1)
Prob{RRA_D right} = 1−RRA_s (3.2)
— If S_D < RRA_D, we are in the upper triangle of the matrix. The diagonal can be reached by
going down (S_D increment), or left (RRA_D decrement), or in both directions. The situation is
now reversed, as a deviation in its own action implies a reduction in the utility of each player in favor
of the other’s. Therefore, the probability of moving must be an increasing function of the respective
satisfaction, which is obtained for example by choosing
Prob{S_D down} = S_s (3.3)
Prob{RRA_D left} = RRA_s (3.4)
In this manner, we define an algorithm whose goal is to lead the choice of D towards an interme-
diate value which offers both good throughput and satisfactory fairness.
3.4 Numerical Results
We ran evaluations within a simple LTE simulator to verify the ability of the proposed approach
to converge towards a trade-off among the utility functions of the two players. All the performance
indices are characterized by a confidence interval of 95% with a maximum relative error of 5%.
We developed and used a simple asynchronous event-driven simulator, written in C++, which re-
produces a base station transmitting to two different mobile users. The base station contains a packet
scheduler with two queues (one for each user) and an RRA module. The scheduler is credit-based
and tries to guarantee fairness by selecting packets from the queues according to their residual credit.
Flows are assumed to have always backlogged traffic. The RRA manages the resource allocation ac-
cording to a greedy criterion: slots and packets are matched in order to maximize the total throughput
given the channel condition of each user, which are assumed to be independent of each other.
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Parameter value
number of flows 2
packet size 500 bytes
Pr{GOOD → GOOD} 0.9
Pr{BAD → BAD} 0.8
number of subcarriers 16
time slots per frame 24
frame duration 1 ms
transmission power per slot 1 mW
Table 3.1. Main system parameters
The radio channel model represents each frequency subchannel by means of a two-state Markov
channel (Gilbert-Elliot model) whose state is updated after each time slot to take into account channel
correlation over time. The number of subcarrier groups is 16 while the time slots for each frame are
24, for a total of 384 resource blocks. A different average noise power is associated with each of the
two states of the chain, thus different values of capacity can be reached (according to the Shannon
formula). For simplicity, when the Gilbert-Elliot channel is in the good state, interference and noise
power are treated as a random variable with uniform distribution between 1 and 2 mW; similarly, in
case of bad channel, the interference plus noise power is uniformly distributed between 1 and 200
mW. The transmission power per slot is fixed to 1 mW. The main system parameters are summarized
in Table 3.1.
In Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3 the fairness and the normalized throughput as a function of time are shown
for several values of D when L = 300 packets. They confirm what was expected from our analysis:
the fairness is a decreasing function of D while the throughput increases. When D = L, we have
that the fairness is always 1, the maximum value according to Jain’s index. On the other hand, the
normalized throughput has its minimum value because the resource allocator has no freedom in the
choice of the packets to transmit and the user diversity cannot be exploited.
When D is increased, the two performance indices considered have contrasting behaviors, as
already expressed in the previous section: the fairness undergoes a decrease while the throughput
starts increasing. The introduction of a certain freedom in the allocation choice shows its effects and
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Figure 3.2. Fairness over time for different values of D.
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Figure 3.3. Throughput over time for different values of D.
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the trade-off among the utility of the two players becomes evident. Figure 3.4 clearly shows this
situation: the points along the curve are the Pareto solutions of the game, one for each value of D,
and there is no possibility to reach a better solution for one player without worsening the other’s one.
All figures report the outcome of the game theoretic algorithm. Both in Fig. 3.2 and in Fig. 3.3,
the automatic choice of D leads to an intermediate value of both performance indices. This means
that each player slightly reduces its own utility for the sake of a better joint solution. In Fig. 3.4 it is
shown that this new operating point is localized close to the Pareto boundary. Moreover, the proposed
algorithm is quite simple and the convergence to a common value of D is extremely fast, thus it is
suitable for an online implementation. Indeed, in Figs. 3.2–3.3 the warm-up period is quite short,
about 300 ms.
For completeness, we ran other tests by varying L in the range [100, 350]. In all these cases
we obtained that the fairness increased with the value of D while the throughput decreased. The
operation point reached by the proposed algorithm always approximately lies on the Pareto boundary.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a novel design approach for resource management in OFD-
MA/TDMA cellular networks such as LTE. A cross-layer approach has been explored, where sched-
uler and radio resource allocator exchange a limited amount of information to provide both an ade-
quate level of fairness among flows and a high throughput. A game theoretic model of the system
has been proposed and a feasible algorithm for the dynamic setting of a system parameter has been
evaluated. The results obtained through simulation show that the proposed solution is able to trade-off
fairness requirements and throughput.
Possible future works include the extension to a multicellular network, where several base stations
coexist and share resources trying to minimize mutual interference through a proper resource alloca-
tion. Moreover, we plan to implement the proposed approach in a more detailed network simulator.
3.5. Conclusions 29
 0.6
 0.62
 0.64
 0.66
 0.988  0.99  0.992  0.994  0.996  0.998  1
n
o
rm
a
liz
ed
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
fairness
L=300
fixed D
game theory
Figure 3.4. Pareto boundary and operating point of the algorithm.
Chapter 4
Promoting Cooperation in Wireless Relay
Networks
In this chapter1 we apply game theory to constructively derive practical network management
policies for wireless relay networks. We focus on the problem of medium sharing and opportunistic
packet forwarding in wireless relay networks, and we show how, by properly modeling the agents
involved in such a scenario, and enabling simple but effective incentives towards cooperation for the
users, we obtain a resource allocation scheme which is meaningful from both perspectives of game
theory and network engineering. Such a result is achieved by introducing throughput redistribution
as a way to transfer utilities, which enables cooperation among the users.
4.1 Introduction
Cooperation has emerged as a new networking concept that has a dramatic effect of improving
the performance from the physical layer up to the networking layers, and it is considered as one of
the most promising enabling technologies to meet the increasingly high rate demands and quality of
service requirements in wireless networks. In this chapter we consider the simplest form of physi-
1The material presented in this chapter has been published in:
[C4] L. Canzian, L. Badia, and M. Zorzi, “Relaying in Wireless Networks Modeled through Cooperative Game Theory,”
in Proc. IEEE CAMAD, Kyoto, Japan, Jun. 10-11, 2011
[J1] L. Canzian, L. Badia, and M. Zorzi, “Promoting Cooperation in Wireless Relay Networks through Stackelberg Dy-
namic Scheduling,” to appear in IEEE Trans. Commun.
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cal layer cooperation: an opportunistic relay channel, in which each user connected to the network
forwards the packets of the other users.
We investigate cooperative relaying not only improving the social welfare of the network, but also
increasing the individual benefit of each single user, that is assumed to act selfishly and strategically.
The motivation behind this approach is that relaying is possible only if incentives are given to each
user to overcome the disadvantage of consuming energy to forward the packets of the other users. We
first prove the potential gain of cooperation through a cross-layer scheme involving joint routing and
medium access, which is analyzed by means of renewal process theory [65]. However, such a globally
efficient allocation may not match the allocation equilibrium in a game theoretic sense. To overcome
this difficulty, we first consider a simple 2–users case and model users’ interaction as a coalitional
game, introducing throughput redistribution as a way to transfer utilities. This will enable cooperation
among the users. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to generalize such an approach to larger networks,
both because it is computationally expensive to characterize the core for a number of users higher
than 3 [52], and because it requires the definition of a proper negotiation protocol to establish the
cooperation roles, an overhead which may considerably limit the cooperation gain in large networks.
Thus, as a main contribution of this chapter, we propose another incentive scheme which follows
the approach of the coalitional game, redistributing the throughput among users through a dynamic
scheduling rule. This scheme involves a coordinator, that triggers cooperative behaviors increasing
the access opportunities of users acting as relays. This kind of approach is framed as a Stackelberg
game involving the coordinator as the leader and the users, whose strategic decision involves whether
to act collaboratively, as followers. It can also be considered as an intervention scheme [66] (which
will be described accurately in Chapters 6 and 7): the coordinator represents the intervention device
and the dynamic scheduling rule represents the intervention rule. However, differently from most of
the intervention schemes in the literature in which the intervention action represents a punishment for
non compliant users, here the scheduling action represents an award for cooperative users.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We describe the scenario under investigation and
the key assumptions in Section 4.2. Then, Section 4.3 formalizes the analysis of cooperative versus
non cooperative schemes by means of renewal process theory. Section 4.4 introduces the throughput
redistribution concept and studies the coalitional game in the 2–users scenario. Section 4.5 represents
the main contribution of this chapter: the dynamic scheduling scheme to provide network incentives
towards cooperation is defined. Numerical results are provided in Section 4.6. We discuss possible
relaxations of some hypotheses in Section 4.7, and Section 4.8 concludes the chapter with some
remarks.
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4.1.1 Related work
Relay networks have been widely studied in information theory [67]. In particular, the relay
channel represents one of the most common scenarios studied. Several theoretical results about the
capacity of this basic network have been available in the literature since long [68], and others keep
being proposed even very recently [69–72]. These studies assume that each user is willing expend
energy in forwarding packets for other users, without having nothing in return. However, relaying is
possible in practice only if incentives are given to the individual users to overcome the disadvantages
of their limited energy budgets. In this spirit, [17] promotes a fair packet forwarding mechanism
balancing the relaying opportunities that each node gives to and receives from other nodes. Similarly,
[18] introduces a virtual currency and mechanism for charging/rewarding service usage/provision.
Both papers assume the application of a tamper-resistant module in each node to store the forwarding
balance or the virtual currency credit. The virtual currency concept is also used in [19], while in
[20] cooperation is reached by using a reputation mechanism. A distributed and scalable acceptance
algorithm was proposed in [21], in order for the nodes of an ad hoc network to decide whether to
accept or reject a relaying request. Finally, [22] considers an incentive mechanism where the nodes
flexibly give transmission bandwidth in exchange for forwarding data.
Differently from [17–20], that are based on the exchange on a network scale of abstract notions
of worth (e.g., currency and reputation), our opportunistic relaying scheme represents a more tangible
and immediate incentive mechanism. The repeated game formulation considered in [21] is efficient
only if a user asking for a relay service can return the favor in future interactions. Our scheme can
be applied in more general situations, even in strongly asymmetric scenarios where some users only
ask for relay services and other users are only asked to act as relays. In fact, users acting as relays are
immediately rewarded, independently of the future interactions with the other users. Our approach
is closer in spirit to [22]. The main difference is that, instead of rewarding cooperative users in the
frequency domain, giving them more bandwidth, we reward cooperative users in the time domain,
increasing their access opportunities. Moreover, there are some different hypotheses that make the
analysis of the two schemes very different, e.g., in this chapter we assume that the users can select
their modulation scheme which in turn determines the packet reception probability, while [22] adopts
a more abstract formulation based on channel capacity.
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Figure 4.1. The considered scenario: an access point surrounded by user nodes
4.2 Problem Statement
Consider a scenario as reported in Fig. 4.1, where a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n nodes, hereafter
called users, are distributed around a further node called node 0. This may represent an access point
of a wireless local area network, or a base station of a cellular network. We focus on the uplink
between each user and node 0; yet, we assume that node 0 is not only the end destination, but also a
resource manager, as explained later.
We denote the signal to noise ratio (SNR) between user i and node 0 as γi and the SNR between
users i and j as γij . Users are labeled in decreasing order of SNR to node 0, i.e., γ1≥γ2≥ . . .≥γn.
We consider time invariant channels and fixed transmission powers Ppkt, so that the γi and γij terms
are constant over time. We also assume perfect channel state knowledge.
A Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme is adopted, with a fixed slot duration Tpkt.
Node 0 controls the time shares of the users by selecting, in each slot t, a specific user that is allowed
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to transmit. The probability that user i is selected in slot t is P (t)i . The selected user transmits a single
packet over the entire slot, comprising a number of bits that depends on its modulation schemeMi. Mi
is chosen over a finite setM according to the channel quality and in turn determines the probabilities
qi and qij that the packet is correctly received by 0 and j. We denote with Epkt = PpktTpkt the energy
consumed by a user for a single packet transmission.
Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) is used as the mechanism to achieve reliable communica-
tion [73]. If the packet transmitted by user i is not correctly received by node 0, the packet is re-
transmitted the next time user i is scheduled, until the packet is received or the maximum number
of retransmissions is reached. For the sake of simplicity, we consider at most one retransmission per
packet, although the extension to multiple retransmissions would be conceptually straightforward.
Users are assumed to be backlogged, i.e., they always have packets to transmit. In the following,
we will start by considering that retransmissions of a packet are only performed by the node that
has originated that packet, i.e., the node that performed the first transmission attempt. We will refer
to this situation as the no cooperation case and denote its corresponding quantities with a super-
script N . P (t)i can be set as a constant/static value for all t, which makes the selection process
independent and identically distributed (iid). The scheduling policy can be described by a vector
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), where
∑n
i=1 Pi = 1, so that P
(t)
i = Pi for all t; for example, a fair sharing is
represented by P = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n).
We will also consider two evolutions of this scheme, where retransmissions of faulty packets may
not be carried out by the same node performing the first attempt. This is enabled by assuming that
during the transmission phase of a generic node i the other nodes listen to the channel and store i’s
packet if they have correctly received it. Thus, they can retransmit it if needed. If more than one user
can retransmit the packet, node 0 selects the one with the best channel.
In the first scheme, called forced cooperation (denoted by superscript F), we assume that the
users have no say in deciding whether or not to cooperate, but must follow node 0’s directions when
instructed to do so, hence the name. Since cooperation does not come from a free decision, there is
no need for rewarding the collaborative users with a higher access probability. Thus, similarly to the
no cooperation case, the access probabilities P (t)i stay the same for every t. However, their physical
meaning changes: they represent the event that the packet originated from i is transmitted during slot
t; if it is the first transmission attempt, it will be performed by i, while this is not necessarily true for
a retransmission.
Finally, we will consider a further cooperative case, called voluntary cooperation (denoted by
superscript V), where the users freely decide whether or not they want to cooperate in the retrans-
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Figure 4.2. Non-cooperative transmission process of a packet of user i
mission process of other users. In this case, node 0 rewards them with a higher access probability,
decreasing by the same amount the access probability of the users being helped. Thus, P (t)i changes
over time. Suppose node i cooperates with node j in slot t, retransmitting a packet originated from
node j. We define Kij as the number of scheduling instants, after slot t, where the scheduling policy
is changed, and ∆P (s)ij > 0 as the variation of the scheduling policy, with respect to the reference
policy P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), in slot s, i.e.,
P
(s)
j = Pj −∆P
(s)
ij ; P
(s)
i = Pi +∆P
(s)
ij ; s = t+ 1, . . . , t+Kij (4.1)
To compare the three cases, we define the bit rate of user i in slot t as
BR
(t)
i =


Ni
Tpkt
i’s packet correctly received by 0 in slot t
0 otherwise
where Ni is the number of bits in user i’s packet, which depends on the chosen modulation scheme
Mi. Finally, we define the asymptotic bit rate of user i as
BRi = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
BR
(t)
i
4.3 Renewal Theory Analysis
In the no cooperation scheme, the transmission process of a generic packet originated from user i
can be represented by the Markov Chain of Fig. 4.2. The successful reception probabilities qi and qij
depend on the modulation scheme Mi and the SNR values γi and γij . In the following we will omit
all these dependencies in favor of a clearer notation.
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The initial state of the Markov Chain is 1i, which means that the next time user i is scheduled
it will transmit the packet for the first time. Analogously, state 2i implies that by scheduling user i
the packet will be transmitted for the second time. State 2i is entered if the first attempt failed. The
term Pi that influences the transition probabilities results from the scheduling process. The absorbing
states Ri and NRi represent the events that user i’s packet is eventually received or not, respectively,
by node 0. When either of the absorbing states is entered, the transmission process of another packet
of node i is considered, restarting again from state 1i.
The time intervals of the packet transmission processes are positive, independent, identically dis-
tributed random variables. These variables define a renewal process which can be studied exploiting
renewal theory results [65]. The asymptotic metrics of the network can be obtained studying the
(statistical) average behavior of the Markov process. In particular, the asymptotic throughput of each
user is equal to the average number of received bits divided by the average time to be absorbed in the
Markov chain associated to that user.
We denote with PNRi the probability to be absorbed in state Ri and with v
N
i the average number
of time slots to be absorbed starting from state 1i. Therefore,
PNRi = qi + (1− qi) qi = qi (2− qi)
vNi =
1
Pi
+
1
Pi
(1− qi) =
2− qi
Pi
Thus, i’s asymptotic bit rate for the no cooperation case is
BRNi =
PNRi Ni
vNi Tpkt
= Piqi
Ni
Tpkt
(4.2)
The best modulation scheme for user i is simply obtained maximizing its throughput
MNi = argmax
Mi∈M
qiNi (4.3)
Recall that both Ni and qi depend on Mi. Finally, the asymptotic bit rate of the network for the no
cooperation scenario is
BRN =
n∑
i=1
BRNi =
1
Tpkt
n∑
i=1
PiqiNi
where the modulation scheme for each user is selected according to (4.3).
In the forced cooperation scheme, the packet transmission process of user i follows the Markov
Chain in Fig. 4.3. Differently from the no cooperation case, the retransmission of i’s packet is
performed by the best user k among those that have received the packet during i’s first attempt, k < i,
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Figure 4.3. Transmission process of a packet of user i in the forced cooperation scheme
otherwise the retransmission is performed by i itself. In the retransmission, k will use the same
modulation order used by i, Mi. In fact, although the optimal modulation Mk for k may be higher, i’s
packet dimension cannot be increased.2 We define qik as the correct reception probability of a packet
transmitted by k using the same modulation scheme of i. Since k < i, we have qik ≥ qi.
The probability PFRi to be absorbed in Ri and the mean number of steps v
F
i to absorption are
PFRi = qi + (1− qi)
i∑
k=1
qik
k−1∏
j=1
(1− qij) q
i
k = qi (2− qi) +
i−1∑
k=1
(1− qi) qik
k−1∏
j=1
(1− qij) (q
i
k − qi)
vFi =
2− qi
Pi
where we took
∏0
j=1 (1− qij) = 1 and qii = 1. In particular, (1− qi) qik
∏k−1
j=1 (1− qij) (q
i
k − qi)
2Actually, node k can even improve its amount of transmitted data by stuffing i’s packet with its own data up toNk−Ni
bits. We neglect this further advantage which, however, would be immediate to include.
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is the probability that 0 has not correctly received i’s packet in the first attempt while k has received
it but no user better than k has received it, multiplied by the difference between the probabilities that
the packet is correctly retransmitted by k and i. It represents the contribution of k to the probability
that i’s packet is eventually received by 0.
Considering for the moment that user i is adopting the same modulation scheme MNi as in the
no cooperation case, we have obtained PFRi ≥ P
N
Ri
and vFi = vNi . The latter is a consequence of
considering a single retransmission (for the multiple retransmission case, vFi ≤ vNi in general).
Similar to (4.2), the asymptotic bit rate of user i in the cooperative scenario is
BRFi = Pi
[
qi +
1−qi
2−qi
i−1∑
k=1
qik
k−1∏
j=1
(1−qij) (q
i
k−qi)
]
Ni
Tpkt
and the best modulation scheme MFi for the cooperative case is
MFi = argmax
Mi∈M
[
qi +
1−qi
2−qi
i−1∑
k=1
qik
k−1∏
j=1
(1−qij) (q
i
k−qi)
]
Ni (4.4)
Finally, for the aggregate throughput we obtain
BRF =
1
Tpkt
n∑
i=1
Pi
[
qi +
1−qi
2−qi
i−1∑
k=1
qik
k−1∏
j=1
(1−qij) (q
i
k−qi)
]
Ni (4.5)
where the modulation scheme for each user is selected according to (4.4). Comparing this result with
the no cooperation case, if in both cases users are adopting the modulation schemes according to
(4.3), we obtain BRF ≥ BRN . This relation is further enforced if we calculate BRF considering
the best modulation schemes for the forced cooperation case, according to (4.4).
To study the voluntary cooperation scheme, we need to introduce a game theoretic framework
modeling interactions among selfish users and their decision to cooperate / not to cooperate. In
Section 4.4 we will study this interaction as a transferable utility coalitional game, in which the users
can redistribute among them the total gain obtained through cooperation. We carry on this analysis
considering a simple 2–user case in which users are interested in maximizing their throughput, and
the redistribution of the throughput is physically possible by changing the access opportunities of the
users – of course each user is free to decide if such an agreement is convenient for him or if it is better
to leave the coalition and refuse to cooperate with the other user. Then, in Section 4.5, following the
idea of the throughput redistribution, we give an active role to node 0, assuming that it can modify
the access opportunities of each user following a dynamic scheduling rule which is a function of each
user’s decision to cooperate or not to cooperate with the other users. This kind of approach is framed
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as a Stackelberg game, in which node 0 is the leader and the users are the followers. In this case we
consider a more realistic scenario in which n users are interested in maximizing their throughput and
minimizing their energy consumption.
4.4 Coalitional Game and Throughput Redistribution
In this section we study the interaction of 2 users through a coalitional game, assuming that they
can form a coalition in which they agree to cooperate with each other, and to redistribute the total
throughput obtained in order to get a higher throughput compare to the no cooperation scenario. We
assume that the coalitional game satisfies properties 1 and 2 of Section 2.7. Note that in the 2–user
case the former property is automatically satisfied. However, the property still holds true even if the
analysis is extended to a network with more than two users, since the TDMA approach guarantees that
different coalitions do not interact: each coalition tries to obtain the maximum throughput by using
the slots assigned exclusively to it. For what concerns property 2, the problem of the throughput
redistribution is addressed at the end of this section.
The value v(·) of the coalitional game is the throughput obtained by each coalition. In a 2–user
case, three coalitions are possible: the two coalitions formed by the single users, 1 and 2, and the
coalition formed by both users, i.e., the grand coalition N = {1, 2}. The value of each coalition is:
v({1}) = BRN1 , v({2}) = BR
N
2 , v(N) = BR
F ≥ BRN = v({1}) + v({2})
Therefore the game satisfies also property 3 of Section 2.7.
Now we want to find a utility allocation that belongs to the core and is fair under certain parame-
ters. Note that, for a super-additive two player game, the core is not empty and coincides with the set
of imputations. In the considered game, the set of imputations is given by:
x1 = BR
N
1 + w(BR
F
2 −BR
N
2 ) , x2 = BR
N
2 + (1− w)(BR
F
2 −BR
N
2 ) (4.6)
where the cooperation weight w belongs to the interval [0, 1]. It is immediate to see that x1 + x2 =
v(N), x1 ≥ v({1}), and x2 ≥ v({2}), ∀w ∈ [0, 1].
The cooperation weight determines the throughput share that each user gets. If w = 0 (i.e., the
throughput is not redistributed) we obtain x1 = v({1}), hence only user 2, whose channel quality to
node 0 is worse, can directly benefit from being helped by user 1’s cooperative relaying. If w > 0,
also user 1 can benefit from the cooperation. The greater w, the greater the incentive for user 1 to
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cooperate. For w = 1, x2 = v({2}), hence only user 1 can benefit from the cooperation3 . Thus, by
setting the value of w we decide the right level of fairness of the subdivision.
So far we have supposed that the total throughput can be divided by users rather arbitrarily. From
a practical point of view, the only thing that can be controlled is the allocation policy, P1 and P2. We
suppose therefore that the allocation policy is changed from P1 and P2 to P ′1 and P ′2 in order to satisfy
the subdivision proposed. Is the new allocation policy feasible? That is, is P ′1 + P ′2 ≤ 1? It is easy to
show that the new allocation policy is feasible. In fact, we have to increase the allocation probability
of the cooperating user 1 and decreasing the allocation probability of 2, while keeping constant the
total bit rate v(N). Since 1 has a better channel, it results that the increase P ′1 − P1 is lower than the
decrease P2 − P ′2 in order to keep the total bit rate constant. Therefore:
P ′1 − P1 < P2 − P
′
2 ⇒ P
′
1 + P
′
2 < P1 + P2 = 1
This means that the allocation is feasible and that there is a positive probability that some slots are not
assigned to anybody, which would not be meaningful. Therefore, the quantity P ′ = 1− P ′1 − P ′2 can
be divided among users, increasing for example both P ′1 and P ′2 by the same amount, or increasing
them by a weighted amount of P ′, where we can use again the cooperation weight w. Finally, this
means that both users have a further benefit in obtaining an even higher bit rate compared to the
subdivision proposed.
4.5 Dynamic Scheduling Scheme
It is very difficult to generalize the approach of Section 4.4 to larger networks, both because it
is computationally expensive to characterize the core for a number of users higher than 3 [52], and
because it requires the definition of a proper negotiation protocol to establish the cooperation roles,
an overhead which may considerably limit the cooperation gain in large networks. Thus, as a main
contribution of this chapter, we propose in this section a dynamic scheduling scheme which follows
the idea of redistributing the throughput among users, awarding cooperative users.
In the voluntary cooperation scheme we allow the user to freely choose whom to cooperate with,
as well as its own modulation scheme. We model their interaction as a static game with complete
info and, for the time being, we consider that the strategy4 of user i consists only in choosing the set
of users it cooperates with, which we denote as ai ⊆ N (i.e., the action set Ai is the power set of
3Actually, in this case user 2 can still benefit in that it saves energy, because some of its packets are retransmitted by
user 1. We will introduce the energy consumption in the users’ utilities in Section 4.5.
4In static games the user strategy coincides with the user action. In this chapter we keep using the word strategy.
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N ). Since each user can cooperate only with users having a worse channel, ai is actually a subset of
{i + 1, . . . , n}. The choice of the modulation scheme can be added in a later step as a superposition
to the choice of ai, and it does not represent a strong interaction factor among users. Also, denote
with Wi the set of users that cooperate with i, i.e., Wi = {j ∈ N : i ∈ aj}.
We represent the preference of each user i through a utility function Ψi(Bi, Ei) which depends on
the number of transmitted bits Bi and on the energy spent Ei per unit time. Actually, for the analysis
of the game we use the incremental utility ψi(∆Bi,∆Ei) representing the increase in Ψi with respect
to the no cooperation case5, i.e.,
ψi(∆Bi,∆Ei) = Ψi(B
N
i +∆Bi, E
N
i +∆Ei)−Ψi(B
N
i , E
N
i )
By definition, ψi(0, 0) = 0. Also, it is reasonable to assume that ψi is a continuous and in-
creasing (respectively, decreasing) function of the variation of transmitted bits (respectively, energy
consumption) per unit time, ∆Bi (respectively, ∆Ei).
Note that ∆Bi and ∆Ei can be split into the contributions due to the individual interactions with
other users: ∆Bi =
∑
j∈N\{i}∆Bij and ∆Ei =
∑
j∈N\{i}∆Eij , where ∆Bij and ∆Eij are the
variations, per unit time, of transmitted bits and energy expenditure of i due to the interaction with j.
Now, we assume that the incremental utility ψi(∆Bi,∆Ei) can be additively split as a sum of local
contributions ψij(∆Bij ,∆Eij), each due to the interaction between i and j, with ψij having the same
characteristics of ψi (continuity and monotonicity). Then we can write:
ψi(∆Bi,∆Ei) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
ψij(∆Bij ,∆Eij) =
∑
j∈Wi
ψij(∆Bij ,∆Eij) +
∑
j∈ai
ψij(∆Bij ,∆Eij) (4.7)
where we exploited the fact that if j /∈Wi∪ai, i.e., j has no interaction with i, then ψij(∆Bij ,∆Eij) =
0.6 In (4.7), ψi is re-arranged in two sum terms. The former involves the users of set Wi offering their
cooperation to i; therefore, in the corresponding terms, ∆Bij and ∆Eij are positive (as we will see in
Section 4.5.1) and negative, respectively. This means that user i will always benefit from cooperation
by another user j with a better channel; however, the strategic choice whether to cooperate or not is
left to user j. The latter term includes instead the variation of ψi due to i offering cooperation to other
nodes belonging to set ai, which is where the decision of i comes into play.
The term ψij can therefore be regarded as the specific utility of user i in a simple 2-player game
between i and j, i < j, where the only user who can make a non-trivial decision is i. It will cooperate
5The game’s outcomes are invariant to this choice. In fact, they depend only on the ranking of the preference of each
user, which is preserved if a (user-dependent) constant is subtracted from the utility of each user.
6A linear ψi(·, ·) will satisfy (4.7). In particular, if ψi(·, ·) is linear then ψi(·, ·) = ψij(·, ·),∀i, j. Moreover, the
converse is also true: if ψi(·, ·) satisfies (4.7) and ψi(·, ·) = ψij(·, ·),∀i, j, then ψi(·, ·) is a linear function.
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with j if and only if ψij ≥ 0 (it is not restrictive to assume cooperation in the equality case). Note
that i’s strategy has no influence on the utilities of lower index users and, therefore, on their decision
process. Hence, i’s decision to cooperate or not with j, with i < j, can be made by maximizing just
the partial utility ψij . In this way, the original n-player game is decoupled into
(
n
2
)
2-player games
whose outcomes can be easily predicted.
In particular, without any incentive mechanism, the option of relaying packets for another node
would never be advantageous. In fact, in this case ∆Bij = 0 and ∆Eij > 0, hence, ψij is negative.
Thus, no node would ever relay a packet. This is why we also include node 0 that can provide
incentives for cooperation, through a reshaping of the transmission probabilities. In this way, users
can now get a positive utility when they act as relays, since they may have higher energy consumption
but also higher throughput.
4.5.1 Stackelberg formulation
In light of the above discussion, we consider node 0 as an active player in the game, which, to
promote cooperation in the network, can change the scheduling policies of users, with respect to
the reference scheduling policy P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), according to (4.1). We want that, after this
intervention by node 0, the users exploiting a collaborative relay still have a throughput improvement,
i.e., if j ∈ ai then ∆Bji ≥ 0; note that they always have an energy saving, i.e., ∆Eji < 0, since i
performs a retransmission in j’s stead. Moreover, as cooperation rewards are granted by node 0, the
transmission probability of i can be increased according to (4.1) only if node 0 correctly received the
packet retransmitted by i. In order to reach both objectives, we impose the following change in the
allocation conditioned on the event that the packet retransmitted by i is correctly received by node 0
Kij∑
s=1
∆P
(t+s)
ij q
N
j N
N
j = wij
qjiNj − q
N
j N
N
j
qji
(4.8)
where wij ∈ [0, 1] is the cooperation weight of i with respect to j. The left hand side represents
the average decrease of the number of bits transmitted by j during the following Kij slots, given
that P (t+s)j = Pj − ∆P
(t+s)
ij , s = 1, . . . ,Kij . Therefore, the average (non conditioned) decrease
of the number of bits is obtained multiplying it by the probability that the packet retransmitted by
i is correctly received by node 0, and we have imposed it equal to wij
(
qjiNj − q
N
j N
N
j
)
. Since
wij ∈ [0, 1], the average increase in the number of bits transmitted by j during slot t, qjiNj− qNj NNj ,
is higher than the average decrease of the number of bits transmitted by j during the subsequent Kij
slots, hence, ∆Bji ≥ 0 as we wanted.
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The cooperation weight wij is a tunable parameter describing how valuable it is to reward coop-
eration by i towards j. If wij is equal to 1, during the Kij + 1 time slots from t to t + Kij user j
transmits an average number of bits equal to what it would have transmitted during the same interval
in the no cooperation case. The lower wij , the higher the throughput of user j, but at the same time
the lower the incentives given to user i, until wij = 0, where no incentives are given to user i.
The cooperation weight wij , ∀i, j : i < j, represents the strategy of node 0, i.e., the strength of
incentives given to cooperating users. We suppose that wij are fixed by node 0 at the beginning of
the communication and are transmitted to all users. In this way, any user knows in advance the gain
it obtains by cooperating with each other user and can select its best strategy. This type of interaction
between node 0 and other users can be cast in the framework of the Stackelberg games, where node
0 plays first and the users act afterwards. The player moving first can predict the behavior of other
players and optimize its own strategy.
We can rewrite (4.8) as
Kij∑
s=1
∆P
(t+s)
ij =
wij
qji
(
qjiNj
qNj N
N
j
− 1
)
under the constraint ∆P (t+s)ij ≤ Pj , s = 1, . . . ,Kij .
There are infinitely many solutions
{
Kij ,∆P
(t+s)
ij , s = 1, . . . ,Kij
}
that satisfy the above equa-
tion. However, cooperating users should be rewarded as early as possible, so as to enable faster
convergence to the asymptotic throughput. Thus Kij is set as the lowest integer such that
KijPj ≥
wij
qji
(
qjiNj
qNj N
N
j
− 1
)
which results in the following scheduling policy variation:
∆P
(s)
ij = Pj ; s = t+ 1, . . . , t+Kij − 1
∆P
(t+Kij)
ij =
wij
qji
(
qjiNj
qNj N
N
j
− 1
)
− (Kij − 1)Pj (4.9)
4.5.2 User strategies
Now, we study the interaction between users considering generic cooperation weights wij and
introducing the selection of the modulation scheme Mi.
In the voluntary cooperation scheme, the packet transmission process of user i follows the Markov
Chain in Fig. 4.4, which is conceptually similar to Fig. 4.3 with the difference that only users
belonging to Wi cooperate with i and the scheduling is dynamic according to (4.1). The access
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probability of user i at the beginning of a slot depends on the users i has cooperated with and on the
users that have relayed i’s packets in the preceding slots. In order to derive the exact metrics associated
to the voluntary cooperation scheme, the Markov chain of Fig. 4.4 should be expanded to take into
account that i might cooperate with other users when it is not scheduled. The transition associated
to the probability 1 − P (t)i should be divided into a number of transitions equal to the cardinality of
ai plus 1, representing the events that i is not scheduled and it does not act as a relay or it acts as
a relay for one of the users belonging to ai. These transitions would end in as many chains, all of
them similar to the lower chain of Fig. 4.4, with the only difference that the access probabilities of
user i are different. To obtain simple analytical expressions of the asymptotic metrics of the voluntary
cooperation scheme, instead of exactly tracing the temporal variation of the scheduling probability
we consider an approximate approach that takes into consideration just the average value P i of the
scheduling probability of a generic user i. This allows us to obtain the following results
PVRi=qi (2−qi) +
∑
k∈Wi
(1−qi) qik
[ ∏
j∈Wi,j<k
(1−qij)
]
(qik−qi)
vVi =(2− qi) /P i
BRVi =P i
[
qi +
1−qi
2−qi
∑
k∈Wi
qik
∏
j∈Wi,j<k
(1−qij) (q
i
k−qi)
]
Ni
Tpkt
BRV=
n∑
i=1
BRVi =
1
Tpkt
n∑
i=1
P i
[
qi +
1−qi
2−qi
∑
k∈Wi
qik
∏
j∈Wi,j<k
(1−qij) (q
i
k−qi)
]
Ni (4.10)
As per (4.1)
P
(t)
i = Pi +
∑
j∈ai
∆P
(t)
ij −
∑
k∈Wi
∆P
(t)
ki
where ∆P (t)ij ,∆P
(t)
ki ≥ 0 are according to (4.9). ∆P
(t)
ij > 0 if and only if i cooperated with j during
one of the preceding Kij slots. ∆P (t)ki > 0 if and only if k cooperated with i during one of the
preceding Kki slots. As per (4.9), ∆Pki depends on qik and Ni that in turn depend on the modulation
scheme Mi. This must be taken into account when optimizing Mi. In particular, since the access
opportunity of user i is decreased after being helped, the net average increase of i’s transmitted bits
due to the cooperation of user k is scaled by a factor (1−wik). We define
Di = qi+
1−qi
2−qi
∑
k∈Wi
(1−wik) qik
[ ∏
j∈Wi,j<k
(1−qij)
]
(qik−qi)
Then, the optimal modulation scheme of user i can be computed as
MVi = argmax
Mi∈M
DiNi (4.11)
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Figure 4.4. Transmission process of a packet of user i in the voluntary cooperation scheme
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where both Di and Ni depend on Mi. If i cooperates with j, the average variation ∆Bij > 0 and
∆Eij > 0 of i’s transmitted bits and energy consumption per unit time are equal to
∆Bij=q
j
i
Kij∑
s=1
∆P
(t+s)
ij Di
Ni
KijTpkt
= wij
(
qjiNj
qNj N
N
j
−1
)
Di
Ni
KijTpkt
∆Eij=
[
1 + qji
Kij∑
s=1
∆P
(t+s)
ij
]
Epkt
(Kij + 1)Tpkt
=
[
1 + wij
(
qjiNj
qNj N
N
j
−1
)]
Epkt
(Kij + 1)Tpkt
(4.12)
where MVi is chosen according to (4.11). Thus, the evaluation of the partial utility ψij(∆Bij ,∆Eij)
depends (through Di) on Wi, i.e., the cooperation choices adopted towards i by users with lower
indices.
Proposition 1. Assuming that users cooperate in case their utility is flat with respect to this choice,
the sub-game between users admits one and only one NE, aNE = {aNE1 , . . . aNEn }.
Proof. The proof follows a constructive and iterative procedure. Let us consider user 1, which can
not be helped by any other node: W1 = ∅, PW1R1 = P
N
R1
and D1 = PNR1/ (2− q1). Since the
probability error function q1 varies with continuity, the set of allocation policies that optimizes (4.11)
is a singleton, therefore user 1 can uniquely select its best modulation scheme MV1 . Then user 1
can compute the optimal set of users to cooperate with, i.e., its best strategy aNE1 , depending on the
modulation selected by each user. This can be done by calculating ∆B1j and ∆E1j according to
(4.12) and evaluating ψ1j , ∀j 6= 1, ∀Mj ∈ M.
This procedure can be repeated for any other user. For a generic user i and for each modulation
scheme Mi, if we know the strategies of users 1, 2, . . . , i−1, we can uniquely calculate Wi, MVi ,
PWiR1 , ∆Bij , and ∆Eij , ∀j > i, ∀Mj ∈ M; from these, we obtain ψij , depending on the modulation
selected by the users with worse channels. In the end, we obtain the best modulation scheme for all
users and the unique NE strategy profile aNE .
Corollary 1. The Nash Equilibrium is Pareto Efficient.
Proof. The utility of user 1 is the highest possible since it is not affected by other users’ strategies
and it selects its own strategy to maximize its own utility. In the same way, the utility of user 2 is the
highest possible given the strategy of user 1. Moreover, if we change the strategy of user 1 we make
user 1 worse off, except for the case in which user 1’s utility is flat in its choice to cooperate with user
2. However, in this case we have assumed that 1 chooses to cooperate with 2, hence, if 1 changes its
strategy, the utility of 2 can not increase. This procedure can be repeated for any other user.
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4.5.3 Access point strategy
Theorem 1 states that the sub-game between the users has only one possible outcome. Moreover,
the constructive proof provides an algorithm to calculate this outcome. The access point can predict,
for each strategy w = (wij)ij ∈ [0, 1](
n
2), the strategies of all users. Therefore, it can choose its best
strategy w∗ = (w∗ij)ij to drive the network performance toward a desired outcome.
Assume that the network performance is quantified by a utility function u0 : [0, 1](
n
2) → <, whose
argument is the strategy selected by node 0. It can be thought as the composition of two functions f
and g, i.e., u0 = g ◦ f , such that f : [0, 1](
n
2) → <n gives the utility of the users as a function of 0’s
strategy and g : <n → < gives the utility of 0 as a function of all users’ utilities. It is reasonable to
assume that g is a continuous function.
Take wthij as the value such that ψij(∆Bij,∆Ei) = 0, which can be derived from (4.12). It
is the minimum wij such that i cooperates with j. The only interesting case is when wthij exists and
wthij ∈ [0, 1], otherwise it is not possible to trigger i’s cooperation with respect to j without decreasing
the throughput of j. Since ψij are continuous, then f is continuous in [0, 1] except in wthij . Indeed,
user i changes its cooperation behavior towards j at wthij . However, from a practical point of view,
if wij ∈ [wthij , 1] the utility of both users i and j increases. In fact, user j achieves at least the
same throughput, while decreasing its energy consumption, whereas the increase in throughput of i
compensates the additional energy spent to cooperate with j. That is, promoting cooperation under
this scheme is always beneficial for both users involved. For this reason, it is reasonable to assume
that u0 is upper semi-continuous.
Proposition 2. If u0 is upper semi-continuous then there exists at least one Stackelberg Equilibrium
(SE). Moreover, all SEs are equivalent from a network performance point of view.
Proof. The utility u0 can be maximized since the sub-game NE exists and is unique. The strategy
space of node 0 is closed and bounded, and u0(·) is upper semi-continuous. An SE can be found by
combining the best strategy w∗ of node 0 and the NE strategy profile of the sub-game among the users
when the strategy of node 0 is w∗. There may be more than one optimal w∗, but they all achieve the
same maximum utility of node 0.
Finally, for result comparison, we consider the following access point strategy
w∗ij =

 w
th
ij if 0 ≤ wthij ≤ 1
0 otherwise.
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We chose this strategy to promote cooperation, i.e., increase network performance while keeping a
high level of fairness (fairness metrics will be defined in the following section).
Note that wthij 6∈ [0, 1] means that it is impossible, with the considered scheme, to provide an
incentive for user i to cooperate with j. In this case the system functionality is independent of w∗ij ,
and we have arbitrarily chosen w∗ij = 0.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
Prior to comparing the 3 cooperation schemes, we introduce some performance metrics.
For any vector of n real numbers, x = (x1, . . . , xn), we define a fairness metric J(x) over x,
called Jain index [64], as
J(x) =
(
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
n
∑n
i=1 x
2
i
(4.13)
We will evaluate this index for the vectors of throughput (BR = (BR1, . . . BRn)) and utility values
(Ψ = (Ψ1, . . .Ψn)). We use superscripts N , F , and V to relate these metrics to the no cooperation,
forced cooperation and voluntary cooperation schemes, respectively.
A scenario with n users uniformly placed within a 400 meters radius from an access point has
been simulated in Matlab. We consider a time slot Tpkt = 1 ms and a symbol period of Tsym = 1
µs, that is, each packet is made of 1000 symbols. The number of bits per packet for a generic user
depends on the number of bits per symbol, i.e., on the modulation scheme selected by that user. We
considerM = {BPSK, QPSK, 16−QAM, 64−QAM}, that correspond to the rates represented
in Fig. 4.5.
Each user transmits with a fixed power of Ppkt = 100 mW. The time invariant channel attenuation
coefficient is given by the superposition of two effects: a power law decay with exponent equal to 3
and a Rayleigh distributed coefficient. The signal to noise ratio obtained at a reference distance of
10 m considering a unit-power Rayleigh coefficient is 10. We consider the initial allocation policy
P = (1/n, 1/n, . . . , 1/n).
We take Ψi(Bi, Ei) = Bi − ciEi, i.e., ψi(∆Bi,∆Ei) = ∆Bi − ci∆Ei, which satisfies (4.7)
with ψij(∆Bij,∆Eij) = ∆Bij − ci∆Eij , ∀i, j, where ci > 0 is a measure on how important the
throughput is for user i with respect to its power expenditure. We consider ci =
qiNi
2Epkt
where qi
and Ni are calculated with a modulation scheme according to (4.3), i.e., ci is equal to half i’s energy
efficiency (rate divided by power consumption) in the non cooperative case. In this way, users having
a low non cooperative rate are more inclined to cooperate with other users, consuming their energy
50 Chapter 4. Promoting Cooperation in Wireless Relay Networks
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
SNR
R
at
e 
[kb
ps
]
Reachable Rate
 
 
BPSK Rate
QPSK Rate
16−QAM Rate
64−QAM Rate
Figure 4.5. Reachable rate varying the modulation depending on the SNR
to obtain a higher throughput, with respect to users having already a high non cooperative rate. We
obtain
wthij =
ciEpkt(
qjiNj
qNj N
N
j
− 1
)
(DiNi − ciEpkt)
We first present some results for a specific topology with n = 10, which is actually the one in
Fig. 4.1. Fig. 4.6 shows the evolution of throughput over time for user 10 (the one with lowest SNR),
for the 3 different schemes. The dashed lines represent the average throughput of no cooperation and
forced cooperation schemes according to (4.2) and (4.5). The cumulative throughput asymptotically
converges to these average values. This convergence is quite fast, as the curves are already stable after
few iterations and become practically indistinguishable from the asymptotic value within 10 seconds.
Fig. 4.7 compares the asymptotic throughput reached by each user. Roughly speaking, this spe-
cific topology includes some users (with indices 1-3) that are able to reach a maximal throughput
of 600 kb/s already under the no cooperation scheme, by using the highest modulation (64-QAM )
without ever incurring in packet retransmission. Conversely, users 7-10 have very poor channel con-
ditions (lower modulation scheme, and possibly frequent retransmissions), and users 4-6 are in an
intermediate condition. Interestingly, in the forced cooperation scheme the users with the highest
indices obtain the greatest benefit. They know that users 1, 2 and 3 are forced to act as relays. Thus,
since they have a good channel towards at least one of these relays, they select the highest modulation
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Figure 4.6. Cumulative throughput of user 10
and their packets are transmitted in two hops exploiting the relays, allowing them to reach a bit-rate
of about 300 kb/s. On the contrary, the cooperating users do not obtain any improvement. Instead,
the voluntary cooperation scheme increases the throughput of cooperating users as well. Especially,
users 7 and 8 are not helped since none of the users with good quality finds a worthwhile incremental
advantage in doing so.
Fig. 4.8 represents the incremental utility ψ of each user and emphasizes even more the differ-
ences between the forced and voluntary cooperation schemes. For the forced cooperation case, the
utility of high index users considerably increases, though at the expense of low index users which have
no reward in their cooperating behavior. When cooperation is forced by node 0, users 7-10 signifi-
cantly increase their own throughput and at the same time cut in half the transmission power because
retransmissions are performed by users 1-3, which in turn only suffer higher power expenditures. The
voluntary cooperation scheme improves this situation, since no user worsens its incremental utility
ψ. The highest index users improve their utility, even though by a smaller extent than with forced
cooperation, and no user is worse off than before. Indeed, this happens because cooperation is of-
fered even in the marginal case where the incremental utility is equal to 0; however, setting a higher
requirement for cooperation would yield similar results, i.e., a utility value which is higher for some
users, lower for none. In this sense, the voluntary cooperation scheme Pareto dominates the no coop-
eration scheme [49]. Moreover, the figure suggests that the voluntary cooperation scheme achieves
a more fair distribution of the utility function among the users. Finally, Fig. 4.8 validates the analy-
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sis carried out in Section 4.5. In fact, even though the incentives to cooperative users are calculated
using the approximate equations (4.10), the real throughput gain for cooperative users is just enough
to compensate the real additional energy consumption to relay the packets of the other users, as we
wanted.
To obtain general results, not constrained over a particular network topologies and channel real-
ization, we ran a simulation campaign over many network topologies drawn at random with a variable
number of users, and averaged the results. Fig. 4.9 represents the average throughput increase of the
whole network thanks to cooperation, for both forced and voluntary cooperation schemes. The values
are normalized to the total throughput obtained in the no cooperation scenario. Both forced and vol-
untary cooperation schemes obtain a significant gain; for 50 users, they improve the total throughput
by more than 25% and 35%, respectively. Remarkably, voluntary cooperation performs better than
forced cooperation; this is due to the better redistribution of additional resources gained through co-
operation, which in the forced cooperation scheme are given just to the users with bad channel quality,
while in the voluntary cooperation scheme are distributed more evenly. It is also worth noting that
the cooperation gain increases in the number of users, which is due to multi-user diversity, i.e., with
more users it is just more likely to find a suitable relay. However, the voluntary cooperation scheme
does better in this sense, i.e., it increases more rapidly in the number of users, in fact it is more likely
to find a suitable relay which is also willing to cooperatively participate in the retransmissions.
Fig. 4.10 shows the Jain index related to the throughput vector, i.e., J(BR). Clearly, the no
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cooperation case just reports what is the average situation for what concerns fairness in the considered
scenario if no cooperation is applied. Apparently, the forced cooperation scheme achieves the best
value of fairness for throughput. In fact, users with lower throughput are helped by collaborative
relays which have no other choice, therefore throughput gaps are smoothed out. After an initial
decrease, the Jain index becomes even larger as the number of users increases. In fact, the higher
the number of users, the higher the probability of finding a suitable relay (not necessarily a willing
one, since cooperation is forced). The fairness decreases quite rapidly for the voluntary cooperation
scheme. This is due to the fact that users with good channel conditions, which already have a higher
throughput than others, are rewarded by the access point if they cooperate, which means that they
further increase their throughput. This pulls fairness even below the no cooperation case. However,
it is worth noting that, although fairness is decreased, throughput is never decreased for anybody.
Moreover, evaluating fairness over throughput just gives a very partial picture. Even though users with
good channel increase their throughput, they also have to pay this gain in terms of power consumption,
since they retransmit packets on behalf of bad users (which in turn can save energy); even their reward
in terms of increased scheduling probabilities also implies more transmissions and therefore higher
energy consumption.
Fig. 4.11 shows the Jain index related to the utility vector, i.e., J(Ψ). The situation is inverted
with respect to the preceding case. As the number of users increases, the fairness rapidly decreases
for the forced cooperation scheme. This is due to the fact that a small subset of users, i.e., those
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Figure 4.11. Average utility fairness
having a very good channel quality and able to act as relays for a large area, are more and more
forced to cooperatively relay packets. This pulls their utility much more below the utility of users that
are exploiting them as relays, decreasing the total fairness of the network to values even below the
no cooperation case. On the other hand, in the voluntary cooperation scheme users acting as relays
do not experience a decrease in their utility while helped users can increase their own utility, which
results in smoother utility gaps. Note that, if the utility fairness is considered as the social welfare
metric, Fig. 4.11 gives a representation of the Price of Anarchy, defined as the ratio between the
overall system welfare in the worst Nash equilibrium and in the best Pareto efficient case. In fact, the
highest value of the utility fairness is 1, obtained when the users’ utilities are equal, while the worst
Nash equilibrium coincides with the unique equilibrium of the game under consideration.
To sum up, the comparison between the three schemes shows that voluntary cooperation is able
to significantly improve the network performance over the case without cooperation. In all the com-
parisons, the forced cooperation scheme is to be regarded as a theoretical upper bound, as it implies a
centralized scheduling determined a priori with full system knowledge, to which all the users adhere.
Conversely, the voluntary cooperation scheme may be applied dynamically (based on transmission
outcomes) and in a distributed manner, since each user decides freely whether to cooperate or not.
The goal of the coordinator is just to set the system in an NE, for which the exchange of information
required is rather limited and the convergence is pretty fast. Note also that the forced cooperation
scheme does not operate in a stable point, i.e., at a NE. Thus, with the same system conditions of
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rational decision and distributed action the forced cooperation scheme will become identical to the
no cooperation scheme. On the contrary, the voluntary cooperation scheme is robust toward strategic
and self-interested users. Moreover, the performance of the voluntary cooperation scheme can be re-
garded as an improvement not only over the basic case without cooperation, but even over the forced
cooperation scheme, especially since it achieves a higher total throughput and a more fair overall
utility distribution.
4.7 Discussions and Future Works
The results obtained in this chapter have been derived considering a simplified model of a wireless
communication network. In this section we discuss possible relaxations of some hypotheses we have
made.
First, we consider the time invariant channels and the perfect channel state knowledge hypothe-
ses, that allow to calculate the performance of each user and of the system by means of an analysis
based on renewal process theory. If channels are time varying, the asymptotic performance is not
longer equivalent to the statistical mean. However, for slowly varying channels, there is enough time
for the physical quantities under investigation (i.e., throughput and energy consumption) to approach
the statistical means, as Fig. 4.6 confirms. Hence, our formulation can be applied to the slowly vary-
ing channels scenario as well, by considering adaptive estimates. This work can also be extended to
highly varying channels and imperfect channel state knowledge, assuming that the entities involved
aim at maximizing the statistical mean of their performance, which might not coincide with their
asymptotic performance. In this case, the statistics of the channel evolution and of the channel esti-
mates are needed.
As frequently considered in many game theoretic studies, we assumed that every user is self-
interested and strategic. In a network there might be some users that act individually or cooperatively
independently of their personal advantage. Our framework and results can be easily extended assum-
ing that a mix of no cooperation and forced cooperation nodes are present in the network of voluntary
cooperation nodes. The former might receive the cooperation of the other users, but never offer their
cooperation. Thus, the indices of such nodes do not belong to set Wi and do not appear in the sum-
mation and multiplication of Eq. (4.10). The latter always offer their cooperation, hence, there is no
need to give them incentives by increasing their access opportunities, i.e., their cooperation weights
can be set to 0. Thus, the indices of such nodes belong to set Wi and appear in the summation and
multiplication of Eq. (4.10). It is straightforward to demonstrate that Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollary
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1 are still valid, excluding the no cooperation and forced cooperation nodes from the sub-game (they
do not play a game since their actions are fixed).
Another aspect which may be worth looking at is the evaluation of the overhead introduced by the
forced and voluntary cooperation schemes with respect to the no cooperation scheme. This point is
key to translate the theoretical framework proposed in this chapter into an effective and realistic MAC
protocol. However, it can be shown through simple computations that such an additional overhead is
minimal and can be neglected. We do not consider the overhead for the estimation and communication
of the channel states (which is needed in every scheme) and the computation of the cooperation
weights (which is needed for the voluntary cooperation scheme), as these operations are performed
sparsely since channels are slowly varying. Instead, we investigate the overhead to schedule different
users, to identify eligible relays and to select one of them.
For the no cooperation scheme, at the beginning of each time slot, we assume that node 0 broad-
casts a short packet indicating the user scheduled in that slot. Such a user, after a short time interval7,
sends the data packet. Finally, after another short time interval, node 0 sends an ACK to the user if it
has received the packet correctly.
We modify such a simple MAC protocol to support the forced cooperation and voluntary cooper-
ation schemes. In this case, during the scheduling phase, node 0 has to indicate not only the packet
to transmit, but also who has to perform such a transmission, in case a relay service is required.
Moreover, the user that transmits the packet adds, at the end of the packet data, a series of bits, one
for each node, to communicate to node 0 the users for which it is available to act as a relay. This
MAC protocol is not suitable if there are some users that are scheduled rarely, as in this case node 0
might not be updated about the relay opportunities offered by such users. In this case another option
should be considered to inform node 0 about relay opportunities, e.g., a short contention window can
be added after the ACK.
The additional overhead introduced in the considered MAC protocol can be easily quantified.
Consider a time slot Tpkt = 1 ms, a symbol period of Tsym = 1 µs and a network of 50 users. Hence,
the additional number of bits needed in the scheduling packet is equal to 6 while the additional number
of bits needed in the data packet is equal to 50. Assuming, in the worst case, a BPSK modulation,
the additional overhead is equal to 56 µs over 1 ms, i.e., about 5%, that is very low compared to the
throughput gain of the forced cooperation and voluntary cooperation scheme that are equal to 25%
and 35% in such a scenario (see Fig. 4.9).
7In the 802.11 g/n/ac standards the SIFS (short inter-frame space), defined as the sum of the RX/TX turnaround time,
MAC processing delay and total receive delay from the antenna, is equal to 16µs
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Finally, in this chapter we have not considered the cost incurred by every node to listen and store
the transmission of all the other nodes. Even though the power spent in reception is typically lower
than the transmission power, such an effect might become predominant for a high number of users.
Moreover, in the worst case each user might have to store up to n− 1 additional packets, requiring a
large buffer. These problems might be counteracted considering a simplified version of the proposed
schemes, where we limit, for each user, the number of users to ask for a relay service and to cooperate
with. Such a simplified version is motivated by the high gain that the voluntary cooperation scheme
is able to obtain for a high number of users, as shown in Fig. 4.9. Such a potential gain might not
be completely exploited if we limit the relay opportunities, but at the same time the scheme becomes
more practical as the number of users increases. We will take into consideration the study of such a
scheme in our future work.
4.8 Conclusions
We tackled the problem of promoting cooperative relaying in a wireless network with coordinated
time-division access, by giving the following contributions. First, we outlined mathematical models,
based on Markov chains and renewal theory, to quantify the achievable throughput. Moreover, we
modeled the cooperation option of the single users through game theory and we proposed an incentive
scheme for voluntary cooperation that gives transmission resources to cooperating users when they
retransmit a packet on behalf of other users. We modeled this access scheme as a Stackelberg game,
where a network unit plays the role of access coordinator. We presented a constructive approach to
determine the NE of the sub-game, proven to be unique. We also proved the existence of a Stackelberg
equilibrium, which results in the best incentive strategy that the coordinator can adopt.
Finally, we numerically compared the three schemes of no cooperation, forced cooperation, and
voluntary cooperation. A careful analysis of these results justifies the voluntary cooperation scheme
as a valid solution to increase the network performance in a viable manner from an implementation
standpoint.
Chapter 5
Inter-Network Cooperation exploiting
Game Theory and Bayesian Networks
In this chapter1 we analyze a scenario where two wireless ad hoc networks are willing to share
some of their nodes, acting as relays, in order to gain benefits in terms of lower packet delivery delay
and reduced loss probability. Bayesian Network analysis is exploited to compute the correlation
between local parameters and overall performance, whereas the selection of the nodes to share is
made by means of a game theoretic approach. Our results are then validated through use of a system
level simulator, which shows that an accurate selection of the shared nodes can significantly increase
the performance gain with respect to a random selection scheme.
5.1 Introduction
We consider two wireless multi–hop networks deployed in the same region, but operated by dif-
ferent entities, that are willing to share some of their nodes, acting as relays for the other network.
In such a scenario, cooperation can leverage the benefits of multi–path diversity, since more paths
connecting two nodes will be available, obtaining a considerable gain in the efficiency of shared re-
sources. Sharing the whole set of nodes provides the highest number of paths available for each of
1The material presented in this chapter has been published in:
[C5] G. Quer, F. Librino, L. Canzian, L. Badia, and M. Zorzi, “Using Game Theory and Bayesian Networks to Optimize
Cooperation in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks,” in Proc. IEEE ICC, Ottawa, Canada, Jun. 10-15, 2012
[J2] G. Quer, F. Librino, L. Canzian, L. Badia, and M. Zorzi, “Inter-Network Cooperation exploiting Game Theory and
Bayesian Networks,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. Commun.
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the two networks. However, this comes at the cost of increased traffic that should be handled by some
of the shared nodes. In a realistic environment, an operator may not be willing to share too many
nodes to improve the traffic of another operator, e.g., for security or privacy reasons. Therefore, both
operators may decide to share only a limited number of nodes. If this is the case, an efficient choice
of the shared nodes, according to certain criteria, is needed. Indeed, some nodes deployed in crucial
positions may be particularly suited for helping the other network; on the contrary, nodes placed close
to the network border are likely to be less useful or even useless. Furthermore, sharing a node implies
that a higher amount of traffic will be routed through it, which results in a higher latency for the traffic
of its own network.
We assume that each node of each network is sending packets to every other node in the same
network. In the case of no cooperation, the two coexisting networks perform their operations sepa-
rately: each network only uses its own resources to deliver the data packets generated by its nodes.
Clearly, since they are assumed to share the same spectrum resources, cross–network interference
may limit the overall performance. For such a scenario, we select a set of local parameters: some
of them are directly observable (i.e., we can assume that each network knows their values), and de-
pend only on the topology of the network (topological parameters), like the number of neighbors at a
given node. Some other parameters are not observable and depend on the link characteristics and on
the traffic load (performance parameters). We exploit Bayesian network analysis to estimate the joint
probability distribution of this set of parameters, and to predict, given the evaluation of the observable
parameters, the values of the other parameters that will be used to calculate a cost metric. Then we
use this information to model the interaction between the two networks through game theory and to
select the best nodes to be used as relays, assuming that both networks are interested in optimizing
their performance.
5.1.1 Related work
In multi–hop wireless networks, the use of relays can be seen as a form of cooperation, since
they create new multi–hop routes. Several protocols have been designed to balance the enhanced link
reliability and the increased number of transmissions [74–77]. Coded cooperation is developed in [74]
and [76], whereas an implementation based on hybrid automatic repeat request is introduced in [77].
The use of relays shows how cooperation can be also exploited for routing purposes, as investigated
in [78–80]. The choice of the best relay, based on the channel conditions, is discussed in [78], whereas
several relays, chosen according to topological criteria, simultaneously cooperate in forwarding a
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packet in the scheme described in [79]. Finally, a cross-layer approach, where cooperation is exploited
in ad hoc networks together with the opportunistic routing paradigm, has been shown in [80].
Although a wide literature is available about cooperation among terminals of the same network,
fewer works have instead been focused on cooperation between different networks. In most of them,
the idea behind a cooperative behavior of two coexisting networks is to share the spectrum resources.
Such a paradigm, known as spectrum sharing, is exploited by primary/secondary cognitive radio
networks: an unlicensed network is allowed to exploit the same spectrum assigned to a licensed one,
provided that a given QoS is guaranteed to the latter. The spectrum can be shared through strategies
exploiting different levels of awareness and coordination, whose performance has been analyzed and
discussed in [81] and [82]. In [83], the authors investigated the case where two cellular networks share
their own spectrum resources and cooperate in order to minimize the mutual interference, observing
a gain inversely proportional to the cardinality of the networks. Also infrastructure sharing has been
considered as a promising cooperation technique for cellular networks; in [84] the sharing of some
parts of the network structure is described from a business and regulatory perspective.
To enable the use of cooperation, it is necessary to infer the network gain and cost in advance,
thus choosing whether or not it is worth to perform cooperation. Other choices, which require some
knowledge about the network, must be made, like which nodes to select as relays. An effective tool
to exploit the available information and make a real-time estimation of the expected performance is
given by probabilistic graphical models [85]. The use of this probabilistic tool is very promising
for wireless network optimization, and it has been recently exploited, e.g., in [86] where a Bayesian
Network approach is adopted for predicting the occurrence of congestion in a multi-hop wireless
network. The use of Bayesian prediction in a game theoretic framework to allow cooperation is
discussed in [87].
In spite of the considerable gain allowed by cooperative transmission, modeling the involved
agents as selfish decision-makers usually leads to inefficient non-cooperative outcomes. In this chap-
ter we formulate the problem as a repeated game, in which agents must account for the consequences
of their current actions on the evolution of the game, and cooperation is obtained by punishing de-
viating users in subsequent stages. Repeated interactions have already been applied to the study of
cooperative relaying. A packet forwarding mechanism balancing the relaying opportunities that each
node gives to and receives from other nodes is proposed in [17]. A virtual currency and a mech-
anism to charge/reward a player that asks/provides a relay service are introduced in [18] and [19].
Finally, [20] considers a reputation mechanism, where a user gains reputation acting as relay and can
choose not to serve users having low reputation.
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Figure 5.1. Logical structure of the proposed approach.
5.1.2 Problem statement and outline of the proposed approach
In the scenario proposed in this chapter, two multi–hop networks share the same wireless re-
sources and compete to access the channel. Each network can share with the other network a limited
number of nodes for packet relaying, with the goal to minimize a given cost metric.
The logical structure of the proposed approach is detailed in Fig. 5.1. During a learning phase,
we observe some local Performance Parameters (PP) of the two networks in many different train-
ing topologies, each of them characterized by some local Topological Parameters (TP). We use the
observed data to build the probabilistic relationships among all the parameters, summarized in a
Bayesian Network (BN). Then we consider the scenario of interest, we observe the TP in such a
scenario, and we use the BN to infer the PP. Through our game theoretic approach we promote the
cooperation among networks and we choose the best nodes to be shared in order to minimize the
chosen cost metric that is obtained from the PP. We measure through simulation the performance
improvement due to cooperation. Note that we do not need to repeat the learning phase every time
the topology changes, since the BN learned from the observation of the training topologies can be
reused for every topology of interest. This makes our approach suitable to be implemented also in the
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presence of a fast changing topology, since it allows to choose the best nodes to be shared based only
on observable TP, without the need for an initial setup.
In brief, the main contributions of this chapter are:
• the use of BN theory to learn the probabilistic relationships among a set of parameters in the
network, in order to infer the network performance from the observable topological parameters;
• the definition of the cooperation problem between two networks sharing the same spectrum
resources as a strategic game;
• the implementation of the BN predictor and the strategic game in an actual wireless network
simulator that evaluates the network behavior at the physical, MAC and network layers;
• a performance comparison showing the effectiveness of our algorithm, which achieves the same
performance of a fully cooperative approach by sharing only few selected nodes.
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows. In Section 5.2 we introduce the BN approach. In
Section 5.3 we describe our network scenario. In Section 5.4 we define three performance metrics and
we detail how to compute them. In Section 5.5 we describe the considered game theoretic approach.
In Section 5.6 we present the simulation setup and show the main results. Section 5.7 concludes the
chapter.
5.2 Bayesian Networks Preliminaries
A Bayesian Network is a probabilistic graphical model [85] describing conditional independence
relations among a set of M random variables through a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), which is
composed of vertices and directed edges. A vertex i in the graph represents a random variable xi,
while a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j represents a direct probabilistic relation between the
corresponding variables xi and xj . In this case, we say that i is a parent of j, and we write xi ∈ pa(xj).
The absence of a direct edge between two variables implies that the variables are independent, given
certain conditions on the other variables.
Learning the DAG is equivalent to calculating an approximate structure of the joint probability
distribution among M variables. This structure is used to calculate the parameters of such joint
probability distribution with a limited number of samples, see [85] for further details. The technique
to learn the approximate joint probability distribution through a BN is divided into two phases, the
structure learning and the parameter learning phases.
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5.2.1 Structure learning
This is a procedure to define the DAG that represents the qualitative relationships between the
random variables, i.e., the presence of a direct connection between a couple of variables, not condi-
tioned by other variables. We follow a score based method [88], i.e., we do not assume any a priori
knowledge on the data, but we just analyze the realizations of the variables and we score each possible
DAG with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [89] that we have chosen as a score function.
The BIC is easy to compute and is based on the maximum likelihood criterion, i.e., how well the
data suits a given structure, and penalizes DAGs with a higher number of edges. If each variable
is distributed according to a discrete probability distribution, i.e., it has a finite number of possible
outcomes, then the BIC becomes very simple to compute, involving only summations for all possible
outcomes of the variables and all possible outcomes of the parents of each variable, see [88]. As an
example, suppose that we apply the BIC score based method to a limited number of realizations of
the variables xh, xi and xj , and we obtain a DAG such that h is a parent of i and i is a parent of j.
Using this approximation, the joint probability of the corresponding variables can be written as
P (xh, xi, xj) = P (xh)P (xi|xh)P (xj |xi)
that is simpler than a general joint probability among three variables.
5.2.2 Parameter learning
This phase consists in estimating the parameters of the simplified joint distribution according to
the probability structure defined by the DAG chosen in the structure learning phase. To obtain the
joint distribution, it suffices to estimate the probability of each variable conditioned by the variables
that correspond to its parent nodes in the graph. Coherently with the choice of the BIC as a scoring
function, we use the maximum likelihood estimation technique also to determine all the conditional
probabilities for each variable considered.
5.3 System Model
In this section, we describe the network scenario under investigation from the physical up to the
routing layer. In our scenario, two ad hoc wireless networks coexist and share the common spectrum
resource. Each network consists of n terminals randomly deployed, and each node is a source of traf-
fic, which generates packets according to a Poisson process with intensity λ packets/s/node. The end
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destination is chosen at random, for each packet, among the other nodes in the network. Furthermore,
time is divided in slots and slot synchronization is assumed across the whole network.
5.3.1 Physical layer
At the physical layer Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) with fixed spreading factor is
employed to separate simultaneous transmissions, since both networks share the same spectrum re-
sources, and a training sequence for channel estimation is added at the beginning of each transmission.
The receiving node, D(0), uses a simple iterative interference cancellation scheme to retrieve the de-
sired packet whenM simultaneous communications, namely T (1), . . . , T (M), are received. We define
the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) at D(0) for the incoming transmission T (i) from
node D(i) as
Γ(i) =
SfP
(i)
N0 +
∑
j 6=i P
(j)
where N0 is the noise power and Sf is the spreading factor. P (j) indicates the incoming power due
to T (j), i.e., for all j = 1, . . . ,M :
P (j) =
PT |hD(j),D(0) |
2d−αj
χ
where PT is the transmission power, which is considered to be the same for all the nodes in the
network, χ is a fixed path-loss term, dj is the distance between the receiving node and the source of
T (j), α is the path loss exponent, and hD(j),D(0) is a complex zero mean and unit variance Gaussian
random variable, which represents the effect of multi-path fading. More precisely, in our scenario,
we consider a time correlated block fading. Therefore, for the channel between nodes D(j) and D(0),
the multi-path fading coefficient in time slot t is
hD(j),D(0)(t) = ρ hD(j),D(0)(t− 1) +
√
1− ρ2 ξ
where ρ is the time-correlation factor and ξ is an independent complex Gaussian random variable
with zero mean and unit variance. The iterative interference cancellation scheme works as follows:
• the destination node D(0) sorts the M incoming transmissions according to the received SINR,
in decreasing order (for simplicity, assume Γ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ Γ(M));
• starting from transmission T (1),D(0) tries to decode the corresponding packet, with a decoding
probability that is a function of Γ(1) and of the modulation scheme;
• if the packet is correctly received, its contribution is subtracted from the total incoming signal;
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• D(0) attempts to decode the transmission with the next highest SINR, T (2), and goes on until
the transmission being decoded is the packet of interest.
5.3.2 MAC layer
At the MAC layer, we implement a simple transmission protocol based on a Request-To-Send/Clear-
To-Send handshake. Every time node D(i) wants to send a packet to node D(j), it checks the desti-
nation availability by sending an Request-To-Send packet; if D(j) is not busy, it replies with a Clear-
To-Send packet so that D(i) can start transmitting the packet. Correct reception is acknowledged by
means of an ACK packet. In the case of decoding failure, after a random backoff time, node D(i)
schedules a new transmission attempt, unless the maximum number of retransmissions Mtx has been
reached, in which case it discards the packet. Signaling packets are very short, i.e., they are transmit-
ted within a single time slot, and are protected by a simple repetition code of rate 1/2. Instead, data
packets may span several time slots, so error detection coding is used to verify their correct reception,
i.e., redundancy bits are added at the end of each packet.
5.3.3 Network layer
The source and destination nodes are not necessarily within coverage range of each other, so we
consider multi-hop transmissions. Two nodes can communicate directly if their distance is less than
or equal to the transmission range r. To transmit to destinations that are not within coverage, nodes
use static routing tables, which are built using Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [?]. Each time
a node generates a new packet, or receives a packet to be forwarded, it puts it in the node queue, with
first-in-first-out policy. The buffer size b is fixed and equal for all nodes. If a new packet arrives when
the buffer is full, it is discarded.
5.4 Definition and Estimation of the Network Performance
In this section, we define three different cost metrics that can be used as performance indicators
by the two networks and we show how to compute such cost metrics starting from link parameters,
which in turn can be decomposed in local PP that can be estimated, through a Bayesian approach,
from observable TP. In Section 5.5 the cost metrics are used to build a game theoretic model for a
careful selection of the sharing nodes and to provide an incentive for both networks to cooperate.
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5.4.1 Cost metrics
We consider three different cost metrics because we do not focus on a particular network appli-
cation, thus, the three cost metrics can be thought as the performance indicators of three different
scenarios. Moreover, we want to remark that the approach we use is transparent to the considered
performance metric, and different metrics can be easily accommodated.
Given the path from D(i) to D(j), we first define the delivery delay ζ(i,j) as the average end-
to-end delay of a packet sent along the path, given that the packet is received, and the packet loss
probability p(i,j)pl as the probability that a packet is lost along the path. Notice that no end-to-end
packet retransmission mechanism is implemented in our network. These link parameters are taken
into account by each of the three cost metrics. In fact, ignoring lost packets (i.e., computing the delay
statistics only on correctly delivered packets) may lead to an optimistic evaluation of the network
performance under heavy traffic, where few packets actually reach the destination. In this case, a
high-loss path might end up being considered better than a more reliable path with a slightly higher
delivery delay. The other extreme, i.e., defining the delay contribution of a lost packet as infinite,
makes the delay evaluation meaningless. Clearly, neither option is desirable in our case. In the
following, we describe the three cost metrics considered, that give a finite bias to the average delay in
case of a packet loss.
Weighted delivery delay: PWD
In this metric, when a packet is lost in the path from D(i) to D(j), we increase the delay of the
following packet in the same path by the time to generate another packet routed on that path2. This
additional delay is given by τ = (n− 1)/λ, i.e., the inverse of the per-path average traffic intensity3.
Accordingly, we recursively define the average weighted delivery delay of a packet sent via multi-hop
transmission by node D(i) to node D(j) as:
PWD(i, j) =
(
1− p
(i,j)
pl
)
ζ(i,j) + p
(i,j)
pl
(
τ + P
(i,j)
WD
)
In this calculation, the channel and interference conditions, and thus the loss probability, are assumed
to be independent for different packets. This is due to the fact that the time between two subsequent
2Equivalently, we assign to lost packets a delay contribution equal to the interarrival time and to received packets the
actual delay incurred; then we divide the sum of all contributions by the number of correctly received packets only.
3Each packet generated at D(i) has a randomly chosen destination among the remaining nodes of the network, so that
the per-node traffic λ needs to be divided by the number of possible destinations, n − 1. Notice that it would be easy to
extend our model considering different traffic intensities for different paths, however, this would lead to a more cumbersome
notation without adding any relevant aspect to the final results.
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packet transmissions over the same path is deemed to be long enough. From (5.1) we obtain:
P
(i,j)
WD = τ
p
(i,j)
pl
1− p
(i,j)
pl
+ ζ(i,j)
Lost or not in-time packet rate: PIT
In many applications, the packets are relevant if they are delivered within a given maximum delay,
dmax. If a packet successfully reaches the destination after a delay longer than dmax, it is considered
obsolete and discarded. In this scenario, to calculate a cost metric we must estimate the probability
pˆ
(i,j)
IT of in-time delivery of a packet in the path from D(i) to D(j), given that the packet is correctly
received. Considering K successful transmissions, with packet delivery delay ζ(i,j)k , k = 1, . . . ,K,
we can estimate
pˆ
(i,j)
IT =
K∑
k=1
1
(
ζ
(i,j)
k ≤ dmax
)
K
where 1(·) is the indicator function. Thus, the in-time packet arrival rate is
λIT =
(
1− p
(i,j)
pl
)
pˆ
(i,j)
IT
λ
n− 1
and the lost or not in-time packet rate can be written as:
P
(i,j)
IT =
(
p
(i,j)
pl +
(
1− p
(i,j)
pl
)
(1− pˆ
(i,j)
IT )
) λ
n− 1
Information obsolescence: PIO
In a monitoring application, we assume that each node is tracking a specific signal and we are inter-
ested in calculating the average time interval since the last correctly received packet was generated,
i.e., the average obsolescence of the information from node D(i) at the receiving node D(j). We
recursively define it as:
P
(i,j)
IO =
(
1− p
(i,j)
pl
)(
ζ(i,j) +
τ
2
)
+ p
(i,j)
pl
(
τ + P
(i,j)
IO
)
where the two terms account for the obsolescence of the information in case of correctly received and
lost packets, respectively. In the case of a packet correctly received, we consider that the obsolescence
of the last correctly received packet linearly varies from ζ(i,j) at the moment in which the packet is
received, to ζ(i,j) + τ , immediately before the next packet is received. Thus, the average information
obsolescence is given by ζ(i,j) + τ/2. In the case of a packet loss, an additional time interval τ is
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added to the information obsolescence every time a packet is lost.4 Similarly to (5.1), we can write:
P
(i,j)
IO = τ
p
(i,j)
pl
1− p
(i,j)
pl
+ ζ(i,j) +
τ
2
(5.1)
Notice that the expressions of P (i,j)WD and P
(i,j)
IO are similar, however, we believe it is worth to describe
both metrics because they can be applied in different scenarios. Nevertheless, in Section 5.6.3, we
discuss only the results obtained considering P (i,j)WD , since with P
(i,j)
IO we would obtain the same
performance gains.
We define the cost metric of the whole network, P , as the average of a cost metric (chosen among
PWD, PIT and PIO) over all the couples of nodes belonging to the network. The aim of each network
is to (selfishly) adopt a cooperation action that minimizes its cost metric P , this issue is addressed in
Section 5.5. In the following subsections, we propose a method to decompose ζ(i,j) and p(i,j)pl , needed
for the computation of P, into local PP, and to estimate the PP from TP which can be easily observed.
5.4.2 Computation of ζ (i,j) and p(i,j)pl
The delivery delay ζ(i,j) is determined by the number of retransmissions in each link on the path.
Indeed, for multi-hop routes, a packet has to wait at each relay node until all the packets ahead in
the queue have been sent. The loss of a packet can be caused either by an excessive number of
retransmissions, which lead to a packet drop, or by a buffer overflow, i.e., the packet is discarded
if the next relay has a full queue. Thus, both the delivery delay ζ(i,j) and the loss probability p(i,j)pl
depend on the channel and interference conditions in each link of the path, that in turn depend on the
nodes that the routing protocol selects as relays.
In a static network, it is possible to estimate ζ(i,j) and p(i,j)pl during a training period, which
on the other hand is impractical if the network is dynamic (mobile nodes or time-varying traffic
statistics). We propose a different way of estimating the delay and the loss probability, based only on
instantaneous topological and routing information. Since a packet sent over a multi-hop path has to
traverse a number of nodes before reaching the destination, we decompose the overall path delivery
delay and the overall path loss probability into contributions given by the various traversed nodes,
and we assume that such contributions are independent. More precisely, the overall delivery delay
is given by the sum of the average delays required to traverse every single node (time in queue plus
transmission time), whereas the overall loss probability is obtained from the loss probabilities at every
4Notice that in our network scenario the packets are received at the destination node in the same order they are trans-
mitted.
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node (probability of too many transmission failures and probability of buffer overflow). If R(i,j) is
the set of nodes belonging to the path between D(i) and D(j) (excluding D(i) and D(j)), we have:
ζ(i,j) = ζ(i) +
∑
h∈R(i,j)
ζ(h)
where ζ(h) is the average time between the arrival of a packet at node D(h) and its reception at the
next hop. This delay depends on the next relay; indeed, while the time needed for traversing the queue
is the same for all packets, the time required for a successful transmission depends on the channel
condition, and hence on the next hop chosen. We consider ζ(h) as averaged over all the packets sent
by node D(h) to the next-hop relays.
The packet loss in the multi-hop path is calculated in a similar way, i.e.,
p
(i,j)
pl = 1− (1− p
(i)
tf )(1− p
(j)
qo )
∏
h∈R(i,j)
(1− p
(h)
tf )(1− p
(h)
qo )
where p(h)tf is the probability that a transmission from node h to the next hop fails because the maxi-
mum number of retransmissions is reached, and p(h)qo is the probability that a packet correctly received
at node D(h) is discarded due to buffer overflow. Furthermore, we notice that p(h)qo depends on the
queue of the receiving node D(h), while p(h)tf depends also on which node is used as next hop. For
this reason, similarly to ζ(h), we consider a value averaged over all the neighbors of D(h).5
The parameters ζ(i), p(i)tf , and p
(i)
qo are the PP we need to estimate to compute the cost metric P of
the whole network.
5.4.3 A Bayesian network approach to infer PP from TP
We want to use some TP, that can be easily observed at each node D(i), to estimate the PP ζ(i),
p
(i)
tf , and p
(i)
qo . We decide to consider the number of neighbors N (i) and the number of flows F (i),
that can be easily calculated from the routing table. The BN approach can be summarized in the
following three steps: (1) we measure TP and PP for each node in simulations run over several
training topologies, as a function of the traffic load λ; (2) we build a DAG with nodes N , F , ζ , ptf ,
and pqo, describing qualitatively the probabilistic relationships among them (see Subsection 5.2.1);
and (3) we estimate the joint distribution according to the probability structure defined by the DAG
(see Subsection 5.2.2).
5The underlying assumption is that the probabilities p(h)qo and p(h)tf , with h ∈ R
(i,j)
, are all independent. This is
a reasonable assumption since there are multiple flows that contribute to the queue length in each node, and the fading
considered is spatially uncorrelated.
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Figure 5.2. Bayesian Network showing the probabilistic relationships among the 5 parameters of interest:
ζ, pt, pq F , andN .
We remark that this procedure is different from using a training period to directly derive the
parameters in the scenario of interest. In fact, in this case a training period would be needed every
time the topology changes, so as to evaluate their value for each specific node or path. On the contrary,
with our procedure we can estimate the general joint probability distribution among these parameters,
that does not depend on the specific topology.
The DAG results the same for all values of λ, and is represented in Fig. 5.2, while quantitatively
the probabilistic relationships change with λ. Note thatN does not influence, to a first approximation,
the values of the three PP, once the value of F is observed. In other words, once we calculate from
the routing table the value of F , we can estimate the PP ζ , pt, and pq, and from these estimated
parameters we can calculate also the overall cost for the network, P .
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5.5 Game Theoretic Approach
In spite of the social gain allowed by cooperation, each network has to individually decide if it
is beneficial for it to cooperate, and possibly to accurately select the set of nodes to share. To do
this, each network can estimate, through the framework introduced in Section 5.4, the performance
obtainable for each cooperation possibility, and play a game with the other network.
For the time being we model the interaction of the two networks as a static game with complete
information. We label the nodes of the networks from 1 to 2n, where the nodes in the sets S1 =
{1, ..., n} and S2 = {n + 1, ..., 2n} belong to network 1 and 2, respectively. We formally define
the game Γ = (N,A1, A2, U1, A2), in which the players are the two networks, N = {1, 2}, and the
actions a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2 represent the set of nodes network 1 and 2 want to share. In general,
an operator may not be willing to share too many nodes or some important nodes (e.g., for security
or privacy reasons), thus the action sets A1 and A2 are a subset of the power set of Sk, Ak ⊆ 2Sk ,
k = 1, 2. The utility Uk : A1 × A2 → < can be any decreasing function of Pk(a1, a2), k = 1, 2,
which denotes the cost metric referred to network k given the shared nodes a1 and a2. Given a1 and
a2 the routing tables calculated via OLSR change accordingly, the number of flows for each node
can be computed, Pk(a1, a2) can be estimated, and finally the utility Uk(a1, a2) can be obtained. In
particular, Uk(∅, ∅) is the utility of network k when no nodes are shared.
We say that an action ak is non trivial is the shared nodes are exploited by the other network to
obtain more efficient paths. Except for the no cooperation action ak = ∅, we consider only non trivial
actions. In fact, a trivial action is perfectly equivalent to the no cooperation action ∅.
Proposition 3. ak = ∅ is a strictly dominant action of the game Γ, for each network k = 1, 2.
Proof. Given the strategy of the other network, network k strictly prefers not to share any node. In
fact, shared nodes strictly increase the traffic handled by the network, which in turns strictly increases
the cost metric and strictly decreases the utility, with respect to the no cooperation case.
Corollary 2. The unique NE of the game Γ is aNE1 = aNE2 = ∅.
In the static game formulation it is not possible to provide incentives for the networks to cooperate
because, whatever the other network decides to do, a network never wants to manage additional flows
of packets belonging to the other network. However, we argue that the static formulation is not
a proper model for the scenario we have in mind, in which the interaction among the networks is
sustained over the time. In this case, a repeated game formulation seems more reasonable.
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5.5.1 Repeated game
We define the infinitely repeated game ΓR in which the two networks play the stage game Γ
infinitely, obtaining the average utility
URk = (1− δ) lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=1
δt−1U
(t)
k
where U (t)k is the utility obtain by network i at stage t and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
We want to design a cooperation strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2) in which both network have the
incentive to cooperate. The key idea is the adoption of a trigger strategy in which the two networks
adopt by default the cooperation action profile a∗ = (a∗1, a∗2) and, as soon as one of the two networks
deviates from this action profile, the other network punishes it by adopting the no cooperation action
∅ forever.6 An issue related to this approach is the selection of an appropriate a∗. In fact, the two
networks have in general different preferences: each of them would like to choose an a∗ that allows
it to obtain the highest gain, that does not usually coincide with the a∗ in which the other network
obtains the highest gain. Inspired by the Nash bargaining solution [49], we select a cooperation action
profile a∗ as a solution of the following problem
argmax
a∈A
(
U1(a)− U
(
1∅, ∅)
)
(U2(a)− U2(∅, ∅))
subject to:
Uk(a)− Uk(∅, ∅) > 0, k = 1, 2 (5.2)
This corresponds to the solution that an impartial arbitrator would recommend to increase in a fair
way the utilities of both networks. We obtain the following results.
Proposition 4. If (5.2) has no solution, there exist no cooperation action profile a∗ 6= (∅, ∅) and
trigger strategy s∗ such that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of ΓR.
Proof. Let assume (5.2) has no solution and there exists a∗ 6= (∅, ∅) and a trigger strategy s∗ such that
s∗ is a NE of ΓR. Since (5.2) has no solution, there exist a network k such that Uk(a∗)−Uk(∅, ∅) ≤ 0.
Without loosing generality we assume that k = 1. If both networks adopt the trigger strategy the
6More complex strategies in which the networks synchronously change, from stage to stage, the cooperative action
profile are possible. Though these strategies may achieve better theoretical results, we argue that they are very complex
and computationally expensive to implement in practice, since they require frequently updates of the routing tables and
introduce the problem of readdressing packets that were transmitted along paths which do not exists anymore. Thus, we
prefer to consider more simple strategies.
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average utility for network 1 is UR1 (s∗1, s∗2) = U1(a∗). If network 2 adopts the trigger strategy and
network 1 always adopts the no cooperation action ∅ the average utility for network 1 is
UR1 (∅, s
∗
2) = (1− δ)U1(∅, a
∗
2) + (1− δ) lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=2
δt−1U1(∅, ∅) > U1(∅, ∅) ≥ U
R
1 (s
∗
1, s
∗
2)
where the first inequality, i.e., U1(∅, a∗2) > U1(∅, ∅), is valid because network 1 can exploit the node
shared by network 2 to find better paths (remember that we consider non-trivial actions), and the last
inequality is valid for hypothesis. Hence, network 1 has the incentive to deviate from the trigger
strategy s∗1 and adopt always the no cooperation action ∅, contradicting the initial hypothesis that s∗
is a NE of ΓR.
Since a Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of a NE, if (5.2) has no solution
neither a trigger strategy SPE exits. In this case we assume that the networks never cooperate ((∅, ∅)
is a NE of the stage game Γ, hence it is also a SPE of ΓR). Notice that (5.2) is without solution if
it does not exist an action profile a 6= (∅, ∅) such that both network can benefit from cooperation.
This possibility happens very rarely (precisely, when for each sharing choice one network would not
exploit a lot the shared nodes of the other network and, at the same time, the other network would
exploit a lot its shared nodes), and corresponds to situations in which cooperation does not provide a
high gain.
Proposition 5. If a∗ is a solution of (5.2) and δ is close enough to 1, then the trigger strategy s∗ is a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of ΓR.
Proof. We need to show that the strategy s∗1 is a best response to the strategy s∗2, in each subgame of
ΓR (if so, for symmetry s∗2 will be a best response to s∗1). Assume network 2 adopts s∗2. Network 1
knows that, if the outcome ever differs from (a∗1, a∗2), network 2 will play ∅ forever. Thus, from that
point on, also for network 1 is optimal to play ∅ forever. So s∗1 is a NE in all the subgames of ΓR in
which a deviation from (a∗1, a∗2) has occurred in the past. Now let consider the subgame of ΓR in a
generic stage t in which a deviation has not occurred in the past (this includes also the case t = 1, i.e.,
the subgame coincides with ΓR). We just need to show that, at stage t, it is not beneficial for network
1 to deviate from the trigger strategy s∗1, playing an action different from a∗1. In fact, if it does not
deviate in stage t, then for the same reason it will not deviate in stage t+1, and so on. The past utility
and the discount factor at the instant t, δt−1, are constants and do not play any role in the equilibrium
analysis. Hence, we can simply impose t = 1 and evaluate network 1’s best first move. If network 1
adopts s∗1 from the initial stage its average utility is UR1 (s∗1, s∗2) = U1(a∗). Every strategy resulting
5.6. Results 75
in an action different from a∗1 in the first stage is dominated by the strategy in which ∅ is always
played, in fact ∅ allows to obtain the highest utility possible in every stage given that user 2 plays
a∗2 in the first stage and ∅ in the subsequent stages. If network 1 always play ∅ achieves an average
utility of UR1 (∅, s∗2) = (1− δ)U1(∅, a∗2) + δ U1(∅, ∅). We obtain UR1 (s∗1, s∗2) ≥ UR1 (∅, s∗2) if and only
if δ ≥ U1(∅, a
∗
2)− U1(a
∗)
U1(∅, a∗2)− U1(∅, ∅)
. Notice that U1(∅, a∗2) > U1(a∗) > U1(∅, ∅), where the first inequality
is valid because network 1 can exploit the node shared by network 2 to find better paths (remember
that we consider non-trivial actions), and the last inequality is valid because a∗ is a solution of (5.2).
Thus, the threshold on δ is lower than 1.
Notice that the trigger strategy can be substituted with a strategy in which, as soon as a deviation
from the cooperation action profile is detected, a network adopts the punishment action ∅ only for a
finite amount of stages. The duration of the punishment must be set so that the gain obtained during
the deviating stage does not compensate the loss incurred during the subsequent stages.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Simulation setup
To assess the effectiveness of our approach, we developed a network simulator which encom-
passes the layers from physical to routing, as described in Section 5.3. The system parameters are
reported in Table 5.1. Each simulation run is performed with randomly generated connected net-
works, and lasts for 10000 time slots. With the given parameters setup, we first identified, through
simulation, the value λt of packet generation intensity which results in an end–to–end packet loss
probability of 0.1. This can be seen as a threshold value between a lightly loaded and an overloaded
network. Different values of the normalized traffic generation intensity λn = λ/λt were considered,
from λn = 0.4 up to λn = 2. For each value, 500 simulation runs were performed to collect the
data required for the BN inference (training topologies). Based on this information, the empirical
distributions and the average values of ζq, ptf and pqo, conditioned on F , were derived.
In the subsequent steps, a new set of 500 simulation runs was performed for each value of λn.
In each run, two networks are again randomly deployed. We investigate the average performance
of the networks when (1) no nodes are shared, namely No Coop; (2) 2 nodes randomly chosen are
shared, namely 2 Rand; (3) 2 nodes selected through the proposed game theoretic approach are shared,
namely 2 GT; (4) all nodes are shared, namely Full Coop. To adopt the game theoretic approach we
assume that the utility function of each network is the reciprocal of the average cost for that network,
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Table 5.1. Simulation parameters
Number of nodes per network 10
Network area side [m] 200
Transmission range, r[m] 75
Transmission power [dBm] 24
Chip rate [chip/s] 7.5× 106
Noise floor [dBm] −103
Path loss exponent 4
Path loss fixed term 1000
Fading correlation factor, ρ 0.9
Modulation type BPSK
Time slot duration [ms] 1
Spreading factor Sf 32
Packet length [bit] 4096
Packet transmission time [slots] 6
Transmission rate, λ [pkts/s/node] 1 to 5
Buffer size b [pkts] 16
Maximum number of MAC retransmissions 5
Initial backoff window [slots] 16
Routing algorithm OLSR
Simulation duration [slots] 10000
5.6. Results 77
Uk(a1, a2) = [Pk(a1, a2)]
−1
, δ is close enough to 1, and the networks can share either no nodes or
exactly 2 nodes. Although our approach can be extended to a larger number of cooperating nodes,
our results show that a large fraction of the available cooperation gain is already achieved with this
choice.
5.6.2 Bayesian network estimation
Exploiting the stochastic estimation of local parameters we can evaluate the expected value of the
three parameters of interest, namely the average delivery delay ζq, the probability of buffer overflow
pqo and the probability of transmission failure ptf , as a function of the number of flows F passing
through the node and of the normalized traffic intensity λn. The expected values of ζq, pqo, and ptf
are shown in Figs. 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. The highest number of flows through a single node
is reached when that node becomes the only connection among five separate clusters of nodes.7 If
these groups have similar cardinalities, we have that the maximum number of flows through a single
node is
Nf < 2(n − 1)
(
n−
n− 1−Nc
Nc
)
where Nc is the number of clusters in which the two networks are divided, and n is the number of
nodes in each network. In our case, due to the small number of nodes in each network (n = 10), we
reasonably assume that in the worst case the nodes can be divided in three separate clusters of nodes,
thus Nf < 144. This explains why the number of flows F is limited in the figures. We also observe
in Fig. 5.3 that for very high values of F and λn, the average delivery delay decreases. We conjecture
that this happens for two reasons: (1) the queue of these nodes are always almost full, so the time to
traverse them cannot grow much further, and (2) a node traversed by a high number of flows is often
chosen as receiver by most of its neighbors. For these reasons, when it transmits, a lower number of
communications can interfere, thus leading to a lower time needed to deliver a packet to the next hop.
5.6.3 Performance
In Fig. 5.6, we present the actual gain, in terms of delay reduction for the metric PWD, offered
by the considered scenarios. The curves are obtained by averaging over 500 random topologies, each
consisting of two networks with n = 10 nodes each. The system parameters are reported in Tab. 5.1.
7A single node can be the only connecting node of no more than 5 clusters of nodes, since in a plane it is impossible to
have more than 5 points with distance less than or equal to r from a central point, such that each couple of points have a
distance bigger than r.
78 Chapter 5. Inter-Network Cooperation exploiting Game Theory and Bayesian Networks
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Number of flows  F
Av
er
ag
e 
de
liv
er
y 
de
la
y 
 ζ
 
 
λ = 1
λ = 2
λ = 3
λ = 4
λ = 5
Figure 5.3. BN estimation of the average delivery delay ζ as a function of the number of flows F passing
through the node.
It can be observed that, as intuition suggests, full cooperation grants the highest benefits, due to
the higher spatial diversity. Hence, this is the maximum achievable gain for the scenario investigated.
This gain is more pronounced when the networks are heavily loaded, since congested paths are more
frequent, and adding new routes becomes more advantageous. When only two nodes can be shared,
the choice of the shared nodes makes the difference. In fact, Fig. 5.6 shows that a careful selection
of the resources to be shared can significantly increase the achievable gain when compared to a blind
random selection. A random selection can not offer a significant gain for lightly loaded networks,
while, for heavily loaded networks, it can offer only one third of the gain granted by full cooperation.
On the contrary, if the shared nodes are chosen by means of our game-theoretic approach, the maxi-
mum achievable gain is fully obtained for lightly loaded networks and closely approached for heavily
loaded networks.
The same performance gains are obtained also by using the cost metric PIO, the information
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Figure 5.4. BN estimation of the probability of buffer overflow pqo as a function of the number of flows F
passing through the node.
obsolescence, since PWD and PIO differ only by a constant term τ/2, see (5.1) and (5.1).
In Fig. 5.7 and in Fig. 5.8 we adopt the cost metric PIT and we show the performance of the four
cooperation strategies in terms of in-time packet arrival rate, λIT . In Fig. 5.7-(a) we show λIT as a
function of the normalized packet generation intensity λn for a maximum allowed delay dmax = 100
slots, and in Fig. 5.7-(b) we show λIT for dmax = 600 slots. We notice that also in this case, adopting
the cost metric PIT , an accurate choice of the cooperating nodes made by our cooperation strategy,
2 GT, allows to reach the same performance of the case in which all nodes are shared, namely Full
Coop. Instead, the random choice of the nodes to share, 2 Rand, provide only a third or less of the
total gain achievable with full cooperation.
In Fig. 5.8, adopting again the cost metric PIT , we show λIT as a function of the maximum
allowed delay dmax for a packet generation intensity λn = 1.2 and λn = 2, in Fig. 5.8-(a) and
in Fig. 5.8-(b), respectively. We observe that varying the maximum allowed delay dmax with our
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Figure 5.5. BN estimation of the probability of transmission failure ptf as a function of the number of
flows F passing through the node.
cooperation strategy we obtain the same gain as with full cooperation, while with a random choice of
the cooperative nodes we obtain less than a third of the total gain achievable with full cooperation.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we develop a framework which can be used to select the cooperation strategy
between two coexisting wireless networks sharing some of their nodes. To sum up, our framework is
represented in Fig. 5.1 and follows the following steps:
(1) we learn the network behavior by measuring the TP and PP of interest over several random training
topologies;
(2) we use the BN method to infer the joint distribution among TP and PP;
(3) in the scenario of interest we observe the TP, we infer the PP, and we estimate the utility function
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of each network for all possible choices of the sharing nodes;
(4) we select the nodes to be shared based on a game theoretic approach in which each network
shares the nodes only if it obtains a benefit in doing that, incentives towards cooperation are provided
through a simple trigger strategy which takes into account the actions adopts by the another network
in the past.
Finally, we develop a wireless network simulator showing that, even when only a small fraction
of the nodes is shared, we obtain a significant gain. In particular, both for lightly and heavily loaded
scenarios, the selection scheme based on game theory can achieve almost the same performance as a
full cooperation scheme, for all the three performance metrics considered.
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Figure 5.6. Weighted delivery delay PWD as a function of the normalized packet generation intensity
λn = λ/λt, for the four compared scenarios.
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Figure 5.7. In-time packet arrival rate λIT as a function of the normalized packet generation intensity λn
for a value of the maximum allowed delay (a) dmax = 100 and (b) dmax = 600, in number of slots.
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Figure 5.8. In-time packet arrival rate λIT as a function of the maximum allowed delay dmax for a nor-
malized packet generation intensity (a) λn = 1.2 and (b) λn = 2.
Chapter 6
Designing and Selecting MAC Protocols
With Selfish Users
In this chapter1 we consider a number of users who compete to gain access to a channel, a slotted-
Aloha like random access protocol and two incentive schemes: pricing and intervention. We provide
some criteria for the designer of the protocol to choose one scheme between them and to design
the best policy for the selected scheme, depending on the system parameters. Our results show that
intervention can achieve the maximum efficiency in the perfect monitoring scenario. In the imperfect
monitoring scenario, instead, the performance of the system depends on the information held by the
different entities and, in some cases, there exists a threshold for the number of users such that, for a
number of users lower than the threshold, intervention outperforms pricing, whereas, for a number of
users higher than the threshold pricing outperforms intervention.
6.1 Introduction
In wireless communication networks, multiple users often share a common channel and contend
for access. Many distributed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols, some of them being used in
current international standards (e.g., IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n), have been designed assuming that users
are compliant with the protocol rules. Unfortunately, a self-interested and strategic user might ma-
1The material presented in this chapter has been published in:
[J3] L. Canzian, Y. Xiao, M. Zorzi, and M. van der Schaar, “Game Theoretic Design of MAC Protocols: Pricing and
Intervention in Slotted-Aloha,” Submitted to IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking
86 Chapter 6. Designing and Selecting MAC Protocols With Selfish Users
nipulate the protocol in order to obtain a larger share of the channel resource at the expense of that of
the other users.
We consider a slotted-Aloha like random access protocol, where each user transmits within a
slot according to some user-chosen probability. Without any further mechanism, self-interested users
would implement the always transmit strategy, resulting in the network collapse. To make the network
robust to selfish users, it is fundamental to design a scheme that provides to the users the incentives
to adopt a better (from the network designer point of view) strategy.
In the past decade a lot of research was dedicated to the development of such incentive schemes
for slotted-Aloha like random access protocols. Some of this research, such as [35–39], adopts pricing
schemes that charge the users for their resource usage.2 In this way, it is in the self-interest of each
user to limit its access probability. Such pricing schemes may achieve the goal of efficient use of
network resources. However, they suffer from the following drawbacks: (1) the designer has to know
how the prices affect the users’ utilities to design an efficient scheme; (2) it is not clear what do to
with the collected money, unless the network is managed by a profit-making enterprise; (3) a secure
infrastructure to collect the money is needed.
Recently, a new incentive scheme, called intervention, has been proposed in [66] and has been
applied to MAC problems [12, 42]. In this scheme, an intervention device is placed in the network.
Such a device can monitor the users’ behavior and intervene affecting the users’ resource usage. The
action of the intervention device depends on the actions of the users. The intervention device provides
the incentives for the users to obey a given access probability rule by threatening punishments if users
disobey. Intervention is more robust than pricing because users cannot avoid intervention as long as
they use network resources, but they might be able to avoid monetary charges. The implementation
of an intervention scheme requires to place an additional device, i.e., the intervention device, in the
network.
Repeated games can also encourage cooperative behaviors [90]. In this case users are forced to
take into account how their current actions can influence the future actions of the other users. A
cooperative behavior is induced by punishing deviating users in the future. Differently from the pre-
viously considered methods, this scheme does not require the presence of a central entity. However,
it requires a repeated interaction among users and the users must keep track of their past observations
2Notice that in the literature pricing schemes may refer also to distributed schemes in which the users are cooperative
and fictitious prices are used to obtain an efficient distributed algorithm. In our case, we consider strategic and selfish users,
thus, to be effective, the pricing scheme requires the users to pay real money.
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and be able to detect deviations and to coordinate their actions in order to punish deviating users. We
exclude incentive schemes based on repeated games because of these difficulties.
In this chapter we provide the tools to design pricing and intervention schemes to make a random
access protocol robust against strategic users. As in most of the previous works in pricing and inter-
vention, we consider only linear intervention and linear pricing schemes, because they are simple to
implement and yet efficient enough to achieve high performance (or even optimality in some cases).
Simple rules are important in particular for pricing schemes, because the users might not accept to
pay for their resource usage following complex rules. It is difficult to argue between different incen-
tive schemes in general: depending on the particular deployment scenario, the performance criterion,
and the implementation issues, each one of the incentive schemes can be better than the others. The
problem of the network designer is to identify the scheme that best fits its requirements and to design
the best policy for the selected scheme.
The complexity of the design process and the performance achievable depend on various features
of the system, such as the number of users, the users’ heterogeneity, the capability of monitoring the
users’ actions and the information held by the designer and the users. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that compares intervention and pricing in terms of the network environment, the
knowledge of the designer and the knowledge of the users. We focus on a simple MAC protocol,
slotted-Aloha, because it makes it possible to formulate a simple game in which the outcomes can be
computed analytically, to highlight the consequence of not taking into account the strategic nature of
some users when designing a MAC protocol, and to obtain important insights about possible solutions
to such a problem. For these features slotted-Aloha is widely used in game theoretic studies [8, 12,
35–39, 42]. The extension of this work to more realistic MAC protocols will be considered in future
works.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we consider the perfect monitoring
scenario, i.e., we assume that the users’ actions are estimated without errors. We show that interven-
tion can achieve the maximum efficiency, i.e., the maximum social welfare, while pricing is able to
reach an efficient use of the network resources but the positive payments subtracted from the users’
utilities prevent it to achieve the maximum social welfare
In the second part, we consider an imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming that a uniformly dis-
tributed noise term is added to the estimated actions. We derive the optimal pricing and intervention
schemes and quantify the performance achievable in this scenario, assuming that (1) neither the de-
signer nor the users are aware of the estimation errors (i.e., they believe that the designer is able
to observe the users’ actions perfectly), (2) only the designer is aware of the estimation errors, and
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(3) both the designer and the users are aware of the estimation errors. In the imperfect monitoring
scenario, the performance of the intervention scheme degrades considerably as the number of users
increases and the information held by the designer and the users plays an important role. In particular,
for case (3) there exists a threshold for the number of users such that, for a number of users lower
than the threshold, the intervention scheme outperforms the pricing scheme, while for a number of
users higher than the threshold the pricing scheme outperforms the intervention scheme. In the other
cases intervention allows to obtain higher performance than pricing. The analysis in this chapter can
serve as a guideline for a designer of a MAC protocol to select between pricing and intervention and
to design the best policy for the selected scheme, depending on some system parameters such as the
number of users, the statistics of the monitoring noise and the information held by the designer and
the users.
Despite its practical importance, very few works address the impact of the monitoring errors and
the information heterogeneity on the design and performance of an incentive scheme. To the best of
our knowledge, no prior work on pricing considers the issue of imperfect monitoring on users’ actions.
As to the intervention scheme, both [12] and [42] consider the imperfect monitoring scenario. [12]
adopts the same noise model we use, but it simplifies the analysis limiting the users’ action space,
whereas [42] considers a different type of imperfect monitoring, whose distribution depends on the
length of the time the intervention device takes to estimate users’ actions. However, in both works it
is assumed that the designer and the users are aware of the imperfect monitoring model. In our work
we analyze the effect of the information heterogeneity, considering also the cases in which nobody
is aware of the estimation errors and in which only the designer is aware of the estimation errors.
This provides understanding on how robust the considered incentive schemes are with respect to the
heterogeneity of information.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe the considered
MAC protocol. We introduce the games that model the interaction between strategic users and we
formulate the problem of designing efficient incentive schemes in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we
derive the optimal pricing and intervention schemes to adopt in the perfect monitoring scenario and
we quantify the performance achievable. We consider the imperfect monitoring scenario in Section
6.5, for three different cases, depending on who is aware of the imperfect monitoring model. Section
6.6 concludes with some remarks.
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6.2 System Model
We consider a wireless network of n users that share a common channel and we make the follow-
ing assumptions for the contention model:
• Time is slotted and slots are synchronized;
• Users always have packets to transmit in every slot;
• If a packet is received, the receiver immediately sends an acknowledgment (ACK) packet;
• The transmission of a packet and the (possible) corresponding ACK is completed within a slot;
• A packet is received successfully if and only if it does not collide with other transmissions;
• Each user i selects a transmission probability ai ∈ [0 1] at the beginning of the communication
and will transmit with the same probability ai in every time slot, i.e., there are no adjustments
in the transmission probabilities. This excludes coordination among users, for example, using
time division multiplexing.
Notice that ACK packets are always successfully received because they are transmitted over idle
channels.
Denoting with a = (a1, . . . , an) the transmission probability vector, the average throughput (in
packets per slot) of user i is given by
Ti(a) = ai
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)
The resource usage of user i is therefore proportional to i’s transmission probability.
We assume that the utility of user i is given by
Ui(a) = θi lnTi(a) (6.1)
where the parameter θi > 0 allows to differentiate between different classes of users. The higher θi,
the higher user i’s valuation for the throughput. The logarithm makes the utility a concave function,
which models the fact that the users usually have more desire to increase their own throughput when
it is low than when it is high.
We define the social welfare of the network as the sum of all users’ utilities:
U(a) =
n∑
i=1
Ui(a) (6.2)
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Finally, the network is said to operate optimally if the users choose the transmission probabilities
that maximize Eq. (6.2). It is straightforward to check that the Hessian of U(a) is a diagonal matrix
with strictly negative diagonal entries, therefore it is negative definite. Imposing the partial derivatives
equal to 0, the unique transmission probability vector a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n) that maximizes Eq. (6.2) is
given by
a∗k =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
, k = 1, . . . , n (6.3)
U(a∗) represents the maximum social welfare achievable.
In order to adopt the optimal transmission probability, the users need to know the sum of the
valuations θi of the other users. This information must be spread in the network at the beginning of
the communication. This can be done either in a distributed way or in a centralized way. In particular,
in the last case an entity (e.g., a predetermined user or the access point) might collect the users’
valuations and broadcast to all users the value
∑n
i=1 θi. Once the users have this information, they
can locally compute their optimal transmission probabilities according to Eq. (6.3) and adopt them.
6.3 Game Model and Design Problem Formulation
While the network optimal transmission policy a∗ is easy to compute, the actual transmission
probability selected by each user depends on the objective of that user. If the users are compliant with
the optimal policy, then they compute and adopt a∗ and the network operates optimally. However,
if the users are self-interested and strategic, instead of complying with the optimal policy they will
adopt the transmission probabilities that optimize their own utility. Since the interests of individual
users are different from the interests of the group of users as a whole, the network might (and usually
will) operate inefficiently.
To analyze the interaction between strategic decision-makers, we define the contention game
Γ = (N,A, {Ui(·)}
n
i=1)
where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the set of users, A = ×ni=1 [0, 1]
n denotes the action space and
Ui : A→ < is the utility of a generic user i, defined by Eq. (6.1). The action for user i represents the
transmission probability ai chosen by user i. Throughout the chapter, we will use the terms action and
transmission probability interchangeably, and similarly for action profile and transmission probability
vector.
The NEs of the contention game Γ can be easily characterized considering the following cases.
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1) Assume that all user, except for user i, adopt a transmission probability strictly smaller than 1.
Then the utility of user i is increasing in ai: the higher the transmission probability chosen by
i the higher i’s throughput. Thus, i chooses ai = 1.
2) Assume that there is at least a user j 6= i that adopts a transmission probability equal to 1.
Then the channel is always busy and user i obtains a throughput equal to 0, regardless of its
transmission probability.
In case 1) ai = 1, in case 2) aj = 1 Thus, a is a Nash Equilibrium of the contention game Γ if
and only if at least one user adopts a transmission probability equal to 1. Notice that ai = 1 is a
weakly dominant strategy for every user i, i.e., ui(1, a−i) ≥ ui(a), for every action profile a. In our
contention game each user has an incentive to adopt the always transmit strategy, resulting in network
collapse.
Here we ask if it is possible to design the network to make it robust against strategic users. We
want to introduce some mechanism to deter the users from adopting high transmission probabilities.
The incentive schemes we consider belong to two classes:
• Pricing: users are charged depending on their transmission probabilities
• Intervention: the users’ resource usage is affected by the intervention device, in a way that
depends on the users’ transmission probabilities
The interaction between the designer, the users and the system can be roughly summarized into
three stages, (1) the design stage, (2) the information exchange stage, and (3) the transmission stage.
In the design stage the designer designs the pricing or intervention scheme. Specifically, the
designer predicts strategic users’ actions given any pricing or intervention scheme, and chooses the
pricing or intervention scheme that results in the most desired outcome. This is done once, then the
designer leaves the system forever. Notice that, to efficiently design these schemes, the designer has to
know how pricing or intervention affect the users’ utilities. This might be easier for the intervention
scheme, in which the users’ throughput is altered. In this case the designer has to know only the
relation between the throughput and the utility of each user. Differently, in the pricing schemes users
are charged for their resource usage. Hence, the designer has to know how throughput and payments
are connected to the utility of each user. In this work we implicitly assume that the designer knows
these dependencies, because we focus on a particular relation between the utilities, the throughput,
and the payments.
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In the information exchange stage some useful information is collect and, possibly, distributed.
The intervention device (or the device that manages the payments in the pricing scheme) has to iden-
tify the users that are connected to the network, has to inform them about the adopted intervention
or pricing scheme, and has to learn the action they select. For the latter point, as an example, it can
count the number of correct transmissions of each user in a certain time interval. However, since this
time interval must be finite, the estimation might be affected by errors. To consider the impact of this
imperfect estimation we will denote by aˆi the estimated action of user i, by aˆ the estimated action
profile and by pii(aˆi | ai) the probability density function of i’s estimated action, given that i’s action
is ai. We say that the monitoring is perfect if the users’ actions are estimated without errors, i.e., aˆi
coincides with ai.3 We say that the monitoring is imperfect if the estimates are affected by errors, i.e.,
there is a positive probability that aˆi is different from ai.
In the transmission stage the users transmit the packets adopting the same transmission probability
and, in the meantime, they have to pay for their resource usage based on the pricing scheme, or their
resource usage is affected based on the intervention scheme.
In this chapter we play the role of a benevolent designer that seeks to design the pricing and
intervention rules to maximize the social welfare of the system in the transmission stage. We neglect
the social welfare obtained in the information exchange stage because we assume that the transmission
stage length is much longer than that of the information exchange stage.
6.3.1 Pricing
Pricing schemes use monetary charges to deter users’ greediness. If i’s payment is increasing in
i’s resource usage, user i might find it convenient to limit its transmission probability. In general, user
i is charged according to the pricing rule fPi : [0, 1]→ <, which is a function of i’s estimated action
aˆi. Assuming that the payments affect additively the users’ utilities, i’s expected utility is given by
UPi (a) = E
[
θi lnTi(a)− f
P
i (aˆi)
]
= θi lnTi(a)−
∫ 1
0
pii(aˆi | ai)f
P
i (aˆi)∂aˆi (6.4)
where E [·] is the expectation operator.
Once a pricing scheme is selected and communicated to the users, the interaction among users
can be modeled through the game
ΓP =
(
N,A,
{
UPi (·)
}n
i=1
)
(6.5)
3In this case pii(aˆi | ai) might be thought as a Dirac delta function centered in ai.
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Among all the possible pricing rules, there is one class of rules that is particularly interesting,
namely, the class of linear pricing rules, in which users are charged linearly with respect to their
transmission probabilities, i.e.,
fPi (aˆi) = ciaˆi
where ci ≥ 0 is the unit price. We restrict our attention to the linear pricing rules, as done in most
of the pricing literature, because they are computationally simple to implement and we do not lose
much, in term of performance, in doing so.
Once the prices c = (c1, . . . , cn) are fixed, since we will prove the existence and uniqueness of
the NE of the game ΓP , the social welfare can be uniquely determined. The goal of the designer
is to choose the unit prices c = (c1, . . . , cn) to maximize the social welfare, i.e., it has to solve the
following Pricing Design (PD) problem:
PD argmax
c
∑
i∈N
UPi (a
NE)
subject to:
ci ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ N
UPi (a
NE) ≥ UPi (ai, a
NE
−i ) , ∀ ai ∈ [0, 1] , ∀ i ∈ N
6.3.2 Intervention
In the intervention framework the designer deploys in the network an intervention device that
monitors the users’ actions and can intervene adopting itself an action that affects the users’ resource
usage. In our case, we assume that the intervention device is able to correctly recognize the packets
transmitted by different users and to estimate the users’ actions. If the packet of a generic user i is
correctly received, the intervention device may choose to jam its ACK4 depending on the estimate of
its action. Specifically, the intervention device jams the ACK sent to user i with a probability that is
given by the intervention rule f Ii : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], which is a function of the estimated action aˆi.
The intervention level f Ii (aˆi) must be interpreted as a punishment to user i after having deviated
from a recommended (socially-beneficial) action. Such punishments are a threat to users, and must be
designed such that the users find in their self-interest to adopt the recommended actions. At the same
time, when users adopt the recommended actions, the intervention level must be minimized (possibly,
nullified), to avoid to decrease the users’ utilities.
4Many works on security, such as [91–93], take into consideration the possibility of performing intelligent jamming in
which the jamming signal is concentrated on control packets.
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Different from pricing, intervention changes the structure of the utility of each user affecting
directly their resource usage. In fact, the average throughput of user i is now given by
T Ii (a) = E

ai (1− f Ii (aˆi)) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)

 = ai(1− ∫ 1
0
pii(aˆi | ai)f
I
i (aˆi)∂aˆi
) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)
(6.6)
where
∫ 1
0 pii(aˆi | ai)f
I
i (aˆi)∂aˆi represents the average intervention level.
The utility of user i is modified accordingly
U Ii (a) = θi lnT
I
i (a) (6.7)
Once the intervention rules are selected and communicated to the users, the interaction among the
users can be modeled through the game
ΓI =
(
N,A,
{
U Ii (·)
}n
i=1
)
(6.8)
We say that the intervention rules f I =
(
f I1 , . . . , f
I
n
)
sustain an action profile a, if a is a NE of ΓI .
Among all the possible intervention rules, there is one class of rules that is particularly interesting,
namely, the class of affine intervention rules. f Ii : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is an affine intervention rule if
f Ii (aˆi) = [ri(aˆi − a˜i)]
1
0
for certain parameters a˜i ∈ [0, 1] and ri ≥ 0, where [·]ba = min {max {a, ·} , b}.
In an affine intervention rule, a˜i represents a target action for user i while ri represents the rate of
increase of the intervention level due to an increase in i’s action. If the estimated action aˆi is lower
than or equal to the target action a˜i, then the intervention level is equal to 0. If the estimated action
aˆi is higher than the target action a˜i, then the intervention level is proportional to aˆi − a˜i, until it
saturates to 1.
For ri → +∞, the intervention device jams the ACKs sent to user i whenever it detects that i
is adopting an action higher than the target one. Such a rule, which we refer to as an extreme rule,
represents the strongest punishment that the intervention device can adopt.
We restrict our attention to the affine intervention rules because they are computationally simple
to implement and we do not lose much, in term of performance, in doing so (as we will see, in some
cases such rules are even able to achieve the benchmark optimum).
Once the parameters a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n) and r = (r1, . . . , rn) are fixed, and assuming that the
users coordinate to the best (from the social welfare point of view) NE of the game ΓI 5, the social
5The existence of NEs will be proved for the considered scenarios and it is easy to coordinate the users to the best NE.
In fact, we will prove that the best NE is uniquely determined by a˜.
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welfare can be determined. The goal of the designer is to choose the parameters a˜ and r to maximize
the social welfare, i.e., it has to solve the following Intervention Design (ID) problem:
ID argmax
a˜,r
[
max
aNE
∑
i∈N
U Ii (a
NE)
]
subject to:
a˜i ∈ [0, 1] , ri ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ N
U Ii (a
NE) ≥ U Ii (ai, a
NE
−i ) , ∀ ai ∈ [0, 1] , ∀ i ∈ N
Differently from the PD problem, the ID problem requires a maximization with respect to the NEs
because of the non uniqueness of the NE.
6.4 Perfect Monitoring
In this section we assume that the estimated actions are equal to the real actions, i.e., aˆi = ai,
for every user i ∈ N . Hence, in Eqs. (6.4) and (6.6) the integrals must be substituted, respectively,
with fPi (ai) and f Ii (ai). In the following we compute the optimal linear pricing scheme and affine
intervention rule that a designer should adopt to maximize the social welfare if the monitoring is
perfect.
6.4.1 Pricing design
Given a linear pricing scheme ci, i ∈ N , the interaction between users in the perfect monitoring
scenario adopting pricing is modeled with the game
ΓP =
(
N,A,
{
UPi (·)
}n
i=1
)
(6.9)
where
UPi (a) = θi ln

ai n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)

− ciai (6.10)
The goal of the designer is to design the unit prices c to maximize the social welfare in the presence
of strategic users, solving the PD problem with the utilities given by Eq. (6.10).
Lemma 1. The unique NE of the game ΓP is aNEk =
θk
ck
, k ∈ N .
Proof. To compute the best response function of users k, we use the first order condition. First, we
check that UPk (a) is concave in ak (i.e., the second derivative with respect to ak is negative). Then,
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we set to 0 the first derivative of UPk (a), with respect to ak.
∂UPk (a)
∂ak
=
θk
ak
− ck ,
∂2UPk (a)
∂a2k
= −
θk
a2k
< 0 ,
∂UPk (a)
∂ak
= 0 −→ ak =
θk
ck
Proposition 6. The optimal pricing scheme to adopt is c∗k =
∑
i θi.
Proof. We want to find the unit prices ck, k ∈ N , so that the social welfare U(a) =
∑n
i=1 U
P
i (a) is
maximized, assuming that the users adopt the NE action profile (i.e., we have to substitute ck with
θk
ak
into the expression of U(a)). We first prove that U(a) is a (multivariable) concave function, by
checking its Hessian.
∂U(a)
∂ak
=
θk
ak
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− ak
,
∂2U(a)
∂a2k
= −
θk
a2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− ak)2
< 0 ,
∂2U(a)
∂akdpi
= 0 , i 6= k
The Hessian of U(a) is negative definite (it is a diagonal matrix with strictly negative diagonal en-
tries), so U(a) is concave. Thus, the global maximizer of U(a) can be obtained with the first order
condition
∂U(a)
∂ak
= 0 −→ ak =
θk∑
i θi
−→ ck =
∑
i
θi , k ∈ N
Notice that the transmission probabilities adopted by the users in the optimal pricing policy are
equal to the transmission probabilities adopted by compliant users to maximize the social welfare,
i.e., aNEk =
θk
c∗k
= a∗, where a∗ is defined in Eq. (6.3).
6.4.2 Intervention design
Given an affine intervention rule ri and a˜i, i ∈ N , the interaction between users in the perfect
monitoring scenario adopting intervention is modeled with the game
ΓI =
(
N,A,
{
U Ii (·)
}n
i=1
)
(6.11)
where
U Ii (a) = θi ln

ai (1− [ri(ai − a˜i)]10) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)

 (6.12)
The goal of the designer is to design the intervention rule to maximize the social welfare in the
presence of strategic users, solving the ID problem with the utilities given by Eq. (6.12).
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Notice the a˜k = 1 and a˜k = 0 represent trivial cases. If a˜k = 1 the intervention device never
jams the ACK sent to user k, ∀ ak, and in this case ak = 1 represents a weakly dominant strategy, as
discussed in Section 6.3. If a˜k = 0 user k is punished whenever it transmits with positive probability.
However, the aim of the designer is to maximize the social welfare, hence, it must first guarantee
a positive throughput to every user. Thus, it is always more beneficial to consider a a˜k slightly
higher than 0 instead of 0. For this reason, in the following we focus on intervention rules in which
a˜k ∈ (0, 1), ∀ k.
Lemma 2. a˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜n) is a NE of the game ΓI if and only if rk ≥ 1
a˜k
, for every user k ∈ N .
Moreover, once a˜ and rk ≥
1
a˜k
are fixed, among all the NEs of ΓI , a˜ is (individually and socially) the
best.
Proof. We can write rk = 1
a˜k + δ
, for some constant δ > −a˜k. Then
U Ik (ak, a˜−k) =


θk ln
[
ak
∏
j 6=k(1 − a˜j)
]
if ak < a˜k
θk ln
[
−a2k + 2a˜kak + δak
a˜k + δ
∏
j 6=k(1− a˜j)
]
if a˜k ≤ ak ≤ 2a˜k + δ
−∞ if ak > 2a˜k + δ
We study the sign of
∂U Ik (ak, a˜−k)
∂ak
in the interval [0, 2a˜k + δ] to obtain the best action for user k.
∂U Ik (ak, a˜−k)
∂ak
=


θk
ak
if ak < a˜k
θk
2 (a˜k − ak) + δ
ak (2a˜k − ak + δ)
if a˜k ≤ ak ≤ 2a˜k + δ
If δ ≤ 0 (i.e, rk ≥ 1
a˜k
), U Ik (ak, a˜−k) is continuous, increasing in ak for ak < a˜k and decreasing
otherwise. Thus, a˜k is the best action for user k.
If δ > 0 (i.e, rk < 1
a˜k
), U Ik (ak, a˜−k) is continuous, increasing in ak for ak < a˜k +
δ
2
and
decreasing otherwise. Thus, a˜k +
δ
2
(> a˜k) is the best action for user k.
Hence, a˜ is a NE if and only if rk ≥
1
a˜k
, ∀ k. Notice also that, in this situation, a˜ is a weakly
dominant strategy: it is in the self interest of each user k to adopt a˜k, independently of the strategies
of the other users. Thus, the users will coordinate to such NE.
Finally, notice that other NEs of ΓI can only be obtained when at least two users transmit with
probability 1. In fact, in this situation no user can increase its utility changing its action. Actually,
the utility can not decrease either: it is constant and it is the worst (individually and socially) possible
utility, corresponding to the situation in which the throughput of each user is equal to 0.
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Proposition 7. The optimal affine intervention rule to adopt is rk ≥ 1
a∗k
and a˜k = a∗k, for every user
k, where a∗k is defined in Eq. (6.3).
Proof. Given the actions of the users, the utility of a user and the social welfare are decreasing as
the intervention level for that user increases. However, using the intervention rule rk ≥
1
a∗k
and
a˜k = a
∗
k, ∀ k, the users have the incentive to adopt the action profile a = a∗ and, at the same time,
the intervention level they are subjected to is equal to 0. Thus, the outcome of the system is equal to
the benchmark optimum. Finally, this implies that rk ≥
1
a∗k
and a˜k = a∗k defines an optimal affine
intervention rule, and, more specifically, it defines also an optimal intervention rule within the class
of all intervention rules.
Corollary 3. The optimal affine intervention rule is optimal in the class of all intervention rules.
6.4.3 Comparison between pricing and intervention and some results
By adopting either pricing or intervention the designer can provide the incentive for strategic
users to choose the optimal action profile of Eq. (6.3). The efficiency of the utilization of the channel
resource is optimized with respect to the valuations θi, i ∈ N , of the users. However, there is a big
difference between pricing and intervention. Intervention schemes reach this objective by threatening
the users to intervene if they do not follow the recommendations, although at the equilibrium the
intervention is not triggered and therefore the resource usage is not affected. Conversely, pricing
schemes charge each user that transmits with a positive probability, thus affecting its utility and the
social welfare. Hence, only the intervention scheme is able to achieve the optimal social welfare that
can be obtained when users behave cooperatively, i.e., when they comply to a prescribed protocol that
maximizes the social welfare.
In Fig. 6.1 the social welfare and the total throughput in the perfect monitoring scenario are
plotted as a function of the number of users in the system, both assuming that the users behave
cooperatively, and adopting the pricing and intervention schemes derived in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2
to enforce the users’ actions. A symmetric case is considered, i.e., θi = 1, ∀ i ∈ N . Thus, the optimal
transmission policy in the cooperative scenario, defined by Eq. (6.3), is a∗k =
1
n
, for every user k.
The results confirm the above discussion: both schemes are able to obtain the same total through-
put of the cooperative case, but only the intervention scheme is able to maximize the (total) users’
satisfaction. In fact, there is a finite gap, which increases as the number of users increases, between
the optimal social welfare and the one achievable with the pricing scheme. Finally, notice that the
social welfare always decreases as the number of users increases because there are more collisions
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Figure 6.1. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the perfect monitoring scenario
and the number of unexploited slots increases, resulting in an inefficient utilization of the channel;
this is an unavoidable consequence of the lack of coordination.
6.5 Imperfect Monitoring
We now study whether the qualitative results obtained for the perfect monitoring scenario still
hold for the imperfect monitoring case. In this section we will see that there is a substantial difference
for the intervention scheme when the monitoring is imperfect. The intuition behind it is related to
the possibility that the estimation errors trigger the intervention even though the users are adopting
the recommended actions. As for the pricing scheme, if the expectations of the estimated actions are
equal to the real actions, each user might be overcharged or undercharged. On average, it is charged
correctly, therefore the performance is not strongly affected.
The imperfect monitoring model we consider for the estimation of user i’s action is an additive
noise term that is uniformly distributed in [−i, i], with 0 < i  1, i.e.,
aˆi = [ai + ni]
1
0 , ni ∼ U [−i, i]
In the following we compute the best linear pricing scheme and affine intervention rule that a
designer should adopt to maximize the social welfare for different scenarios, depending on the infor-
mation that the designer and the users have about the imperfect monitoring. In particular, we consider
the following cases:
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1) Nobody is aware of the estimation errors: neither the designer nor the users know about the
existence of the noise, and think that the designer can estimate perfectly the users’ actions.
2) The designer is aware of the estimation errors: the designer knows about the existence and the
distribution of the noise, while the users think that the designer can estimate perfectly their
actions.
3) Everybody is aware of the estimation errors: both the designer and the users know about the
existence and the distribution of the noise.
6.5.1 Nobody is aware of the estimation errors
In this scenario both the designer and the users believe that the users’ estimated actions, aˆ, are
equal to the real ones, a. The additive noise ni might be caused by a physical phenomenon which is
not predicted by the designer and the users. As an example, the intervention device (or the device that
manages the payments in the pricing scheme) might have, at a certain point, a malfunctioning that is
not revealed and introduces noise in the measurements.
Both the designer and the users have a wrong perception of the reality: they both believe that the
utilities are as in the perfect monitoring scenario even though their real utilities are affected by the
noise. Since the users select their actions based on their beliefs, once the pricing and the intervention
rules are fixed, their interaction can still be modeled through the games (6.9) and (6.11), as in the
perfect monitoring case. Analogously, the designer designs the pricing or the intervention rule based
on its beliefs. Hence, it has no reason to select rules different from the optimal (with respect to its
beliefs) rules derived in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2. The only difference with respect to the perfect
monitoring case is that the real performance of the system is different from the one expected by the
users and the designer.
Notice that both users and designer might update their beliefs observing the real performance of
the system. However, this might not be easy to do due to the lack of information. On one hand,
the designer designs an intervention rule and implements it in the intervention device, then it leaves
the system. If the estimation errors are not correctly predicted in the design stage they affect the
system, unless the designer implements a mechanism in the intervention device to reveal such errors.
However, it might be difficult to discriminate between an estimation error and a real deviation of a
user trying to increase its own utility.
On the other hand, the users might not be able to recognize the effect of an estimation error. As an
example, in the intervention scheme the estimation error triggers, occasionally, the intervention, with
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the consequent decrease of the throughput of a generic user i. However, user i’s throughput decreases
if another user increases its transmission probability as well. Thus, i is not able to understand if its
utility has decreased due to the presence of the estimation errors or for some other reasons, and is not
able to update its belief correctly.
This scenario has been considered in order to analyze how robust to an unknown noise the
schemes derived in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 are.
6.5.2 The designer is aware of the estimation errors
In this scenario the users are not aware about the estimation noise, while the designer knows
the distribution of the noise and knows that the users’ beliefs are wrong. Once the pricing and the
intervention rules are given, the interaction between users can still be modeled through the games
(6.9) and (6.11), in which the users act believing that their utilities are not affected by the estimation
noise. When designing the pricing or the intervention rule, the designer has to take into account both
that the users act strategically, according to their mismatched perceptions, and that the social welfare
is affected by the noise. It has to solve the PD and ID problems using the expectation of the noisy
utilities given by Eq. (6.4) and (6.7) in the maximization and using the non-noisy utilities given by
Eq. (6.10) and (6.12) in the constraints. In fact, the set of constraints represents the NEs of the
game played by the users, in which the users select their action to maximize the utilities they believe
to receive, i.e., the non-noisy utilities; while the maximization reflects the choice of the designer,
that wants to maximize the real satisfaction of the users, represented by the expectation of the noisy
utilities.
Finally notice that, as described in Subsection 6.5.1, it might be difficult for the users to reveal
the presence of the estimation errors by observing the real performance of the system.
6.5.2.1 Pricing design
Let ak,1 denote the unique solution of equation
θka
3
k −
(
θk + 4k
n∑
i=1
θi
)
a2k +
(
4kθk − 
2
kθk
)
ak + 
2
kθk = 0
in (0, k), assuming
θk∑n
i=1 θi
< k. Let ak,2 denote the unique solution of equation
−θka
3
k +
(
θk − 4k
n∑
i=1
θi
)
a2k +
(
4kθk + (1− k)
2 θk
)
ak − (1− k)
2 θk = 0
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in (1− k, 1), assuming
θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− k.
In the proof of the following result, it is shown that ak,1 and ak,2 exist and are unique.
Proposition 8. The optimal unit price ck to adopt is, ∀ k ∈ N ,
ck =


θk
ak,1
if θk∑n
i=1 θi
< k∑n
i=1 θi if k ≤
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≤ 1− k
θk
ak,2
if θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− k
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
6.5.2.2 Intervention design
To design an intervention rule able to sustain the target action profile a˜, the designer has to satisfy
the condition rk ≥
1
a˜k
, ∀ k, provided by Lemma 2. The best option for the designer is to select
rk =
1
a˜k
, ∀ k, in order to sustain a˜ and, at the same time, to minimize the punishment adopted against
k when intervention is triggered by estimation errors. Finally, the designer has to select the best a˜k,
for every user k.
Let ak,3 denote the unique solution of equation
−θk − n∑
j=1
θj

 a2k +

2θk − 2k n∑
j=1
θj

 ak + 2kθk = 0
in (0, k). In the proof of the following result, it is shown that ak,3 exists and is unique.
Proposition 9. The optimal affine intervention rule to adopt is, for every user k, rk = 1
a˜k
and
a˜k =


ak,3 if k > 4θk
4
∑n
j=1 θj −
∑n
j=1,j 6=k θj
4θk + k
∑n
j=1,j 6=k θj
4
∑n
j=1 θj
if k ≤ 4θk
4
∑n
j=1 θj −
∑n
j=1,j 6=k θj
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
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6.5.3 Everybody is aware of the estimation errors
In this scenario both the designer and the users are aware of the estimation errors and they know
their distribution. The interaction between users must be modeled through the games (6.5) and (6.8)
considering the real distribution of the noise in Eq. (6.4) and (6.6). The designer has to solve the PD
and ID problems using the utilities given by Eq. (6.4) and (6.7).
6.5.3.1 Pricing design
Once the pricing scheme is given, the interaction between users can be modeled with the game in
Eq. (6.5), where
UPi (a) = θi ln

ai n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)

− ci
2i
∫ i
−i
[ai + x]
1
0 ∂x
Denote
C () =
{
x :
1
2
≤ x ≤ 1−  and x lnx− x ≥ 
4
− 1
}
ak =


−
k
2
+
1
2
√
2k +
8kθk
ck
if θk
ck
< k
θk
ck
if k ≤ ak ≤
1
2
or ak ∈ C (k)
1 otherwise
(6.13)
Lemma 3. ak is the unique NE of the game ΓP .
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Consider the following notation:
ak,4 =
θk(2− k)
4
∑
i θi
+
1
2
√[
θk(2− k)
2
∑
i θi
]2
+ 4
θkk
2
∑
i θi
ak,5 = max C (k)
Proposition 10. The optimal unit price ck to adopt is, ∀ k ∈ N ,
ck =


2kθk
ak,4(ak,4 + k)
if ak,4 < k
θk
k
if ak,4 ≥ k and θk∑
i θi
≤ k∑
i θi if k ≤
θk∑
i θi
≤
1
2
or
θk∑
i θi
∈ C (k)
θk
ak,5
otherwise
(6.14)
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Proof. See Appendix A.4.
6.5.3.2 Intervention design
Once the intervention scheme is given, the interaction between users can be modeled with the
game in Eq. (6.8), where
U Ii (a) = θi ln

aiE [[ri (ai + ni − a˜i)]10] n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)


Lemma 4. Assume 2k ≤ ak ≤ 1 − k, ak is the unique NE of the game ΓI if rk → +∞ and
a˜k = ak + k.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Lemma 4 states that, using an extreme rule, each user k has the incentive to adopt a transmission
probability ak which is k lower than a˜k, to avoid the possibility of an intervention triggered by the
estimation errors. This is true as long as a˜k is not too low, otherwise for user k it is convenient to
adopt a transmission probability closer to a˜k, accepting the risk of an intervention triggered by the
estimation errors.
Proposition 11. If a∗k =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≥ 2k, for every user k, then the intervention rule rk → +∞ and
a˜k = a
∗
k + k is an optimal affine intervention.
Proof. According to Lemma 4, users have the incentive to adopt a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗n). In this case the
intervention level is equal to 0 because the estimation errors can not be higher than  = (∗1, . . . , ∗n).
Thus, the outcome of the system is equal to the benchmark optimum. Finally, this implies that rk →
+∞ and a˜k = a∗k + k define an optimal affine intervention rule, and, more specifically, also define
an optimal intervention rule within the class of all intervention rules.
Corollary 4. If a∗k =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≥ 2k, the optimal affine intervention rule is optimal in the class of
all intervention rules.
We consider the following affine intervention rule, for every user k
rk → +∞
a˜k =

 a
∗
k + k if a∗k ≥ 2k
3k otherwise
(6.15)
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Eq. (6.15) defines an optimal intervention rule if a∗k ≥ 2k, for every user k. If a∗k < 2k , for
some user k, the intervention rule might not be optimal. This rule is designed with the objective to
minimize the intervention level. In fact, each user i has the incentive to adopt the action a˜i−i, which
results in an intervention level equal to 0.
6.5.4 Comparison between pricing and intervention and some results
In the following we investigate how the social welfare and the total throughput vary increasing
the number of users in the system, for the imperfect monitoring scenario, adopting both the pricing
and the intervention schemes. We consider the symmetric case, i.e., θi = θj and i = j , ∀ i, j ∈ N .
Thus, the optimal transmission policy in the cooperative scenario, defined by Eq. (6.3), is a∗k = 1n ,
for every user k.
First we assume that nobody, neither the designer nor the users, is aware of the estimation errors.
As discussed in Subsection 6.5.1, the designer adopts the schemes derived in Section 6.4 and the
users, consequently, have the incentive to adopt the action a∗k = 1n . Fig 6.2 shows that the estimation
errors have different effects in the two schemes. In the pricing scheme they do not affect the total
throughput, and the social welfare is slightly affected only when the number of users exceeds 1
i
= 10
(corresponding to the condition a∗k < i). In fact, if the number of users is less than or equal to 10,
each user is (on average) charged correctly. Conversely, if the number of users exceeds 10, the ex-
pectation of the estimated transmission probability aˆk is higher than the real transmission probability
a∗k and each user is (on average) slightly overcharged, resulting in a social welfare slightly lower than
the one obtainable in the perfect monitoring scenario (see Fig. 6.1). In the intervention scheme the
effect of the estimation errors is stronger. In fact, they occasionally trigger intervention, which de-
creases both the throughput and the utility experienced by each user. Nevertheless, the social welfare
adopting intervention is still higher than the social welfare adopting pricing.
Now we consider the imperfect monitoring scenario assuming that only the designer is aware of
the estimation errors. In this case, the designer can adopt the optimal pricing and intervention schemes
derived in Subsection 6.5.2. The social welfares obtainable with both schemes, shown in Fig. 6.3,
are only slightly higher than the social welfares obtainable when nobody is aware of the estimation
errors, shown in Fig. 6.2 (such differences will be clearer in Figs. 6.6 and 6.7). This means that
the designer can not gain much with the additional information on the presence of estimation errors,
and knowing their statistics. In particular, for the pricing scheme such information is useless if the
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Figure 6.2. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the imperfect monitoring scenario,
assuming nobody is aware of the estimation errors
number of users is less than 10, because the best pricing schemes derived in Subsections 6.5.2 and
6.4.2 are identical in this situation.
Now we investigate the performance achievable in the imperfect monitoring scenario assuming
that everyone is aware of the estimation errors. In this case the users, knowing that the noise might
bias the payments (pricing) or the punishments (intervention), adopt a different NE action profile.
Since the designer can foresee the users’ behavior, it can adopt the pricing and intervention schemes
derived in Subsection 6.5.3. Fig. 6.4 shows that the performance attainable with the pricing scheme is
very similar to the preceding cases, only slightly worse. Conversely, the performance achievable with
the intervention scheme is completely different from the preceding cases. The intervention scheme
is able to achieve the optimal social welfare as long as the number of users is less than or equal
to 5 (corresponding to the condition a∗k ≥ 2k), as predicted by Proposition 11). If the number of
users is higher than 5, both the total throughput and the social welfare decrease rapidly as the number
of users increases. This trend is a consequence of the action adopted by the users in this situation,
which is constant and equal to 2k instead of scaling with the number of users. This causes a rapid
increase of the number of collisions. Finally, this trend determines a threshold in the number of users
such that, for a number of users lower than the threshold, intervention outperforms pricing, whereas,
for a number of users higher than the threshold, pricing outperforms intervention. The value of the
threshold for the considered system parameters is equal to 15.
In Fig. 6.5 the value of the threshold is plotted varying k, the maximum intensity of the noise.
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Figure 6.3. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the imperfect monitoring scenario,
assuming that only the designer is aware of the estimation errors
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Figure 6.4. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users, in the imperfect monitoring scenario,
assuming everybody is aware of the estimation errors
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Figure 6.5. Threshold vs. noise in the imperfect monitoring scenario, assuming everybody is aware of the
estimation errors
The threshold decreases as k increases, because the intervention scheme is more sensitive to the esti-
mation errors than the pricing scheme. For the highest noise considered, i.e., i = 0.2, the intervention
scheme outperforms the pricing scheme as long as the number of users is less than 9.
In order to have a quantitative comparison between the different scenarios, in Figs. 6.6 and 6.7 we
plot the social welfare and the total throughput achievable for all considered cases, adopting pricing
and intervention respectively. In both Figures, we see that the system achieves the best performance
if the monitoring is perfect. In case it is not, for the pricing scheme the best case is when only the
designer is aware of the estimation errors, whereas the worst case is when also the users are aware of
the estimation errors. It is not surprising that, in a strategic setting, the more information the selfish
users have the worse the efficiency of the equilibrium point. Conversely, for the intervention scheme
we notice that when the users are aware of the estimation errors the social welfare might be higher
than when they are not. This result does not contradict the previous one, in fact it is caused by the
additional information that the designer has as well: it knows that the users know that estimation errors
exist, thus, it can design different intervention rules. In particular, it can adopt a more severe rule (e.g.,
the extreme rule, with rk → +∞) that forces the users to keep their transmission probabilities low
in order to avoid that the intervention is occasionally triggered by the estimation errors. Fig. 6.7
shows that there is a threshold in the number of users such that, for a number of users lower than
the threshold, it is socially convenient that the users are aware of the estimation errors, while for a
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Figure 6.6. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users adopting pricing, for different scenar-
ios
number of users higher than the threshold it is not.
Finally, in Figs. 6.8 and 6.9 we consider the imperfect monitoring scenario assuming that ev-
eryone is aware of the estimation errors, and we compare the considered intervention scheme of Eq.
(6.15) with the optimal affine intervention rule. The optimal affine intervention rule is computed
adopting an exhaustive search algorithm. Notice that this is possible because we consider a sym-
metric scenario. In asymmetric scenarios the calculation of the optimal rule through an exhaustive
search algorithm would be computationally too expensive. Fig. 6.8 shows the action selected by the
users and the average intervention level varying the number of users, while Fig. 6.9 shows the so-
cial welfare and the total throughput varying the number of users. Proposition 11 guarantees that the
considered intervention rule is optimal for a number of users equal or lower than 5 (corresponding to
the condition a∗k ≥ 2k). However, as we can see, the considered intervention rule is optimal until 9
users. If the number of users exceeds 9, it is preferable to be more aggressive with the intervention
rule, using a a˜k lower than 3k and forcing the users to decrease their transmission probability as well,
even though this means that the intervention is occasionally triggered.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we tackle the problem of designing pricing and intervention schemes to provide
incentives for the users to exploit efficiently the channel resource in a contention game. The design
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Figure 6.7. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users adopting intervention, for different
scenarios
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Figure 6.8. The users’ actions and the average level of intervention vs. number of users in the imperfect
monitoring scenario, assuming everybody is aware of the estimation errors, adopting the considered policy
and the optimal one
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Figure 6.9. Social welfare and total throughput vs. number of users in the imperfect monitoring scenario,
assuming everybody is aware of the estimation errors, adopting the considered policy and the optimal one
of the optimal schemes strongly depends on the parameters of the system, such as the statistics of the
estimation errors, and on the information held by the designer and by the users.
In this work we have considered both the perfect monitoring and the imperfect monitoring scenar-
ios, assuming, for the latter case, that (1) neither the designer nor the users are aware of the estimation
errors, (2) only the designer is aware of the estimation errors, and (3) both the designer and the users
are aware of the estimation errors. The optimal linear pricing and affine intervention schemes have
been analytically computed (for the case (3), the considered intervention scheme is optimal only in
some conditions).
The analysis shows that the intervention scheme, differently from the pricing scheme, is able
to achieve the optimal performance in the perfect monitoring scenario. On the other hand, in the
imperfect monitoring scenario intervention might be triggered even when the users adopt the recom-
mended actions, resulting in a degradation of the system performance. Nevertheless, we noticed that
intervention outperforms pricing in cases (1) and (2), while for case (3), as a rough general princi-
ple, intervention achieves greater efficiency than pricing when the number of users is small and the
opposite is true when the number of users is large.
Another interesting result is related to the effect of the information held by the different entities.
While it is always desirable for the designer to have as much information as possible, the effect of
the information held by the selfish users is not trivial. In many cases it is preferable that the users are
uninformed, but, sometimes, the information held by the users allows the designer to design better
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rules. In our particular case, we have seen that the intervention can achieve the benchmark optimum
if the users are aware of the estimation errors and the number of users is not too high. This suggests
the idea, that might be true also in other settings, of hiding some system parameters from the users in
determinate conditions.
Finally, the analysis in this chapter can serve as a guideline for a designer to select between pricing
and intervention and to design the best policy for the selected scheme, depending on some system
parameters such as the number of users, the statistics of the monitoring noise and the information
held by the designer and the users.
Chapter 7
Information Revelation and Intervention
with an Application to Flow Control
In this chapter1 we study the interaction between a designer and a group of strategic and self-
interested users who possess information the designer does not have. Because the users are strategic
and self-interested, they will act to their own advantage, which will often be different from the interest
of the designer, even if the designer is benevolent and seeks to maximize (some measure of) social
welfare. In the settings we consider, the designer and the users can communicate (perhaps with
noise), the designer can observe the actions of the users (perhaps with error) and the designer can
commit to (plans of) actions – interventions – of its own. The designer’s problem is to construct and
implement a mechanism that provides incentives for the users to communicate and act in such a way
as to further the interest of the designer – despite the fact that they are strategic and self-interested
and possess private information. To address the designer’s problem we propose a general and flexible
framework that applies to many scenarios. In an important class of environments, we find conditions
under which the designer can obtain its benchmark optimum – the utility that could be obtained if
it had all information and could command the actions of the users – and conditions under which it
cannot. More broadly we are able to characterize the solution to the designer’s problem, even when it
does not yield the benchmark optimum. Because the optimal mechanism may be difficult to construct
1The material presented in this chapter has been published in:
[J4] L. Canzian, Y. Xiao, W. Zame, M. Zorzi, and M. van der Schaar, “Intervention with Private Information, Imperfect
Monitoring and Costly Communication: Design Framework,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. Commun.
[J5] L. Canzian, Y. Xiao, W. Zame, M. Zorzi, and M. van der Schaar, “Intervention with Complete and Incomplete
Information: Application to Flow Control,” Submitted to IEEE Trans. Commun.
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and implement, we also propose a simpler and more readily-implemented mechanism that, while
falling short of the optimum, still yields the designer a "good" result. We then apply our framework
and results to design a flow control management system, in both the complete and the incomplete
information scenarios. Illustrative results show that the considered schemes can considerably improve
the efficiency of the network.
7.1 Introduction
We study the interaction between a group of users and a designer. If the users are compliant
or the designer can command the actions of the users, then the designer is faced with an optimal
control problem of the sort that is well-studied. Little changes if the users have private information
(about themselves or about the environment) that the designer does not have but the designer can
communicate with the users, because the designer can simply ask or instruct the users to report that
information. However, a great deal changes if the users are not compliant but rather are self-interested
and strategic and the designer can not command the actions and reports of the users. In that case, the
users may take actions and/or provide reports that are in their own self-interest but not necessarily in
the interest of the designer. The objective of this work is to understand the extent to which the designer
can provide incentives to the users to take actions and provide reports that further the objectives of the
designer, be those selfish or benevolent. (The case of a benevolent designer is probably the one of most
interest, but the problem faced by a benevolent designer is no easier than the problem faced by a selfish
designer: the goal of a benevolent designer is to maximize some measure of social welfare – which
might include both total utility and some measure of fairness – but the goal of an individual user is to
maximize its own utility; hence the incentives of the designer and of the individual user are no more
aligned when the designer is benevolent than when the designer is selfish, so the same incentives to
misrepresent and misbehave are present in both circumstances. Such incentives frequently lead to the
over-use of resources and to substantial inefficiencies [9, 11].) Here, we are specifically interested in
settings in which the users can send reports to the designer and the designer in turn can send messages
to the users before the users act, after which the designer may take actions of its own – interventions.
Our use of intervention builds on [12, 16, 42, 66], but we go beyond that work in considering private
information, imperfect monitoring and costly communication – in addition to intervention.
Our work has something in common with the economic theory of mechanism design in the tra-
dition of [94–98]. Indeed, our general framework builds on that of [99], and the abstract theory of
mechanism design – in particular the revelation principle – does play a role. However, [99] does not
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solve any of our problems because after we use the revelation principle to restrict our attention to
incentive compatible direct mechanisms we must still construct the optimal mechanism, which is a
non-trivial undertaking.2 Moreover, when we admit physical (and other) constraints, noisy communi-
cation and imperfect monitoring, the revelation principle does not help because it entirely obscures all
of these complications. Finally, the revelation principle simply does not hold when communication is
costly.
We treat settings in which the users have private information but (perhaps limited and imperfect)
communication between the users and the designer – more precisely, the device employed by the de-
signer – is possible. The users have the opportunity to send reports about their private information,
and the device can in turn send messages to the users; in both cases, we allow for the possibility that
communication is noisy so that the report/message sent is not necessarily the report/message received.
After this exchange of information, the users take actions. Finally, the device, having (perhaps im-
perfectly) observed these actions, also has the opportunity to act. Generalizing a construction of [99],
we formalize this setting as a communication mechanism. The device the designer employs plays two
roles: first to coordinate the actions of the users before they take them and second to discipline the
users afterwards. Because users are self-interested and strategic, their reports and actions will only
serve the interest of the designer if they also serve their own interests. Thus we are interested in strat-
egy profiles for the users that each user finds optimal, given the available information, the strategies
of others and the nature of the given device; we refer to these as communication equilibria. Note that
the device is not strategic – it is a device after all – but the designer behaves strategically in choos-
ing the device. Because we focus here on the problem of the designer, we are interested in finding
devices that support equilibria that the designer finds optimal. (If the designer is benevolent – i.e.,
intends to maximize social welfare, perhaps constrained by some notion of fairness – these devices
will also serve the interests of the users as a whole, but if the designer is self-interested they may not.)
We are particularly interested in knowing when the designer can find a device so as to achieve his
benchmark optimum – the outcome he could achieve if he knew all relevant information and users
were fully compliant – despite the fact that information is in fact private and users are in fact self-
interested. For a class of environments that includes many engineering environments of interest (e.g.,
power control [15, 16], medium access control (MAC) [12, 25], and flow control [24–28]) we find
2Proposition 1 in [99] shows that the problem of choosing the optimal incentive compatible direct mechanism is a linear
programming problem provided that type sets and action sets are finite and fixed and that the designer can send arbitrary
messages – but in our context the action sets may not be finite, the action set of the designer is definitely not fixed, and the
designer’s choice of messages may be constrained, so our problem is different, and much more complicated.
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conditions under which there exist mechanisms that achieve the benchmark optimum and conditions
under which such mechanisms do not exist. In case they do not exist, we find conditions such that the
problem of finding an optimal protocol can be decoupled. Because the optimal protocol may still be
difficult to compute, we also provide a simple algorithm that converges to a protocol that, although
perhaps not optimal, still yields a ‘good’ outcome for the designer. We then apply our framework
and results to design a flow control management system, in both the complete and the incomplete
information scenarios. First, we analytically compute the NE and the BNE of the complete and in-
complete information flow control games without intervention, quantifying its inefficiency. Then, we
apply the intervention scheme in the complete information setting and we design the device that can
achieve the optimal performance. Finally, we apply our theoretical framework to design schemes able
to deal with the incomplete information scenario as well. Illustrative results show that the considered
schemes can considerably improve the efficiency of the network.
Throughout, we assume that the designer can commit to a choice of a device that is pre-programmed
to carry out a particular plan of action after the reports and actions of the users. In mechanical terms,
such commitment is possible precisely because the designer deploys a device – hardware or software
or both – and then leaves. Indeed, the desire of the designer to commit is one reason that it em-
ploys a device. Although other assumptions are possible, this assumption seems most appropriate for
the settings we have in mind, in which the designer is a long-lived and experienced entity who has
learned the relevant parameters (user utilities and distribution of user types) over time, but the users
are short-lived, come and go but do not interact repeatedly: in a particular session they are not playing
a repeated game and are not forward-looking.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces our framework of
devices and mechanisms and the notion of equilibrium. Section 7.3 presents an example to illustrate
how private information, information revelation and intervention all matter. Section 7.4 asks when
some devices achieve the benchmark optimum. Section 7.5 studies the properties of the optimal de-
vices and Section 7.6 offers a constructive procedure for choosing devices that are simple to compute
and implement – if not necessarily optimal. Section 7.7 introduces the flow control problem. Section
7.8 studies flow control games without incentive schemes and show their inefficiency. Section 7.9
designs the incentive schemes for the complete and incomplete information scenarios and quantifies
the improvement in the network efficiency. Section 7.10 concludes with some remarks.
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7.1.1 Related work
There is by now a substantial communication engineering literature that addresses the problem
of providing incentives for strategic users to obey a particular resource allocation scheme. Such
incentives might be provided in a number of different ways. [12, 16, 42, 66] provide incentives via
intervention in the absence of private information. A rather different literature, including [37, 39,
41, 100], adopts literal pricing schemes: users are required to make monetary payments for resource
usage.3 Literal pricing schemes require the designer to have specific knowledge (the value of money
to the users) and require a technology for making monetary transfers, which is missing in many
settings, such as wireless communication. Moreover, it does not necessarily solve the problem of a
benevolent designer since monetary payments are by definition costly for the user making them and
hence wasteful. An additional difficulty in employing literal payment schemes is that it is debatable
whether users would agree to a pricing scheme that dynamically varies with the state of the system,
in particular if users have to pay for a service that had hitherto been free. A smaller literature [38,
102, 103] addresses environments in which users have private information – their private monetary
valuations for access to the resource – and uses ideas from mechanism design and auction theory [104]
to create protocols in which users are asked to report their private monetary valuations, after which
access to the resource is apportioned and users make monetary payments according to their access and
the reports of valuations. For very detailed comparison of pricing, intervention and other approaches,
see [105].
7.2 Framework
We consider a designer and a collection of users. The designer chooses an intervention device and
then leaves – the designer itself takes no further actions. In a single session the device interacts with
a fixed number of users n, labeled from 1 to n. We will write N = {1, . . . , n} for the set of users.
We think of the users in a particular session as drawn from a pool of potential users, so users may
be (and typically will be) different in each session. We allow for the possibility that users are drawn
from different pools – e.g., occupy different geographical locations or utilize different channels.
User i is characterized by an element of a set Ti of types, which encodes all relevant information
3A different literature, which includes [13, 15, 101] but is quite far from the work here, uses pricing in scenarios where
users are compliant, rather than self-interested and strategic. In those scenarios, however, the function of pricing is de-
centralization: prices induce utility functions for the users that lead them to take the desired actions without the need for
centralized control. In these scenarios pricing is figurative rather than literal: monetary payments are not actually required.
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about the user. Write T = T1 × . . . × Tn for the set of possible type profiles. Users know their own
type; users and the designer know the distribution of user types pi (a probability distribution on T ). In
each session, user i chooses an action from the set Ai of actions. We write A = A1 × . . . × An for
the set of possible action profiles and (ai, a−i) for the action profile in which user i chooses action
ai ∈ Ai and other users choose the action profile a−i ∈ A−i = A1 × . . . × Ai−1 × Ai+1 . . . × An;
we use similar notation for types, etc.
The designer is characterized by its utility function and the set D of devices it might use. A
device – which might consist of hardware or software or both – has four features: 1) it can receive
communications from users, 2) it can send communications to users, 3) it can observe the actions
of users, and 4) it can take actions of its own. As in [66], we interpret the actions of the device as
interventions. We formalize a device as a tuple D = 〈(Ri), (Mi), µ,X,Φ, R, M , A〉, where:
• Ri is the set of reports that user i might send; write R = R1 × . . . × Rn for the set of report
profiles;
• Mi is the set of messages that the device might send; write M =M1 × . . .×Mn for the set of
message profiles;
• µ : R→ ∆(M) is the message rule, which specifies the (perhaps random) profile of messages
to be sent to the users as a function of the reports received from all users; if r is the profile of
observed reports we write µr for the corresponding probability distribution on M , and µr(m)
for the probability that the message m is chosen when the observed report is r;4
• X is the set of interventions (actions) the device might take;
• Φ : R × M × A → ∆(X) is the intervention rule, which specifies the (perhaps random)
intervention the device will take given the received reports, the transmitted messages and the
observed actions; if r are the observed reports, m the transmitted messages and a the observed
actions, we write Φr,m,a for the corresponding probability distribution on X;
• R : R → ∆(R) encodes the noise in receiving reports: users send the report profile r but the
designer observes a random profile rˆ distributed according to Rr ;
• M : M → ∆(M) encodes the noise in receiving messages: the device sends the message
profile m but users observe a random profile mˆ distributed according to Mm ;
4If the message m is always chosen given the observed report profile r, µr is point mass at m, i.e., µr(z) = 1 if z = m,
µr(z) = 0 otherwise. However, in this case we usually prefer to abuse notation and write µ(r) = m. Below, we will make
similar notational abuses without further comment.
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• A : A → ∆(A) encodes the error in monitoring actions: the users choose an action profile a
but the device observes a random profile aˆ distributed according to Aa .
The set of all conceivable devices is very large, but in practice the designer will need to choose a de-
vice from some prescribed (perhaps small) subset D, so we assume this throughout. In this generality,
reports and messages could be entirely arbitrary but typically reports will provide (perhaps incom-
plete) information about types, and messages will provide (perhaps incomplete) recommendations for
actions, and we will frequently use this language.
If the report spaces are singletons then reports are meaningless, so singleton report spaces Ri
express the absence of reporting. Similarly, a singleton message space M expresses the absence of
messaging and a singleton intervention space X expresses the absence of intervention. The absence
of noise/error with regard to reports, messages or actions can be expressed by requiring that the
corresponding mapping(s) be the identity; e.g, Rr is point mass at r and so rˆ = r for all report
profiles, etc. However, in any of these cases we would usually prefer to abuse notation and omit the
corresponding component of the tuple that describes the device.
The utility Ui(a, t, ri, x) of user i depends on the actions a and types t of all users, the report ri
chosen by user i, and the intervention x of the designer. The utility U(a, t, r,m, x) of the designer
depends on the actions a and types t of all the users, on the reports r, the messages m and intervention
x of the designer. The dependence of utility on reports and messages allows for the fact that commu-
nication may be costly. Note that the utility of a user depends only on the report that user sends, but
the utility of the designer depends on the messages it sends and on the reports of the users. If this
seems strange, keep in mind that if the designer is benevolent and seeks to maximize social utility, he
certainly cares about the reporting costs of users.
A communication mechanism, or mechanism for short, is a tuple C = 〈N, (Ti, Ai, Ui), pi, U,D〉
that specifies the set N of users, the sets Ti of user types, the sets Ai of user actions, the utility
functions Ui of users, the distribution pi of types, the utility functions Ui of users, the utility function
U of the designer, and the device D. We view the designer as choosing the device, which is pre-
programmed, but otherwise taking no part: the users choose and execute plans and the device carries
out its programming.
The operation of a communication mechanism C is as follows.
• users make reports to the device;
• the device “reads” the reports (perhaps with error) and sends messages to the users (perhaps
depending on the realization of the random rule);
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• users “read” the messages5 (perhaps with error) and take actions;
• the device “monitors” the actions of the users (perhaps imperfectly) and, following the rule,
makes an intervention (perhaps depending on the realization of the random rule).
A strategy for user i is a pair of functions fi : Ti → Ri, gi : Ti ×Mi → Ai that specify which
report to make, conditional on the type of user i, and which action to take, conditional on the type of
user i and the message observed. We do not specify a strategy for the device because the device is not
strategic; its behavior is completely specified by the message rule and the intervention rule – but the
designer behaves strategically in choosing the device. Given a profile (f, g) of user strategies, and
the intervention device D, the expected utility of a user i whose type is ti is obtained by averaging
over all random variables involved, i.e.,6:
EUi(f, g, ti,D) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t | ti)
∑
rˆ∈R
Rr (rˆ)
∑
m∈M
µrˆ(m)
∑
mˆ∈M
Mm (mˆ)
∑
aˆ∈A
Aa (aˆ)
∑
x∈X
Φrˆ,m,aˆ(x)Ui(a, t, ri, x)
where rj = fj(tj) and aj = gj(tj, mˆj), ∀ j ∈ N , are the reports sent and the actions taken by users.
Similarly, the expected utility of the designer is
EU(f, g,D) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)
∑
rˆ∈R
Rr (rˆ)
∑
m∈M
µrˆ(m)
∑
mˆ∈M
Mm (mˆ)
∑
aˆ∈A
Aa (aˆ)
∑
x∈X
Φrˆ,m,aˆ(x)U(a, t, r,m, x)
The strategy profile (f, g) is an equilibrium if each user is optimizing given the strategies of other
users and the device D; that is, for each user i we have
EUi(fi, f−i, gi, g−i, ti,D) ≥ EUi(f
′
i , f−i, g
′
i, g−i, ti,D)
for all strategies f ′i : Ti → Ri, g′i : Ti ×Mi → Ai.7 We often say that the device D sustains the
profile (f, g). We remark that the existence of such an equilibrium is not always guaranteed without
additional assumptions and needs to be explicitly addressed in the specific case at hand.
Note that the action of the device is fixed and not strategic – in particular, the interventions planned
by the device but not executed with positive probability – that is, threats that are not carried out – need
5Note that we assume that each user i can only read its own message mi. However, our framework is suitable to model
also situations in which user i is able to hear the message mj intended for user j. In this case it is sufficient to focus on
devices in which the message sent to user j is part of the message sent to user i.
6We have tacitly assumed that all the probability distributions under consideration have finite or countably infinite
support – which will certainly be the case if the spaces under consideration are themselves finite or countably infinite; in a
more general context we would need to replace summations by integrals and to be careful about measurability, etc.
7The notion of equilibrium defined here is that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game induced by the
communication mechanism. For simplicity, we have restricted attention to equilibrium in pure strategies; we could also
allow for equilibria in mixed strategies.
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not be optimal. This reflects our assumption that the designer can commit to using the device. Again:
the device does not behave strategically, the designer behaves strategically in choosing the device.
The designer seeks to optimize his own utility by choosing a device D from some prescribed
class D of physically feasible devices. Because users are strategic, the designer must assume that,
whatever device D is chosen, the users will follow some equilibrium strategy profile (f, g). Since
the designer will typically recommend actions, we assume that, if more than one equilibrium strategy
profile exists, the users choose (because they are are coordinated to) the equilibrium that the designer
most prefers (in case of a benevolent manager, it usually coincides with the equilibrium that the users
prefer). Hence, the designer has to solve the following Optimal Device (OD) problem8:
OD argmax
D∈D
maxf,gEU(f, g,D)
subject to:
EUi(fi, f−i, gi, g−i, ti,D) ≥ EUi(f
′
i , f−i, g
′
i, g−i, ti,D)
∀ i ∈ N , ∀ ti ∈ Ti , ∀ f
′
i : Ti → Ri , ∀ g
′
i : Ti ×Mi → Ai
We say that a solution D of the above problem is an optimal device. To maintain parallelism with
some other literature, we sometimes abuse language and refer to the designer’s problem as choosing
an optimal mechanism – even though the designer only chooses the device and not the types of users,
their utilities, etc. Note that optimality is relative to the prescribed set D of considered devices.
Moreover, the expected utility the designer obtains choosing the optimal device must not be confused
with the benchmark optimum utility the designer could achieves if users were compliant, which is in
general higher. If they coincide, we say that the device D is a maximum efficiency device.
7.2.1 Null reports, messages and interventions
In many (perhaps most) concrete settings, it is natural to presume that users might sometimes
choose not to make reports and that the device might sometimes not send messages or make an in-
tervention. The easiest way to allow for these possibilities is simply to assume the existence of null
reports, null messages and null actions. In particular, we can assume that for each user i there is
a distinguished report r∗i which is to be interpreted as ‘not sending a report’. (On the device side,
observing r∗i should be interpreted as ‘not receiving a report’.) Because not making a report should
8Because the utility functions of users depend on reports, and the utility function of the designer depends on messages
and reports, which are parameters of the device chosen, this tacitly assumes that utility functions are defined on a domain
sufficiently large to encompass all the possibilities that may arise when any device D ∈ D is chosen.
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be costless, we should assume that – fixing types, reports of others to the device, actions by the users
and intervention by the device – r∗i yields utility at least as great as any other report: Ui(a, t, r∗i , x) ≥
Ui(a, t, ri, x) and U(a, t, r∗i , r−i,m, x) ≥ U(a, t, ri, r−i,m, x), for all a, t, x, ri, r−i,m. Given this
assumption, and using utility when sending the report r∗i as the baseline, we can interpret the dif-
ferences Ui(a, t, r∗i , x) − Ui(a, t, ri, x) and U(a, t, r∗i , r−i,m, x) − U(a, t, ri, r−i,m, x) as the cost
of sending the report ri to the user i and to the designer, respectively. In this generality, the cost of
sending a report might depend on all other variables. We remark that this cost does not take into
consideration the impact of the communication on the interaction among the users and the interven-
tion device: in deciding whether or not to send a report, a user must take into account the fact that
sending a report may alter the messages sent by the device and hence the actions of the users and the
intervention of the device. So sending a report may well lead to higher utility because it influences
the strategic choices of others.
Similarly, we could assume that for each user i there is a distinguished message m∗i that the
device might send but which we interpret as ‘not sending a message’. (On the user side, we interpret
receipt of the message m∗i as ‘not receiving a message’.) Because not sending a message m∗i should
be costless, we assume that U(a, t, r,m∗i ,m−i, x) ≥ U(a, t, r,mi,m−i, x) for all a, t, r,m−i, x,mi,
and so interpret the difference U(a, t, r,m∗i ,m−i, x) − U(a, t, r,mi,m−i, x) as the cost of sending
the message mi, which might depend on all other variables.
Finally, we could assume that there is a distinguished intervention x∗ that we interpret as ‘not mak-
ing an intervention’. If (as we usually do) we want to interpret an intervention as a punishment, we
should assume that x∗ yields utility at least as great as any other intervention for each user and the de-
signer: Ui(a, t, ri, x∗) ≥ Ui(a, t, ri, x) and U(a, t, r,m, x∗) ≥ U(a, t, r,m, x) for all i, a, t, r,m, x,
and we interpret the differences Ui(a, t, ri, x∗)−Ui(a, t, ri, x) and U(a, t, r,m, x∗)−U(a, t, r,m, x)
as the cost of the intervention to the user i and to the designer, respectively, which might depend on
all other variables.
If the sets of reports (respectively, messages, interventions) are singletons, then by default there
are no possible reports (respectively, messages, interventions).
If D is a device for which ‘not making an intervention’ is possible and (f, g) is an equilibrium
with the property that Φrˆ,m,aˆ(x∗) = 1, for all type profiles t, observed reports rˆ, sent messages m and
observed actions aˆ (with rˆ,m and aˆ occurring with positive probability), we say that D sustains (f, g)
without intervention. The most straightforward interpretation is that the device threatens punishments
for deviating from the recommended actions and that the threats are sufficiently severe that they do
not need to be executed. Again, this is natural in context: by using the intervention device, the
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designer commits to meting out punishments for deviation, even if those punishments are costly for
the designer as well as for the users.
7.2.2 Direct mechanisms
To be consistent with [99], we say that the mechanism Cd is a direct mechanism if Ri = Ti for
all i (users report their types, not necessarily truthfully) and M = A (the device recommends action
profiles), there are no errors, and reports and messages are costless (i.e., utility does not depend
on reports or messages). If Cd is a direct mechanism we write (f∗, g∗) = (f∗1 , . . . , f∗n, g∗1 , . . . g∗n)
for the strategy profile in which users are honest (report their true types) and obedient (follow the
recommendations of the device); that is, f∗i (ti) = ti and g∗i (ti, ai) = ai for every user i, type ti, and
recommendation ai = µi(ti). If (f∗, g∗) is an equilibrium, we say that Cd is incentive compatible.
If a device is such that the resulting mechanism is an incentive compatible direct mechanism, we say
that the device is incentive compatible.
Incentive compatible direct mechanisms play a special role because of the following general-
ization of the revelation principle. (We omit the proof, which is almost identical to the proof of
Proposition 2 in [99].)
Proposition 12. If C is a mechanism for which reports and messages are costless and (f, g) is an
equilibrium of the mechanism C, then there is an incentive compatible direct mechanism Cd with the
same action and intervention spaces for which the honest and obedient strategy profile (f∗, g∗) yields
the same probability distribution over outcomes as the profile (f, g).
As we shall see later (this version of) the revelation principle is useful but its usefulness is limited
for a number of reasons. The first reason is that, although it restricts the class of mechanisms over
which we must search to find the designer’s most preferred outcome, we still have to find the optimal
device in this class, which is not always an easy task. The second reason is that in practice there
will often be physical limitations on the devices that the designer can employ (because of limits
to the device’s monitoring capabilities, for instance) and hence limitations on the communication
mechanisms that should be considered, but these may not translate into limitations on a corresponding
direct mechanism. For instance, in a flow control scenario, it will often be the case that the device can
observe total flow but not the flow of individual users and can only observe this flow with errors; no
such restrictions occur in direct mechanisms. Finally, as noted before, the revelation principle does
not hold when communication is costly.
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7.2.3 Special cases
The framework we have described is quite general so it is worth noting that many, perhaps more
familiar, frameworks are simply special cases:
• If T , R, M and X are all singletons, then our framework reduces to an ordinary static game
with complete information and our equilibrium notion reduces to Nash equilibrium.
• If R, M and X are all singletons, then our framework reduces to an ordinary Bayesian game
and our equilibrium notion reduces to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
• If T ,R and X are all singletons, then our framework reduces to a game with a mediation device
and our equilibrium notion reduces to correlated equilibrium.
• If T , R and M are all singletons, then our framework reduces to the intervention framework
of [66] and our equilibrium notion reduces to intervention equilibrium.
• If there are no errors, and reports and messages are costless, then our framework reduces to a
communication game in the sense of [99] and our equilibrium notion reduces to communication
equilibrium.
7.3 Why Intervention and Information Revelation Matter
To illustrate our framework, we give a simple example to show that strategic behavior matters,
intervention matters, and communication plus intervention matters – in the sense that they all change
the outcomes that can be achieved.
We consider the problem of access to two channels A and B (e.g., two different bandwidths, or
two different time slots). In each session, two users (identified as user 1 and user 2, but drawn from
the same pool of users) can access either or both channels; we use A,B,AB to represent the obvious
actions. Each user seeks to maximize its utility, which is the sum of its own goodput in the two
channels.
Potential users are of four types: HL, ML, LM and LH; the probability that a user is of a given
type is 1/4. We interpret a user’s type xy as the quality of channels A,B to that user: channel A has
quality x (Low, Medium or High), channel B has quality y (Low, Medium or High). 9 The goodput
9Note that the quality to a user is correlated across channels: each user finds one channel to be of Low quality and the
other to be of Medium or High quality. This is not at all essential – the qualitative comparisons would be unchanged if we
assumed quality to a user was uncorrelated across channels – but the calculation would be much messier.
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obtained by user i = 1, 2 from a given channel depends on the user’s type and on which user(s) access
the channel.
• if user i does not access the channel it obtains goodput = 0
• if both users access the channel they interfere with each other and both obtain goodput = uI
• if user i is the only user to access channel A and its type is xy then it obtains goodput ux (where
x = L,M,H)
• if user i is the only user to access channel B and its type is xy then it obtains goodput uy (where
y = L,M,H)
We assume 2uI < uL < uM < uH .
We consider five scenarios: (I) no intervention or communication, (II) communication but no
intervention, (III) intervention but no communication, (IV) intervention and communication, and
(V) the benchmark setting in which the designer has perfect information and users are obedient.
For simplicity, we assume that the devices available to the designer are very restricted: reports and
messages are costless, there are no errors and the actions are either x∗ = “take no action” or x1 =
“access both channels”. If the device takes no action, user utilities are as above; if the device accesses
both channels then each user’s goodput is uI on each channel the user accesses.10 The designer is
benevolent and hence seeks to maximize social utility – the expected sum of user utilities.
I No communication, No Intervention Independently of the user’s type, the other user’s type,
and the other user’s action, it is always strictly better for each user to access both channels,
so in the unique (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium both users always choose action AB , and (in
obvious and suggestive notation), (expected) social utility is EU(I) = 4uI .
II Communication, No Intervention Nothing changes from scenario I: no matter what the users
report and the device recommends, it is strictly better for each user to access both channels, so
in the unique equilibrium both users always choose action AB , and social utility is EU(II) =
4uI .
10Note that in this model the utility obtained when accessing a channel in the presence of interference does not depend
on the number of interferers present and on their channel qualities, which may not be realistic in certain scenarios. This
assumption is made here in order to keep the discussion simple, but could be easily relaxed at the price of a much more
cumbersome discussion in terms of notation and number of cases to be considered. In addition, in most reasonable scenarios
(i.e., when the goodput obtained in the presence of any amount of interference is significantly lower than that obtained in
its absence), the qualitative conclusions we draw here would be maintained.
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III Intervention, No Communication The sets Ri of reports and M of messages are singletons,
so the device obtains no information about the users and can suggest no actions to the users.
The best the designer can do is to use an intervention rule that coordinates the two users to
different resources; given the restriction on device actions an optimal rule is:
Φ (a1, a2) =

 x
∗ if a1 = A and a2 = B
x1 otherwise
where a1 and a2 are the actions adopted by the two users. Given this intervention rule, the
best equilibrium strategy profile (i.e., the one that yields highest social utility) is for user 1 to
access channel A and user 2 to access channel B, so that there is never a conflict.11 Given the
distribution of types, social utility is EU(III) = (uH/2) + (uM/2) + uL.
IV Communication, Intervention We consider a direct mechanism in which the users report
their types (Ri = Ti) and the device D recommends actions (M = A). The device uses the
following message and intervention rules:
µ(r1, r2) =

 (A,B) if r1 = HL or r1 =ML or r2 = LH or r2 = LM(B,A) otherwise
Φ(r1, r2, a1, a2) =

 x
∗ if (a1, a2) = µ(r1, r2)
x1 otherwise
where r1, r2 are the reports and a1, a2 are the actions. This is an incentive compatible direct
mechanism. To see this we must show that the honest and obedient strategy (f∗1 , g∗1) is the
most preferred strategy for all types of user 1, given that user 2 follows its honest and obedient
strategy (f∗2 , g∗2), and conversely for user 2. We will describe the calculations for user 1, from
which those for user 2 can be derived by the symmetry of the problem.
Assume user 1 is of type HL. If it is honest and obedient, it obtains a utility of uH because it
accesses its preferred channel. This utility is always higher than the utility it obtains not being
obedient, i.e., if it does not follow the recommendation. In fact in this case it never obtains
a utility higher than 2uI because the channels are interfered by the device. Now let assume
user 1 is obedient but not honest. If it reports type ML it can still access its preferred channel,
obtaining a utility of uH , the same as if it were honest. If it reports type LM or LH , it accesses
half of the time its preferred channel and half of the time its less preferred channel (depending
11This is not the only equilibrium but it is the best, both for the designer and the users. In the other equilibrium the users
access both channels.
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on the type of user 2), obtaining an expected utility of (uH + uL)/2 which is lower than uH .
These considerations translate mathematically in the following relations, stating that user 1 has
an incentive to be honest and obedient if it is of type HL,
EU1(f
∗, g∗,HL,D) =


uH > 2uI ≥ EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g1, g
∗
2 ,HL,D) ∀ f1, if g1(HL, a1) 6= a1
uH = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗,HL,D) if f1(HL) =ML
uH > (uH + uL)/2 = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗,HL,D) if f1(HL) = LM orLH
Analogously, if user 1 is of type ML, LM or LH we obtain:
EU1(f
∗, g∗,ML,D) =


uM > 2uI ≥ EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g1, g
∗
2 ,ML,D) ∀ f1, if g1(ML, a1) 6= a1
uM = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗,ML,D) if f1(ML) = HL
uM > (uH + uL)/2 = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗,ML,D) if f1(ML) = LM orLH
EU1(f
∗, g∗, LM,D) =


(uM + uL)/2 > 2uI ≥ EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g1, g
∗
2 , LM,D) ∀ f1, if g1(LM, a1) 6= a1
(uM + uL)/2 = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗, LM,D) if f1(LM) = LH
(uM + uL)/2 > uL = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗, LM,D) if f1(LM) = HL orML
EU1(f
∗, g∗, LH,D) =


(uH + uL)/2 > 2uI ≥ EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g1, g
∗
2 , LH,D) ∀ f1, if g1(LH, a1) 6= a1
(uH + uL)/2 = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗, LH,D) if f1(LH) = LM
(uH + uL)/2 > uL = EU1(f1, f
∗
2 , g
∗, LH,D) if f1(LH) = HL orML
Notice that following this mechanism never leads to interference (users always access different
channels) and users are “assigned” to the most efficient channels 7/8 of the time. However,
users are not always assigned to the most efficient channels: if type profiles are (t1, t2) =
(ML,HL) or (t1, t2) = (LH,LM) then user 1 is assigned to channel A and user 2 is assigned
to channel B, which is inefficient. This inefficiency is an unavoidable consequence of incentive
compatibility: if user 2 were always assigned to his preferred channel A when he reported
HL (for instance) then he would never be willing to report ML when that was his true type.
Expected social utility under this mechanism is
EU(IV ) = (1/16) [2(uH + uH) + 4(uH + uM ) + 4(uH + uL) + 2(uM + uM ) + 4(uM + uL)]
= (3uH/4) + (3uM/4) + (uL/2)
V Benchmark Social Optimum: Public Information, Perfect Cooperation The social opti-
mum is obtained by assigning the user with the best channel quality to his favorite channel and
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never assigning two users to the same channel. Expected social utility is
EU(V ) = (1/16) [2(uH + uH) + 4(uH + uM ) + 6(uH + uL) + 2(uM + uM ) + 2(uM + uL)] =
= (7uH/8) + (5uM/8) + (uL/2)
Direct calculation shows that social utilities in four of the five scenarios are strictly ranked:
EU(I) = EU(II) < EU(III) < EU(IV ) < EU(V )
In words: in comparison to the purely Bayesian scenario (no intervention), communication without
intervention achieves nothing, intervention without communication improves social utility by damp-
ening destructive competition, intervention with communication improves social utility even more
by extracting some information and using that information to promote a more efficient coordination
across types, but even intervention with communication does not achieve the benchmark social op-
timum under full cooperation. It is possible to show that the same conclusions would be obtained
in an environment with n users and m channels (for arbitrary n,m), provided that m ≥ n and
muI < uL < uM < uH .
It is worth noting that similar comparisons across scenarios could be made in many environments
and the ordering of expected social utility would be as above:
EU(I) ≤ EU(II) ≤ EU(III) ≤ EU(IV ) ≤ EU(V )
In general, any of these inequalities might be strict.
7.4 Resource Allocation Games in Communication Engineering
In the following we explore the designer’s problem in a class of abstract environments that exhibit
some features common to many resource sharing situations in communication networks, including
power control [15, 16], medium access control (MAC), [12, 25], and flow control [24–28]. We char-
acterize the direct communication mechanisms that are optimal among all mechanisms. We provide
conditions on the environment under which it is possible for the designer to achieve its benchmark
optimum – the outcome it could achieve if users were compliant – and conditions under which it is
impossible for the designer to achieve its benchmark optimum. Although we can characterize the
optimal device, other mechanisms are also of interest, for several reasons. The optimal device may be
very difficult to compute. It is therefore of some interest to consider mechanisms that are sub-optimal
but easy to compute, and we provide a simple algorithm that converges to such a mechanism.
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7.4.1 The considered environment
In this subsection we formalize the particular (but, at the same time, quite general) environment
we consider from now on, motivating each assumption with examples of its application in resource
sharing situations in communication networks.
We consider a finite and discrete type set made by real numbers Ti = {τi,1, τi,2, ..., τi,vi} ⊂
<, vi ∈ N, in which the elements are labeled in increasing order, τi,1 < τi,2 <, ..., < τi,vi . We
interpret the type of a user as the valuation of a particular resource for the user (e.g., different types
may represent different quality of service classes). We assume that every type profile has a positive
probability to occur, i.e., pi[t] > 0, ∀ t. We allow the users to take actions in a continuous interval
Ai =
[
amini , a
max
i
]
⊂ <, which we interpret as the level of resource usage (e.g., it may represent
the adopted transmission power, which is positive and upper bounded). We assume that the devices
available to the designer are such that reports and messages are costless, there are no errors, and there
exists the intervention action x∗ ∈ X which we interpret as “no intervention”. In this case we can
simply write Ui(a, t, x) for the utility of user i and U(a, t, x) for the utility of the designer and we
can restrict our attention to incentive compatible direct mechanism. That is, we consider only the
incentive compatible devices D = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ,X,Φ〉 in which x∗ ∈ X.
We assume that the designer’s utility satisfies the following assumptions, ∀ t ∈ T ,
A1: U(a, t, x∗) > U(a, t, x), ∀ a ∈ A, ∀X, ∀x ∈ X, x 6= x∗
A2: gM (t) = argmaxa U(a, t, x∗) is unique
A3: gM (t) is differentiable with respect to ti and
∂gMi (t)
∂ti
> 0 12
Assumption A1 states that the “no intervention” action is the strictly preferred action of the de-
signer, regardless of users’ actions and types. Interpreting interventions as punishments, assumption
A1 asserts that the designer is not happy if the users are punished.
Assumption A2 states that, for every type profile t ∈ T , the users’ joint action profile that max-
imizes the designer’s utility is unique, and by assumption A3, each component in gM is continuous
and increasing in the type of that user. If actions represent the level of resource usage and types rep-
resent resource valuations, assumption A3 asserts that the higher i’s valuation the higher should be
i’s level of resource usage.
12This assumption requires the designer utility to be defined over a continuous interval that includes the finite type set T .
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Under these assumptions, the benchmark optimum for the designer can be easily determined
EU ben =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)U(gM (t), t, x∗) (7.1)
For each type profile t ∈ T , we define the complete information game
Γ0t = (N,A, {Ui(·, t, x
∗)}ni=1)
Γ0t is the complete information game (users know the type of everybody) that can be derived from our
general framework assuming that sets of types Ti, reports Ri, messages Mi and interventions X are
singleton (in particular, X = {x∗}). It can be thought as the game that models users’ interaction in
the absence of an intervention device and when the type profile is known.
The strategy of user i in this context is represented by the function gi : T → Ai (notice that we
can omit the dependence on the messages), since the function f : T → R is automatically defined
(users do not send reports or receive messages, or equivalently, always send the report ‘no report’
and receive the message ‘no message’). We denote by gNE0(t) =
(
gNE
0
1 (t), . . . , g
NE0
n (t)
)
a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of the game Γ0t , which is an action profile so that each user obtains its maximum
utility given the actions of the other users, i.e.,
Ui
(
gNE
0
(t), t, x∗
)
≥ Ui
(
gi(t), g
NE0
−i (t), t, x
∗
)
, ∀ i ∈ N , gi : T × {m
∗} → Ai
We assume that users’ utilities Ui(a, t, x∗) are twice differentiable with respect to a and, ∀ a ∈ A,
∀ t ∈ T , ∀ i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,
A4: Ui(a, t, x∗) is quasi-concave in ai and there exists a unique best response function hBRi (a−i, t) =
argmaxai Ui(a, t, x
∗)
A5: ∂
2Ui(a,t,x
∗)
∂ai∂aj
≤ 0
A6: There exists gNE0 such that gNE0(t) ≥ gM (t) 13 and gNE0k (tk, t−k) > g∗k(tk, t−k) for some
user k ∈ N and type tk ∈ Tk
Since for A4 the users’ utilities are quasi concave (thus the game Γ0t is a quasi-concave game)
and the best response function hBRi (a−i, t) that maximizes Ui(a, t, x∗) is unique, either i’s utility is
monotonic with respect to ai, or it increases with ai until it reaches a maximum for hBRi (a−i, t), and
decreases for higher values. As a consequence, a NE gNE0(t) of Γ0t exists. In fact, the best response
13Throughout the chapter, inequalities between vectors are intended component-wise.
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function hBR(a, t) =
(
hBR1 (a−1, t), . . . , h
BR
n (a−n, t)
)
is a continuous function from the convex and
compact set A to A itself, therefore Brouwer’s fixed point theorem assures that a fixed point exists.
Assumption A5 asserts that Γ0t is a submodular game and ensures that hBRi (a−i, t) is a non in-
creasing function of aj , j 6= i. Interpreting ai as i’s level of resource usage, this situation reflects
resource allocation games where it is in the interest of a user not to increase its resource usage if
the total level of use of the other users increases, in order to avoid an excessive use of the resource.
Nevertheless, assumption A6 says that strategic users use the resources more heavily compared to the
optimal (from the designer’s point of view) usage level.
The class of games satisfying assumptions A1-A6 includes the linearly coupled games [25] and
many resource allocation games in communication networks, such as the MAC [12,25], power control
[15,16] and flow control [24–28] games, assuming that the designer’s utility is increasing in the users’
utilities (i.e., a benevolent designer).
7.4.2 Intervention in the complete information setting
Before analyzing the designer’s problem in the general framework, we first introduce formally the
special case of intervention in the complete information setting, though the main focus of this chapter
is the design of a mechanism dealing with both information revelation and action enforcement. In fact,
some properties of the general mechanism are linked to the properties of the complete information
setting defined in this subsection.
For each type profile t ∈ T and intervention rule Φ : A → ∆(X) (we can omit the dependence
on reports and messages), we define the complete information game
Γt = (N,A, {Ui(·, t,Φ(·))}
n
i=1)
Γt is the complete information game (users and designer know the type of everybody) that can be
derived from our general framework assuming that sets of types Ti, reports Ri and messages Mi are
singletons. Our general framework reduces in this case to the intervention framework of [66] and our
equilibrium notion reduces to intervention equilibrium.
As in the game Γ0t , the strategy of user i is represented only by the function gi : T → Ai. How-
ever, in this case each user has to take into account the effect of the intervention action chosen follow-
ing the distribution Φa, which depends on the adopted action profile a. Accordingly to the notions
introduced in the general framework, we say that a device D, defined by the set of interventions X and
the intervention rule Φ, sustains (without intervention) the strategy profile g(t) = (g1(t), . . . , gn(t))
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in Γt if g is an equilibrium of Γt (and Φg(t)(x∗) = 1). If there exists a device D able to sustain
(without intervention) the profile g in Γt, we say that g is sustainable (without intervention) in Γt.
7.5 Optimal Devices
In this section we study the class of environments introduced in Section 7.4 with the general
framework proposed in Section 7.2. In particular, we take the part of a designer seeking to maximize
his own expected utility in the presence of self-interested and strategic users, choosing an optimal
device in the class of available devices D specified in Section 7.4 .
First of all we wonder if the designer can choose a maximum efficiency device D ∈ D to obtain
his benchmark utility despite the fact that the users are strategic. We characterize the existence and the
computation of maximum efficiency devices based on some properties of the complete information
setting. Moreover, we prove that a necessary condition for the existence of a maximum efficiency
device requires the type sets to be sufficiently sparse.
Even for cases in which a maximum efficiency device does not exist, the designer is still interested
in obtaining the best he can, choosing an optimal device. For this reason we study the problem of
finding the optimal device and we prove that, under some properties of the complete information
setting, the original problem can be decoupled into two sub-problems easier to solve.
7.5.1 Properties of a maximum efficiency device
In this subsection we address the problem of the existence and the computation of a maximum
efficiency incentive compatible device.
The first result we derive asserts that a maximum efficiency device exists if and only if, for every
type profile t, the optimal (for the designer) strategy profile gM (t) is sustainable without intervention
in Γt, and users have incentives to reveal their real type given that they will adopt gM and the inter-
vention device does not intervene. If this is the case, we are also able to characterize all maximum
efficiency devices.
Proposition 13. D = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ,X,Φ〉 is a maximum efficiency device if and only if, ∀ t ∈ T ,
1: the optimal action profile gM (t) is sustainable without intervention in Γt;
2: each user i having type ti prefers the action profile gM (t) with respect to the action profile
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gM (t′i, t−i), for every alternative type t′i user i might have, i.e,∑
t−i∈T−i
pi[t | ti]Ui
(
gM (t), t, x∗
)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi[t | ti]Ui
(
gM (t′i, t−i), t, x
∗
)
∀ i ∈ N, ∀ ti ∈ Ti, ∀ t
′
i ∈ Ti
3: the suggested action profile is the optimal action profile of game Γt, i.e., µ(t) = gM (t);
4: the restriction of the intervention rule in r = t and m = gM (t), i.e., Φ′a = Φt,gM (t),a, sustains
without intervention gM (t) in Γt.
Proof. See Appendix B.1
Condition 1 is related to what is achievable by the designer in the complete information setting,
condition 2 is related to the structure of the environment (which is not controllable by the designer),
while conditions 3-4 say how to obtain a maximum efficiency direct mechanism once 1-2 are satisfied.
In the second result we combine condition 2 of Proposition 13 with assumptions A3-A6 to derive a
sufficient condition on the type set structures under which a maximum efficiency incentive compatible
direct mechanism does not exist. We define the bin size βk of user k’s type set, Tk, as the maximum
distance between two consecutive elements of Tk: βk = maxs∈{1,...,vk−1} (τk,s+1 − τk,s). We define
the bin size β as the maximum among the bin sizes of all users: β = maxk∈N βk .
Proposition 14. There exists a threshold bin size ζ > 0 so that if β ≤ ζ then a maximum efficiency
incentive compatible direct mechanism does not exist.
Proof. Let k ∈ N and tk ∈ Tk be such that gNE0k (t) > gMk (t), ∀ t−i ∈ T−i. We rewrite condition 2
of Proposition 13 for users k and type tk:∑
t
−k∈T−k
pi[t | tk]Ui
(
gM (tk, t−k), t, x
∗
)
≥
∑
t
−k∈T−k
pi[t | tk]Ui
(
gM (t′k, t−k), t, x
∗
)
, ∀ t′k ∈ Tk (7.2)
We have hBRk (gM−k(t), t) ≥ hBRk (gNE
0
−k (t), t) = g
NE0
k (t) > g
M
k (t), where the first inequality is valid
because of the submodularity.
Let t˜k(t−k) be the value of user k’s type so that gM (t˜k(t−k), t−k) = hBRk (gM−k(t˜k(t−k), t−k), t)
if it exists (in this case A3 guarantees it is greater than tk); and t˜k(t−k) = τk,vk otherwise. Let t˜k =
mint
−k
t˜k(t−k). If
(
tk, t˜k
]⋂
Tk 6= ∅ (in particular, this is true if β ≤ t˜k − tk), ∀ t′k ∈
(
tk, t˜k
]⋂
Tk
and ∀ t−k ∈ T−k we obtain
Uk
(
gM (t′k, t−k), t, x
∗
)
> Uk
(
gM (tk, t−k), t, x
∗
)
contradicting Eq. (7.2).
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Interpretation: when user k’s type is tk, k’s resource usage that maximizes the designer’s utility,
gMk (t), is lower than the one that maximizes k’s utility, hBRk (gM−k(t), t), ∀ t−k ∈ T−k. If k reports a
type t′k slightly higher than tk, then the intervention device suggests a slightly higher resource usage,
allowing k to obtain a higher utility. Hence, k has an incentive to cheat and resources are not allocated
as efficiently as possible. To avoid this situation, the intervention device might decrease the resources
given to a type t′k. In this case the loss of efficiency occurs when the real type of k is t′k and it does not
receive the resources it would deserve. These two cases are such that at least one of them corresponds
to a non-zero inefficiency. Since both occur with positive probability, a positive overall inefficiency
is unavoidable.
It is worth noting that we consider finite type sets and a finite intervention rule set mainly to
simplify the logical exposition. However, all results might be derived also with infinite and continuous
sets. In particular, if type sets are continuous Proposition 14 implies that a maximum efficiency
incentive compatible direct mechanism never exists.
7.5.2 Properties of an optimal device
If a maximum efficiency device exists, the set of optimal devices in D coincides with the set of
maximum efficiency devices in D, that is characterized in Proposition 13. If a maximum efficiency
device does not exists, the designer seeks to obtain the best he can, minimizing the loss of efficiency.
He has to choose the optimal device solving the OD problem. However, this may be computationally
hard.
In this subsection we consider some additional conditions to simplify the OD problem. First, we
assume that the designer’s utility is a function of the users’ utilities (this is the case, for example, of a
benevolent designer that seeks to maximize some measure of social welfare). Moreover, we suppose
that, for each type profile t ∈ T , every action profile g(t) lower than gNE0(t) is sustainable without
intervention in Γt. Finally, we assume that the utility of a user i adopting the lowest action amini is
always equal to 0, i.e., Ui(amini , a−i, t, x) = 0, ∀ a−i, t, x. Interpreting amini as no resource usage,
this means that, independently of types and other users’ actions, a user that does not use resources
obtains no utility. In particular, this last assumption implies that:
Lemma 5. The utility of user i is non increasing in the actions of the other users.
Proof.
Ui(a, t, x) = Ui(a
min
i , a−i, t, x) +
∫ ai
amini
∂Ui(z, a−i, t, x)
∂z
∂z =
∫ ai
amini
∂Ui(z, a, t, x)
∂z
∂z
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∂Ui(a, t, x)
∂aj
=
∫ ai
amini
∂2Ui(z, a−i, t, x)
∂z∂aj
∂z ≤ 0
where the inequality is valid because of the submodularity (see A5).
Under the additional assumptions of this subsection, we can prove the following result that allows
the designer to further restrict the class of mechanisms to take into consideration.
Lemma 6. There exists an optimal device such that, for every type profile t ∈ T , the recommended
action profile a˜(t) is unique (i.e., µ is point mass at a˜(t)) and the restriction of the intervention rule
in r = t and m = a˜(t), i.e., Φ′a = Φt,a˜(t),a, sustains without intervention a˜(t) in Γt.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
Lemma 6 suggests the idea to decouple the original problem into two sub-problems. First, we
can calculate the optimal message rule µ˜ under the constraint that users adopting the recommended
actions have the incentive to report their real type. Then, it is sufficient to identify an intervention rule
Φ˜ able to sustain µ˜(t) without intervention in Γt, ∀ t. This is formalized in the following.
Consider the device D˜ = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ˜,X, Φ˜〉, where
µ˜ = argmax
µ
∑
t∈T
pi(t)U (µ(t), t, x∗)
subject to:∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t | ti)Ui (µ(t), t, x
∗) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t | ti)Ui
(
µ(t′i, t−i), t, x
∗
)
∀ i ∈ N, ∀ ti ∈ Ti, ∀ t
′
i ∈ Ti
and, ∀ t ∈ T , Φ′a = Φ˜t,µ(t),a sustains without intervention µ(t) in Γt.
Proposition 15. D˜ is an optimal device.
Proof. Lemma 6 guarantees that there exists an optimal device inside the class of devices in which,
∀ t, the recommended action profile µ(t) is unique and the restriction of the intervention rule in r = t
and m = µ(t), i.e., Φ′a = Φt,µ(t),a, sustains without intervention µ(t) in Γt. Among all devices
belonging to such class, D˜ is selected to maximize the designer’s expected utility. Thus, D˜ is an
optimal device.
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7.6 Algorithm that Converges to an Incentive Compatible Device
In this section we provide a practical tool for the designer to choose an efficient device. Because
the optimal device may be very difficult to compute, even in the decoupled version of Proposition
15, we provide a simple algorithm that converges to an incentive compatible device D in which µ
is point mass (i.e., given a report the recommended action profile is unique) and, although perhaps
not optimal, still yields a ‘good’ outcome for the designer. More precisely, D will sustain without
intervention the honest and obedient strategy profile. The algorithm has been designed with the idea
to minimize the distance between the optimal action profile gM (t) and the suggested action profile
µ(t), for each possible type profile t. Such algorithm is run off-line by the designer to choose an
efficient device and can be used when, for every type profile t and at each step of the algorithm,
the designer is able to identify a device for the complete information setting that sustains without
intervention the suggested action profile µ(r) in Γr. (Note that the suggested action profile will never
be lower than the optimal action profile gM (t) or higher than the NE action profile gNE0(t) of Γ0t .)
Given a device D in which µ is point mass, we denote by Wi(ti, t′i) the expected utility that user
i, with type ti, obtains reporting type t′i and adopting the suggested action, when the other users are
honest and obedient and the intervention device does not intervene, i.e.,
Wi(ti, t
′
i) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t | ti)Ui(µ(t
′
i, t−i), t, x
∗)
Moreover, we say that X and Φr,m,a are induced by µ if the device defined by X and Φ′a(x) =
Φr,µ(r),a(x) sustains µ(r) without intervention in Γr, ∀ r ∈ T . If the designer is able to identify the
device defined by X and pi′a in the complete information setting, then he can easily compute X and
Φr,m,a induced by µ, obtaining a device for the general framework that, by construction, gives the
users the incentive to always adopt the recommended actions (i.e., users are obedient) and does not in-
tervene (threats of punishments do not need to be executed since users follow the recommendations).
The algorithm initializes the device D in the following way: µ(r) = gM (r), X and Φ induced by
µ. This means that, given the report profile r, the device recommends the optimal (for the designer
and if user types are r) action profile gM (r) and the users will adopt it. However, this does not
guarantee that the users are honest: the reported type profile may be different from the real one, i.e.,
r 6= t. To give an incentive for the users to be honest, in each step of the algorithm the recommended
action profile µ(r) is modified to increase the utility the users obtain if they are honest (or to decrease
the utility they obtain when they are dishonest). Whenever µ(r) is modified, also X and Φ must be
modified accordingly, selecting X and Φ induced by µ such that users remain obedient.
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To explain the idea behind the algorithm we exploit Fig. 7.1, where i’s utility is plotted with
respect to i’s action, for a fixed type profile t, when all users are honest (i.e., r = t) and the other users
are obedient (i.e., gj(tj , µj(t)) = µj(t), ∀ j 6= i). Each sub-picture refers to different recommended
actions (i.e., different µ), and in each sub-picture four points are marked (some of which may possible
coincide) representing the following cases: (1) i adopts the best (for the designer) action gMi (t); (2)
i adopts the recommended action µi(t); (3) i adopts the NE action gNE0i (t) (notice that it is not the
best action for user i because the other users do not adopt gNE0−i (t)); and (4) i adopts the best action
hBRi (µ−i(t), t).
The initialization case, in which (1) and (2) coincide, is represented by the upper-left Fig. 7.1.
By assumption A6 gMi (t) ≤ gNE
0
i (t) and by assumption A5 gNE
0
i (t) ≤ h
BR
i (µ−i(t), t), because
µ−i(t) ≤ g
NE0
−i (t). If Wi(ti, ti) ≥ Wi(ti, t′i), for every alternative i’s reported type t′i, then user i
has an incentive to report its true type ti. If, at a certain iteration of the algorithm, this is valid for all
users and for all types they may have, then the algorithm stops and we obtain a device that sustains
without intervention the honest and obedient strategy profile.14
Conversely, suppose there exists a user i and types ti and t′i such that Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, t′i),
i.e., user i has an incentive to report t′i when its type is ti. In this case the algorithm increases the
recommended action µi(t) by a quantity equal to i, moving it in the direction of the best response
function hBRi (µ−i(t), t), for every possible combination of types t−i of the other users, and X and Φ
must be modified accordingly such that users remain obedient. This has the effect, as represented by
upper-right Fig. 7.1, to increase the utility of user i when it is honest, ∀ t−i, which in turn implies that
the expected utility of users i when it is honest (i.e., W (ti, ti)) increases. This procedure is repeated
as long as Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, t′i) and µi(t) ≤ gNE
0
i (t).
In case i’s suggested action µi(t) reaches gNE
0
i (t) and still Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, t′i), then the
suggested action of user k, µk(t), is increased by a quantity equal to k, ∀ k ∈ N , k 6= i, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i.
As we can see from lower-left Fig. 7.1, this means to change the shape of the curve representing
i’s utility with respect to i’s action. In particular, by assumption A5, the best response function
hBRi (µ−i(t), t) is moved in the direction of the recommended action µi(t).
If µk(t) reaches µNE
0
k (t) as well, ∀ k ∈ N , then µi(t) coincides with the best response function
hBRi (µ−i(t), t), as represented in the lower-right Fig. 7.1. In fact, by definition, the NE is the action
profile such that every user is playing its best action against the actions of the other users. Since µi(t)
14Notice that, if a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism exists, since it must satisfy the conditions
of Proposition 13, then the initialization of the algorithm corresponds to a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct
mechanism and the algorithm stops after the first iteration.
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coincides with hBRi (µ−i(t), t), ∀ t−i ∈ T−i, user i is told to play its best action for every possible
combination of the types of the other users. Hence, user i cannot increase its utility reporting type t′i,
i.e., it must be Wi(ti, ti) ≥Wi(ti, t′i).
The algorithm stops the first time every user has an incentive to declare its real type. Since at
each iteration the suggested action profiles are increased by a fixed amount, the algorithm converges
after a finite number of iterations. The higher the steps i, i ∈ N , the lower the convergence time of
the algorithm. On the other hand, the lower the steps, the closer the suggested action profile to the
optimal one.15
Algorithm 1 General algorithm.
1: Initialization: µ(t) = gM (t), ∀ t ∈ T , X and Φ induced by µ
2: For each user i ∈ N and each pair of types ti, t′i ∈ Ti
3: If Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, t′i)
4: If µi(t) < gNE
0
i (t) for some t−i ∈ T−i
5: µi(t)←min
{
µi(t) + i, g
NE0
i (t)
}
, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i, X and Φ induced by µ
6: Else
7: µk(t)←min
{
µk(t) + k, g
NE0
k (t)
}
, ∀k ∈ N , k 6= i, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i, X and Φ induced by µ
8: Repeat from 2 until 3 is unsatisfied ∀ i, ti, t−i
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Figure 7.1. User i’s utility vs. user i’s action, for different suggested actions
15Notice that, since no assumption such as convexity is made for the designer’s expected utility, an action profile closer
to the optimal one does not necessarily imply a better outcome for the designer.
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7.7 Introduction to Flow Control
In this section, we introduce the congestion problem in a store-and-forward node of a network,
namely, the server. Each user connected to the server, represented by a traffic flow that enters the
server, sends its packets with Poisson arrival rate. The server serves the packets, following a first-in-
first-out policy, with exponentially distributed service time. The system can be modeled as an M/M/1
queue. We take into account the possibility that users belong to different classes of traffic, requiring
different quality of service. The class of traffic a user belongs to is represented by the type of the
user. We assume that each user can independently set its transmission rate to maximize its own utility
represented by the power, defined in [106] as the ratio between the throughput and the delay and later
extended in [107] to take into account multiple classes of traffic.
In the subsequent sections, we study the interaction between users in two different scenarios: (1)
in the complete information scenario every user is aware of the types of the other users and their
interaction can be modeled with a complete information game; (2) in the incomplete information
scenario the users are not aware of the types of the other users, but a common probability distribution
of the types of the other users exists, and the interaction can be modeled with a Bayesian game. We
show that the self-interested and strategic nature of the users leads to the overuse of the resources
and to substantial inefficiencies in both cases, which are quantified using as performance criterion the
geometric mean of the users’ utilities. To improve the efficiency of the network, we use a standard
intervention scheme for the complete information scenario and we exploit our framework for the
incomplete information scenario.
7.7.1 Related work
Flow control is a necessary operation to make a service accessible to many users. Several met-
rics have been considered as performance indicators. The power was proposed in [106] as a way to
trade-off between throughput and delay. This concept was later extended in [107] to take into account
multiple classes of traffic. To obtain distributed flow control algorithms, [108–110] model the flow
control problem as a network utility maximization problem, and interpret the Lagrangian multipliers
as prices. These approaches derive efficient distributed algorithms, however they assume that users
are obedient in that they maximize the utilities designed by the designer, instead of their own utilities.
Thus, they can not be compared with this work, in which we assume that users are strategic. The ear-
lier applications of game theory to flow control problems were limited to the computation of the Nash
equilibria of existing congestion schemes, to quantify their performance in the presence of strategic
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Obedient
users
Strategic
users
Incentive
scheme
Incomplete
Information
Information
revelation
[108–110] X
[25,27,28,34,111] X
[24, 30, 40, 41] X X
[112, 113] X X X
our work X X X X
Table 7.1. Comparison among different flow control works
users. Examples of this approach include [27,28,111] which use the power as the performance metric,
and [34] that shows that most congestion control schemes used, such as TCP, encourage a behavior
that leads to congestion. [25] characterizes the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto Boundary for linearly
coupled communication games, leading to the same result as [28] for the particular case of the flow
control game. In addition, [25] investigates the properties of an alternative solution concept named
conjectural equilibrium, in which users compensate for their lack of information by forming internal
beliefs about the other users. Later, with the same philosophy of our work, game theory was used to
design practical schemes to deal with selfish and strategic users. [30, 40] consider pricing schemes,
in which users are charged based on their resource usage, and show that if appropriate cost function
and pricing mechanism are used, one can find an efficient Nash equilibrium. [41] designs the pricing
scheme that maximizes the service provider’s revenue instead of the users’ satisfaction. [24] uses a
packet-dropping scheme – a particular instance of intervention schemes – to improve the efficiency
of the Nash equilibrium, allowing to arbitrarily approach the optimal social welfare. None of the
above works has addressed the flow control problem in the incomplete information setting. To the
best of our knowledge, the only works dealing with incomplete information, such as [112,113], adopt
a Bayesian approach, in which the expected – with respect to the unknown information – utilities are
maximized. Our work differs from them in that we introduce the ideas of mechanism design [94–99]
and intervention [66] to create protocols that elicit the private information of the users. Table 7.1
summarizes the differences between the described literature.
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Figure 7.2. Representation of a flow control application as an M/M/1 queue
7.7.2 Formulation of the flow control problem
We consider n flows with Poisson arrival rates of a1, a2, ..., an that are serviced by a single server
with exponentially distributed service times with mean 1
C
. Since we assume that all packets have the
same length, we will talk interchangeably of arrival rate (pkt
s
) and transmission rate (Mbps), and C
can be seen as the channel capacity, in pkt
s
, after the server.16 We refer to each stream of packets as
a user. We assume that each user i can control its own traffic (e.g., by adjusting the coding quality of
its communication), i.e., it can select its transmission rate (action) ai ∈ Ai = [0, C]. As represented
by Fig. 7.2, the system is an M/M/1 queue with an input arrival rate λ =
∑n
i=1 ai.
In most cases a user is faced with two conflicting objectives, i.e., to maximize its throughput17 and
to minimize its average delay. The conflict between throughput and delay is obvious since as more
traffic enters the server queue the delays become larger. In order to incorporate these two measures
in a single performance metric, the concept of power has been proposed in [106] and later extended
in [107]. It is defined as the ratio between the throughput and the average delay, where the exponent
of the throughput is a positive constant. We can therefore write i’s utility as
Ui(a, ti) = a
ti
i (C − λ) = a
ti
i
(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)
(7.3)
where a = (a1, . . . , an) denotes the transmission rate (action) profile and the parameter ti > 0
represents user i’s type.
16We consider packets of the same length to keep a simple notation and because the qualitative results are not affected
by this assumption. However, the model and the analysis can be easily extended to take into account packets of different
lengths.
17Here the throughput refers to the traffic the server is able to service, i.e., the transmission rate available to the user, and
does not take into account the packets lost due to physical layer transmission errors.
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The value of ti may depend, for example, on the quality of service of the application correspond-
ing to the i-th stream of packets. As we will see in Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5), that consider compliant users
and strategic users respectively, the rate adopted by a user is increasing in its type. This consideration
suggests the idea that the higher the type of a user, the higher the importance of the rate, with respect
to the delay, for that user. As an example, streams of packets associated to delay dependent applica-
tions should have a low type while streams of packets associated to delay tolerant applications should
have a high type.
In general, the applications a server has to deal with may change over time. For this reason it
is useful to define the type set Ti, for every user i, whose elements represent all the possible types
user i may have. We assume that the type set is the same for all users and is finite, i.e., Ti = T1 =
{τ1, τ2, ..., τv}, v ∈ N, τk ∈ <, τ1 < τ2 < ... < τv, for every user i ∈ N . Suppose that at the
beginning of a communication session the types of the users connected to the system are unknown.
We assume that a common probability distribution exists and that user types are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with pi(ti) denoting the probability that a user has type ti, ti ∈ T1, and
pi(t) =
∏n
i=1 pi(ti) the probability that the type profile is t, t ∈ T = T n1 . pi(ti) can be thought as the
average fraction of applications having type ti that require services to the server.
The network must be designed to operate efficiently following the manager’s objective, which can
be quantified by a utility function. We assume that the manager’s utility is the geometric mean of the
users’ utilities:
U(a, t) = n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (a, ti) = (C − λ)
+
n∏
i=1
a
ti
n
i
where (x)+ = max {x , 0}.18 This choice allows to maintain a balance between two competing
interests a benevolent manager might have: to maximize the social welfare of the network (defined
as the sum utility) and to allocate resources fairly, giving to users similar utilities. Notice that max-
imizing U(a, t) with respect to users’ actions is equivalent to maximizing a proportional fairness of
users’ utilities, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 lnU
+
i (a, ti), and the optimal solution gM (t) =
(
gM1 (t), . . . , g
M
n (t)
)
, as a
function of users’ types, is given by (see [25])
gMi (t) =
tiC
n+
∑n
k=1 tk
(7.4)
18We consider U+i instead of Ui for mathematical reasons, because utilities as defined in Eq. (7.3) may also be negative,
and the geometric mean would lose meaning with negative quantities. Anyway, notice that it is in the interest of both the
users and the manager to have λ ≤ C, i.e., working in the sub-space of the original domain such that U+i = Ui.
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We denote by EUi(g, ti) and EU(g) the expected (with respect to the types) utilities of user i
having type ti and of the manager, where g(t) = (g1(t), . . . , gn(t)) represents the actions adopted by
the users when the type profile is t, i.e.,
EUi(g, ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i)Ui(g(t), t) , EU(g) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)U(g(t), t)
The benchmark optimum for the manager – the maximum expected utility he could achieve if
users were compliant to a prescribed scheme – is therefore equal to EU ben = EU(gM (t)).
7.8 Flow Control Games Without Intervention
In this Section we compute the outcome of a flow control problem considering self-interested
and strategic users, for both the complete and the incomplete information scenarios. Moreover, we
quantify the loss of efficiency of the manager’s utility with respect to the maximum efficiency utility.
7.8.1 Complete information scenario
We define the complete information game
Γ0t = (N,A, {Ui}
n
i=1)
where each user i selects its action gi(t) strategically, knowing the types t−i of all the other users.
We denote by gNE0(t) =
(
gNE
0
1 (t), . . . , g
NE0
n (t)
)
a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game Γ0t .
The unique NE gNE0i (t) of Γ0t is, ∀ i ∈ N , (see [25])
gNE
0
i (t) =
tiC
1 +
∑n
k=1 tk
(7.5)
Notice that strategic users use the resources more heavily with respect to compliant users, i.e., gNE0i (t) >
gMi (t), ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ t ∈ T (excluding the trivial case n = 1).
The manager’s expected utility in the complete information scenario is equal to EU(gNE0(t)).
7.8.2 Incomplete information scenario
We define the incomplete information game
Γ0 = (N,A, T, pi, {Ui}
n
i=1)
where each user i selects its action gi(ti) strategically, knowing its own type ti and the probability
distribution of the types of the other users, pi(t−i).
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We denote by gBNE(t) =
(
gBNE1 (t1), . . . , g
BNE0
n (tn)
)
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of
the game Γ0.
Proposition 16. There exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium gBNE(t) of Γ0 which can be
obtained by solving a linear systemAgBNE = b. In addition, the inverse ofA,A−1, can be computed
analytically.19
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The manager’s expected utility in the incomplete information scenario is equal to EU(gBNE(t)).
7.8.3 Illustrative results
Fig. 7.3 shows the manager’s expected utility with respect to the number of users, considering
C = 5Mbps and a type set T1 = {0.1, 1} with uniformly distributed types. The upper curve repre-
sents the benchmark optimum, while the dashed and the dotted lines represent the manager’s expected
utility when users are strategic, in the complete and incomplete information cases, respectively. The
manager’s utility when users act strategically, for both the complete and the incomplete information
scenarios, is far below the benchmark optimum. Notice that the manager can obtain a higher utility
in the incomplete information scenario with respect to the complete information scenario, at least
when there are more than three users in the system. This agrees with the results of [114, 115] where,
in a strategic setting, the less closely related the agents’ goals the lower the quantity of information
they prefer to exchange. In our case, the objective of the manager becomes less closely related to the
objective of a single user as the number of total users increases. In fact, the manager’s objective is to
increase the utility of all users in a fair way, while the goal of a user is to improve only its own utility,
at the cost of the utility of all the other users. Hence, as the number of users increases, the selfishness
of a single user has a higher negative impact on the manager’s objective.
7.9 Flow Control Games with Intervention
Fig. 7.2 shows that the manager’s expected utility in strategic settings (for both the complete
and the incomplete information scenarios) is much lower than the benchmark optimum. Here we ask
whether the manager can do something to make the system robust against strategic users, filling, at
least partially, the gap between the benchmark optimum and the manager’s expected utility in strategic
settings.
19The expressions of b, A and A−1 can be found in Appendix B.3
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Figure 7.3. Intervention device utility with respect to the number of users
We assume that the manager can choose and deploy a device in the system that (1) can receive
communications from users, (2) can send communications to users, (3) can monitor the actions of
users, and (4) can transmit a stream of packet x ∈ X = [0, x] to the server, which we interpret as an
intervention. The intervention action increases the incoming traffic of the server λ =
∑n
i=1 ai + x,
and the users’ and the manager’s utilities change accordingly:
U Ii (a, ti, x) = a
ti
i (C − λ) = a
ti
i
(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai − x
)
(7.6)
U I(a, t, x) = n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U I+i (a, ti, x) = (C − λ)
+
n∏
i=1
a
ti
n
i
It is straightforward to check that the users’ and the manager’s utilities satisfy assumptions A1-A6.
In particular, the manager’s preferred action is x∗ = 0 (i.e., no intervention), and the game Γ0t defined
in Subsection 7.8.2 coincides with the game Γ0t defined in Subsection 7.4.1.
In the complete information scenario, the intervention device is a tool the manager employs to in-
struct the users on how to behave, giving them the incentive to adopt efficient actions by threatening
punishments which are not executed if users follow the recommendations. In addition, in the incom-
plete information scenario, the device is also used to retrieve the relevant information from the users,
i.e., their types. First, we formalize a device in the more general scenario of incomplete information
20
, and we will then discuss the natural simplifications for the complete information scenario.
20The formalization will be similar to the one introduced in Section 7.2, but here we assume there are no errors, reports
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A device is a tuple D = 〈µ, x,Φ〉 where
• µ : T → A is the message rule, which specifies the recommendations to be sent to the users
as a function of the reported types. If r ∈ T are the reports we write m = µ(r) for the
recommended actions, m = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ A;
• x represents the maximum rate the intervention device is able to transmit;
• Φ : T × A ×A → X is the intervention rule, which specifies the transmission rate the device
will adopt given the received reports, the transmitted messages and the users’ adopted actions.
If r are the reports, m the transmitted messages and a the users’ adopted actions, we write
Φ(r,m, a) for the adopted intervention action.
In the incomplete information scenario, a strategic user i selects its report ri and its action ai
in order to maximize its expected utility given the information and the beliefs it has. Specifically, a
strategy for user i consists of a pair of functions (fi, gi), in which fi : T1 → T1 specifies the report of
user i based on its type, and g : T1 × Ai → Ai specifies the action of user i based on its type and on
the recommendation received. As usual, we denote by f and g the profiles of the two strategies.
In the following, we summarize the different stages of the interaction between the users and the
intervention device in the incomplete information scenario.
Stage 1: each user i sends the report ri = fi(ti) to the intervention device
Stage 2: the intervention device sends the recommended action mi = µ(r) to each user i
Stage 3: each user i takes the action ai = gi(ti,mi)
Stage 4: the intervention device monitors the users’ action profile21 a and adopts the intervention action
x = Φ(r,m, a)
Here we restrict the attention to the class of affine intervention devices D, in which the interven-
tion level increases linearly with the users’ actions. It may seem restrictive to only consider such a
and messages are costless and we do not consider randomized rules because, as we will see, pure rules are sufficient to
obtain optimal results in the complete information case and to satisfy the conditions we need to use the algorithm in the
incomplete information case.
21The device can estimate the users’ rates by counting in real time the number of packets that each user has sent since the
beginning of the communication session. Such estimates may be inaccurate, in particular in the first phases of the session.
Here we neglect this issue, implicitly assuming that the session is long enough (with respect to the users’ rates) to converge
very soon to accurate estimations. We will take into consideration an extension of this work in which we analyze in more
detail the impact of imperfect monitoring.
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simple class of devices. However, D will turn out to be optimal, i.e., it is not possible to increase the
manager’s expected utility by considering more complex devices.
D = 〈µ, x,Φ〉 is an affine intervention device if the intervention rule Φ is of the form
Φ(r,m, a) =
[
n∑
i=1
ci(r,m) (ai − a˜i(r,m))
]x
0
where a˜i(r,m) ≥ 0 represents a target action for user i, ci(r,m) ≥ 0 is the rate of increase of
the intervention level due to an increase of i’s action, and [·]ba = min {max {a, ·} , b}. Though in
this abstract definition a˜i(r,m) might be different from the recommended action mi = µ(r), in the
schemes we will propose in the following we will have a˜i(r,m) = mi, ∀ r, m−i, i.e., a˜(r,m) will
represent the recommended action profile.
Fig. 7.4 shows how the intervention rule Φ changes the relation between i’s utility and i’s action,
for given type, report and message profiles and assuming that the other users adopt the target action
profile a˜−i(r,m). The utility of user i is plotted for three different values of the parameter ci(r,m)
(ci(r,m) = 0 means that the intervention device never intervenes). For an action ai lower than the
target action a˜i, i’s utility is as if the device did not exist. However, for an action ai higher than
the target action a˜i(r,m), i’s utility is lower compared to the utility it would have obtained without
the device, and the gap increases as ci increases. In fact, if the users adopt the target action profile
a˜(r,m) the intervention level is 0, but if a single user i deviates from the recommendation adopting
an action ai > a˜i(r,m), the intervention device reacts transmitting a flow of packets with a positive
rate x = Φ(r,m, a), that is increasing in ci(r,m) and affects the utility of every user. This agrees
with our view of intervention as a threat of punishments which are not executed if all users follow the
recommendations.
As noted before, in the complete information scenario the interaction between the users and the
device can be simplified, because the type profile t is known by everybody. In particular, since the
device already knows t, the reports do not play any role and we can consider fi(ti) = ti, ∀ i (or,
alternatively, we can skip Stage 1). Moreover, the users know in advance the messages they will
receive because messages are a deterministic function of the type profile (hence, also Stage 2 can be
skipped). Finally, since reports and messages are given, the intervention rule can simply be written
as a function of the users’ actions: Φ(a) = Φ(t, µ(t), a). In particular, for an affine device the
parameters ci = ci(t, µ(t)) and a˜i = a˜i(t, µ(t)) are constant. Thus, in the complete information
scenario a device is simply described by x and Φ. In this context, each user i has to select an action
ai to maximize its utility.
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Figure 7.4. Manager’s expected utility vs. number of users for the complete and incomplete information
scenarios
Given a device D, in both the complete and the incomplete information cases, the interaction
among users can be modeled as a game. In the following we provide the tools for the manager to
choose a device in the class D, for both the complete and the incomplete information scenarios.
7.9.1 Complete information scenario
In the complete information scenario, given a device D = 〈x,Φ〉, the interaction among users is
modeled with the game
Γt =
(
N,A,D,
{
U Ii
}n
i=1
)
in which each user i strategically selects the action gi(t) (the dependence on t shows that if the type
profile t changes, the game Γt changes as well and the users may decide to take different actions) to
maximize its utility U Ii , see Eq. (7.6).
The outcome of such interaction is represented by the NE. The manager faces the problem of
choosing a device D so that there exists a NE of the game Γt that gives it the highest utility U I
among what is achievable with all possible NEs.
Lemma 7. Consider the affine device D such that, ∀ i ∈ N ,
ci ≥
ti (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)− a˜i
a˜i
, x ≥
ci [ti (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)− a˜i]
1 + ti(1 + ci)
(7.7)
If a˜ ≤ gNE0 , then a˜ is a NE of Γt.
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Proof. See Appendix B.4
Interpretation: If a ci high enough is selected, and if the device is able to transmit with a large
enough transmission rate, the threat of punishment discourages the users from adopting actions higher
than the target. This situation is shown in Fig. 7.4 for ci = 2. Hence, if the utility of user i is
increasing before the target action a˜i (in particular, this is valid if a˜i ≤ gNE0i ), as in Fig. 7.4, the
target action a˜i becomes the best response action for user i.
Proposition 17. ∀ t ∈ T , the optimal profile gM (t) is sustainable without intervention in Γt, adopting
the device x ≥ C
1 + τ1
, a˜ = gM (t) and ci ≥ n− 1, i ∈ N .
∀ t ∈ T , every strategy profile a ≤ gNE0(t) is sustainable without intervention in Γt, adopting
the device x ≥ C , a˜ = a and ci high enough (i.e., ci ≥ τv(C−
∑n
k=1 a˜k)−a˜i
a˜i
), i ∈ N .
Proof. First, consider the second affirmation. The condition of Eq. (7.7) on x is automatically sat-
isfied if the right hand side is lower than 0. Moreover, if it is higher than 0, the right hand side is
increasing in ci. In fact, the function h(ci) = acib+aci , with a, b ≥ 0, is increasing in ci, because
h′(ci) =
ab
(b+aci)2
> 0. Thus, the condition of Eq. (7.7) on x becomes stricter as ci increases. Taking
the limit for ci → +∞ we can find the following stricter condition on x that does not depend on ci:
x ≥
ti (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)− a˜i
ti
= C −
n∑
k=1
a˜k −
a˜i
ti
In order to obtain conditions that are independent of users’ types and action profiles to sustain, we
can consider the following stricter conditions:
x ≥ C −
n∑
k=1
a˜k −
a˜i
τv
, x ≥ C −
n∑
k=1
a˜k , x ≥ C (7.8)
As for ci, we can find a stricter condition independent of users’ types substituting ti with τv. Thus,
once the action profile to sustain is fixed, it is sufficient to select a ci satisfying
ci ≥
τv (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)− a˜i
a˜i
(7.9)
Now consider the first affirmation. Substituting a˜ = gM (t) we obtain
ci ≥
ti (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)
a˜i
− 1 = n+
n∑
k=1
tk −
tiC
∑n
k=1 tk
tiC
− 1 = n− 1
As to x, substituting a˜ = gM (t) into the second condition of Eq. (7.8) we obtain
x ≥
nC
n+
∑n
k=1 tk
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Finally, since the right hand side is decreasing in
∑n
k=1 tk, a stricter condition can be obtained sub-
stituting tk = τ1, ∀k ∈ N , obtaining
x ≥
C
1 + τ1
If the device is able to transmit a stream of packets with a rate higher than a certain threshold (that
is upper-bounded by C), if a˜ = gM (t) and if ci ≥ n − 1, the threat of punishments is an incentive
for the users to adopt the optimal action profile gM (t). Note that, in this case, the punishments are
not executed. Thus, the manager can extract the maximum utility from the game Γt. The following
corollary is an implication of this consideration.
Corollary 5. The class of affine intervention rules D is optimal (i.e., it is not possible to gain more
by considering more complex devices) in the complete information scenario.
Finally, the manager’s expected utility for the complete information scenario with intervention
device is equal to the maximum efficiency utility EU(gM (t)).
7.9.2 Incomplete information scenario
In the incomplete information scenario, given a device D = 〈µ, x,Φ〉, the interaction among
users is modeled with the Bayesian game
Γ =
(
N,A, T, pi,D,
{
U Ii
}n
i=1
)
in which each user i strategically adopts the functions fi : T1 → T1 (which specifies the report of
user i based on its type) and g : T1 ×Ai → Ai (which specifies the action of user i based on its type
and on the recommendation received) to maximize its expected utility
EU Ii (f, g, ti,D) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i)U
I
i (a, t, x)
where, ∀ i ∈ N ,
ri = fi(ti) , m = µ(r) , ai = gi(ti,mi) , x = Φ(r,m, a)
The outcome of such interaction is represented by the BNE. The manager faces the problem of
choosing a device D so that there exists a BNE of the game Γ that gives it the highest expected utility
EU I(f, g,D) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)U I(a, t, x)
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among what is achievable with all possible BNEs.
In the following we apply the results derived in Subsection 7.5.1 to find the conditions for the
existence and to compute a maximum efficiency device, that allows the manager to achieve its bench-
mark optimum. In case such device does not exist, the network cannot operate as efficiently as in
the compliant users scenario. Moreover, in this case the optimal device is hard to compute. For this
reason, we consider two suboptimal devices which are easier to compute than the optimal device.
7.9.2.1 Existence and calculation of a maximum efficiency device
We wonder if there are some conditions under which the manager can select a device to obtain
the same utility it would achieve with compliant users. The following result provides an answer to
this question.
Proposition 18. If ∀ l = {1, . . . , v − 1} and ∀ t−i ∈ T−i,(
n+
∑
j 6=i tj + τl+1
n+
∑
j 6=i tj + τl
)τl+1(
τl
τl+1
)τl
≥ 1 (7.10)
then the affine device µ(t) = gM (t), x ≥ C
1 + τ1
, a˜i(r,m) = m and ci ≥ n−1, i ∈ N , is a maximum
efficiency incentive compatible device.
Proof. See Appendix B.5
Notice that all maximum efficiency incentive compatible devices must be of the form µ(t) =
gM (t), x ≥
C
1 + τ1
, a˜i(r,m) = m and ci ≥ n − 1, i ∈ N . However, if condition (7.10) is not
satisfied, the device might not be able to give to the users the incentive to report truthfully.
7.9.2.2 Algorithm that converges to an incentive compatible device
Here we specialize, for the flow control application, the general algorithm proposed in Subsection
7.6 that converges to an incentive compatible device. Prop. 17 guarantees that, at each step of the
algorithm, the considered device sustains without intervention the suggested action profile µ(r) in Γr
(note that the suggested action profile will never be higher than gNE0(t)).
The algorithm has been designed with the idea of minimizing the distance between the optimal
action profile gM (t) and the suggested action profile µ(t), for each possible type profile t. If a maxi-
mum efficiency device exists, the initialization of the algorithm corresponds to a maximum efficiency
incentive compatible device and the algorithm stops after the first iteration. If a user i having type τs
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can benefit by pretending to be of type τl , for each type profile τ = (τl, t−i) the algorithm increases
the recommended action for user i – if it is lower than gNE0i (τ) – or the recommended actions for
the other users. In both cases, the new device is selected such that the new suggested action profile
µ(τ) is sustained without intervention in Γτ . Proceeding in this way, the algorithm will converge to a
device in which no user can benefit by pretending to be of another type.
Algorithm 2 Flow control algorithm.
1: Initialization: ∀ r ∈ T , x ≥ C , µ(r) = gM (r), a˜(r, µ(r)) = µ(r), ci(r, µ(r)) ≥ n− 1
2: For s = 1 : v and l = 1 : v
3: If Wi(τs, τs) < Wi(τs, τl)
4: For t−i ∈ T−i
5: τ ← (τl, t−i)
6: If µi(τ) < gNE
0
i (τ)
7: µi(τ)← min
{
µi(τ) + i, g
NE0
i (τ)
}
, a˜(τ, µ(τ)) = µ(τ), ci(τ, µ(τ)) satisfying (7.9)
8: Else for k = 1 : m, k 6= i
9: µk(τ)← min
{
µk(τ) + k, g
NE0
k (τ)
}
, a˜(τ, µ(τ)) = µ(τ), ck(τ, µ(τ)) satisfying (7.9)
10: Repeat from 2 until 3 is unsatisfied ∀ s, l
7.9.2.3 Communication-free device
In this Subsection we define a new type of device, called communication-free device, in which
reports do not play any role for the final outcome, i.e., the message and intervention rules do not
depend on reports. This is particularly useful in situations where it is not possible for the users to
communicate with the device, or where communication is very expensive. However, also for scenarios
where users can send reports, a communication-free device might represent a good sub-optimal device
that is efficient and easy to compute.
Consider the communication-free device D that, independently of users’ types, suggests action
profile a,
a = argmin
a
[
− ln
(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)
Et
[
n∏
i=1
a
ti
n
i
]]
ai ≥ 0 , ai ≤ C , ∀i ∈ N (7.11)
Proposition 19. Eq. (7.11) defines a convex problem if τv ≤ n. Moreover, if the device D sustains a
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without intervention in Γ, then D is an optimal communication-free incentive compatible device and
the manager’s expected utility is EU(a).
Proof. See Appendix B.6
Corollary 6. Consider the communication-free device D such that, ∀ r ∈ T and ∀ i ∈ N ,
µ(r) = a , Φ(r, a, a) =
[
n∑
i=1
ci(a)(ai − ai)
]x
0
, ci(a) ≥
τv (C −
∑n
k=1 ak)− ai
ai
, x ≥ C
(7.12)
If a ≤ gNE0(t), ∀ t ∈ T , then D is an optimal communication-free incentive compatible device and
the manager’s expected utility is EU(a).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that D sustains a without intervention in Γ. Notice that Φ(r, a, a) = 0,
so it is sufficient to show that a is an equilibrium in Γ. Notice thatD satisfies the conditions of Lemma
7, ∀ t ∈ T , therefore D sustains a in Γt, i.e., ∀ t ∈ T , ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ ti ∈ T1 , ∀ aˆi ∈ Ai,
Ui
(
f , a, t
)
≥ Ui
(
f , aˆi, a−i, t
)
As a consequence, ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ ti ∈ T1 , ∀ aˆi ∈ Ai,∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i)Ui (f, a, t) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i)Ui (f, aˆi, a−i, t)
Hence, a in an equilibrium in Γ.
Notice that a ≤ gNE0(t), ∀ t ∈ T , is a sufficient condition such thatD is an optimal communication-
free incentive compatible mechanism, but it is not necessary. In fact, D might sustain a without
intervention in Γ even if a  gNE0(t) for some t ∈ T .
7.9.3 Illustrative results
In the following we are going to quantify the manager’s expected utility and the expected through-
put and delay for each type of user in different scenarios. We consider C = 5Mbps and a common
type set T1 = {0.1, 1}. Except for Fig. 7.6, we assume that the types are uniformly distributed, i.e.,
P (0.1) = P (1) = 0.5, and we plot the results varying the number of users from 2 to 16.
We first look at how the manager’s expected utility varies increasing the number of users, in
the complete and incomplete information scenarios. The left side of Fig. 7.5 refers to the complete
information scenario. The overlapped upper lines represent the manager’s expected utility when users
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are compliant and when they are strategic with the device derived in Subsection 7.9.1. The manager’s
expected utility is decreasing in the number of users because, as the number of users increases, the
total congestion experienced by every user increases as well. However, it is remarkable that with the
intervention scheme the manager can completely fill the gap between the benchmark optimum and
its expected utility when the users are strategic but no incentive scheme is adopted (dotted line). The
right side of Fig. 7.5 refers to the incomplete information scenario. In this scenario the manager is
guaranteed to achieve the benchmark optimum using the device derived from the algorithm (dashed
line) if the number of users is sufficiently small. In fact, for a number of users less than or equal to
3, it is straightforward to check that the sufficient condition (7.10) is satisfied, hence, a maximum
efficiency device exists and the algorithm converges to it. For a larger number of users, there is
no guarantee of optimality, and in fact the results of Fig. 7.5 show that in this case the manager’s
expected utility is lower than what could be obtained with compliant users. However, the manager
can still considerably increase its expected utility compared to the case of strategic users and no
incentive scheme (dotted line), by adopting the device derived from the algorithm for a number of
users lower than 8 and the communication-free device (dash-dot line) for a number of users greater
than or equal to 8 (f defined in (7.12) turns out to sustain the solution of (7.11) without intervention
in Γ). It is not surprising that the communication-free device is able to obtain good performance for
a large number of users, in fact in this situation the manager is able to foresee more accurately the
fraction of users of a certain type, hence the information about users’ types becomes less important.
Now we investigate how the results depend on the type probability distribution for the incomplete
information scenario. In Fig. 7.6 we fix the number of users to 4 and we vary the probability of the
low type, P (0.1), from 0 to 1, which is equivalent to varying P (1) from 1 to 0. We can see that the
gap between the benchmark optimum and the manager’s expected utility achievable with the device
derived from the algorithm is not strongly dependent on the type probability distribution. In fact, such
a mechanism provides incentives for each type of user to be honest and obedient, even though some
user types rarely occur. Notice that in the algorithm the recommended action profile for a certain
type profile is increased by a finite amount  if the users do not have an incentive to report truthfully,
which has the effect to produce the little step visible in Fig. 7.6 (the lower , the smoother the step).
On the contrary, the communication-free device is strongly dependent on the probability distribution
of user types. In fact, the recommended and enforced action profile depends exclusively on the type
probability distribution. As an example, if the low type occurs rarely, the device will suggest to
the users to adopt an action profile that is close to the objective of the users with high type, that will
probably be the majority of the users in the network. In the extreme case, if low type users are for sure
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Figure 7.5. Manager’s expected utility vs. number of users for the complete and incomplete information
scenarios
not present in the network (i.e., P(0.1) = 0), than the adopted action profile will maximize the interests
of the users having high type and the communication-free device is able to achieve the benchmark
optimum. Notice that in this situation the manager has no uncertainty about the types of the users in
the network, which is the reason why it is able to extract the maximum utility. In some sense, the
uniform probability distribution represents the worst case for the communication-free device because
the manager has the highest uncertainty over the types of the users in the network.
So far we have only considered the utility as performance indicator. However, the utility includes
the two real performance metrics, throughput and delay. Now we investigate the expected through-
put and delay achievable with the considered schemes in the complete and incomplete information
scenarios, for each type of user.22 Fig. 7.7 shows the expected throughput (left-side) and delay (right-
side) for the complete information scenario. Continuous lines refer to the high type users, while
dashed lines refer to the low type users. Notice that the high type users obtain a higher expected
throughput and a higher expected delay compared to the low type users (this will be true also for the
incomplete information scenario), confirming that the higher the type the higher the user’s preference
for throughput with respect to delay. In both pictures, the upper (continuous and dashed) lines refer
22Notice that all users in the network experience the same delay. However, such delay depends on the type profile: the
higher the number of high type users with respect to the number of low type users, the higher the delay. Thus, the expected
delay for a low type user is lower than the expected delay for a high type user.
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Figure 7.6. Manager’s expected utility vs. low type probability for the incomplete information scenario
to the strategic scenario without intervention device, in which the users adopt the NE action profile,
while the overlapped lower (continuous and dashed) lines represent the optimal action policy, obtain-
able with compliant users or with strategic users with the device derived in Subsection 7.9.1. With
no incentive scheme, strategic users tend to overuse the resources of the network, transmitting with
higher rates compared to the optimal ones. This translates into much higher delays, that increase
quickly as the number of users increases. Conversely, the optimal transmission policy is such that
the expected delay is almost constant with respect to the number of users. This means that also the
aggregate throughput is almost constant, and the rate of each user scales as 1
n
.
Fig. 7.8 shows the expected throughput (left-side) and delay (right-side) for the incomplete infor-
mation scenario. Continuous lines refer to the high type users, while dashed lines refer to the low type
users, with the exception of the performance obtainable adopting the communication-free device, rep-
resented by the dash-dot line, in which different types of users adopt the same action and experience
the same throughput and delay. In both pictures, the upper (continuous and dashed) lines refer to
the strategic scenario without intervention device, in which the users adopt the BNE action profile,
while the lower (continuous and dashed) lines represent the optimal action policy. The performance
obtainable adopting the device derived from the algorithm lies in between. The lines that represent the
expected delay for the BNE action profile are truncated for a number of users equal to 3 and 5 because
for more users the system might become unstable. In fact, in the BNE the expected utility of a user is
maximized, given that the other users adopt the BNE. However, for some type profile instances, the
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Figure 7.7. Total expected throughput and delay vs. number of users for the complete information scenario
utility might be equal to 0, i.e., the delay might diverge. Thus, the expected delay diverges as well. In
words, there is a positive probability that the network becomes congested. The device derived from
the algorithm allows to improve this situation, limiting the delay experienced by each user. However,
such a delay increases almost linearly as the number of users increases. This is the reason why the
communication-free device, at a certain point, even though it is not able to differentiate the service
given to different classes of traffic, is able to obtain a better performance (from the manager’s utility
point of view) than the mechanism derived from the algorithm. In the communication-free device
each user, independently of its type, adopts a rate which is between the optimal rates adopted by the
low type users and the high type users, and this situation reflects in the expected delay. This allows to
keep a very low and constant delay with respect to the number of users.
7.10 Conclusion
In this chapter we extend the intervention framework introduced by [66] to take into account
situations of private information, imperfect monitoring and costly communication – in addition to
intervention. We allow the designer to use a device that can communicate with users and intervene
in the system. The goal of the designer is to choose the device that allows him to obtain the highest
possible utility in the considered scenario. For a class of environments that includes many engineer-
ing scenarios of interest (e.g., power control [15, 16], medium access control (MAC) [12, 25], and
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Figure 7.8. Expected throughput and delay per user vs. number of users for the incomplete information
scenario
flow control [24–28]) we find conditions under which there exist devices that achieve the benchmark
optimum and conditions under which such devices do not exist. In case they do not exist, we find
conditions such that the problem of finding an optimal device can be decoupled. Because the optimal
device may still be difficult to compute, we also provide a simple algorithm that converges to a device
that, although perhaps not optimal, still yields a ‘good’ outcome for the designer.
Then we consider the design of a flow control management system, in both the complete and the
incomplete information scenarios. We quantify the inefficiency of the NE of the complete information
game and the BNE of the incomplete information game. We design an intervention scheme for the
complete information scenario able to provide the incentive for the users to adopt the optimal trans-
mission rate, by threatening punishments if they deviate. Such scheme is able to obtain the optimal
performance achievable when the users act cooperatively. For the incomplete information scenario,
we designs two devices: the first one is able to retrieve the private information from the users giving
them the incentive to report it truthfully; the second one is based only on the a priori information that
the device has about the users. Illustrative results show that these devices can considerably increase
the efficiency of the network in the incomplete information scenario as well.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis discusses the application of game theory to the design of wireless network proto-
cols which are robust against self-interested and strategic users. To reach this goal, the designer has
to provide to the users an incentive to follow the protocol rules. On one hand, this constrains the
choice of the protocol and results in schemes which are, in general, less efficient than optimal cen-
tralized schemes. On the other hand, this allows to obtain more stable protocols, not vulnerable to
strategic users. As networks become more decentralized, users’ terminals become more autonomous,
programmable and (computationally) powerful, this design approach is fundamental to avoid high
unforeseen inefficiencies.
This dissertation presents the following contributions to the design of efficient game-theoretic
schemes in wireless networks. In Chapter 3 a virtual game among the radio resources allocator
and the scheduler is proposed to manage the resources in an LTE system, trading off fairness and
throughput, while ensuring the modularity of the overall system.
In Chapter 4 we address the problem of promoting cooperative relaying in a wireless network.
This objective is reached with a dynamic scheduling rule which increases the access opportunities of
cooperative users. We model this access scheme as a Stackelberg game, where a network unit plays
the role of access coordinator, and we prove the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium. A careful
analysis of the numerical results justifies our scheme as a valid solution to increase the network
performance in a viable manner from an implementation standpoint.
In Chapter 5 we develop a framework which can be used to select some nodes to be shared
between two coexisting wireless networks. We consider a wireless network simulator that evaluates
the network behavior at the physical, MAC and network layers. A Bayesian network approach is used
by the two networks to evaluate their performance based on observable topological parameters. The
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interaction among the two networks is then modeled as a repeated game, and a trigger strategy is used
to promote cooperation. Numerical results show that, even when only a small fraction of the nodes is
shared, our scheme approaches the performance of a full cooperation scheme, in which the networks
are assumed to share all their nodes.
In Chapter 6 we use two incentive schemes, pricing and intervention, to design a random access
protocol robust against strategic users. We compare the two schemes in terms of the network envi-
ronment, the knowledge of the designer and the knowledge of the users. Our results show that the
intervention scheme, differently from the pricing scheme, is able to achieve the optimal performance
if the user actions are perfectly observable. On the other hand, if they are not, the intervention scheme
may punish the users even if they follow the recommendations, resulting in a degradation of the sys-
tem performance. Nevertheless, we notice that intervention outperforms pricing if the users are not
aware that their actions are imperfectly observed. While if they are aware of it, as a rough general
principle, intervention achieves greater efficiency than pricing when the number of users is small and
the opposite is true when the number of users is large.
In Chapter 7 we extend the intervention framework to take into account situations of private in-
formation, imperfect monitoring and costly communication, in which a device is adopted to provide
to the users an incentive to report truthfully their information and to follow the instructions. For a
class of environments that include many resource allocation games in communication networks, we
provide tools for the designer to design an efficient system. In an abstracted environment, we find
conditions under which the designer can achieve the same outcome it could if users were compliant,
and conditions under which it can not. We also provide a simple algorithm that converges to a scheme
that, although perhaps not optimal, still yields a good outcome for the designer. Then we consider
the design of a flow control management system, in both the complete and the incomplete informa-
tion scenarios. In the former we design a scheme which is able to obtain the optimal performance
achievable when the users act cooperatively; in the latter we propose two mechanisms that, though
not optimal, can considerably increase the efficiency of the network.
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8.1 Future Directions
The application of game theory to design robust protocols in wireless networks is a challenging
topic. Game theory can be applied to a variety of wireless networking problems at different levels:
power control, interference avoidance, resource allocation, relaying, flow/congestion control, network
routing, network formation, content distribution, security, etc. Here we want to focus on the adopted
methodologies, rather than on a particular application.
To derive analytical results, game theory is usually applied to simple models, which only partially
capture the real problems. This analysis may provide useful insights about the inefficiencies that
may occur in the presence of strategic users and about possible solutions. However, such solutions
cannot be directly applied to the real problems, because small perturbations (derived from unrealistic
assumptions) may significantly change the equilibrium. We believe that game theoretic schemes must
get rid of such simplified assumptions to be adopted in real systems. In particular, we tried to highlight
the role of information in game theoretic approaches. The last three chapters of this dissertation are
focused on this aspect.
Specifically, in Chapter 5 we used a Bayesian network approach to estimate some performance
parameters, which are then used by the two networks – in place of the real non observable values – to
make the decisions. In Chapter 6 we showed that the equilibrium efficiency strongly depends on the
observability of the user actions and on the information heterogeneity. In Chapter 7 we developed a
framework and derived some results to retrieve the unknown information from the users.
We believe that these types of approaches must be explored more deeply in game theoretic studies.
In fact, in real wireless systems users do not usually have access to all the information. They may
not (perfectly) know the other users’ objectives. They may not (perfectly) observe the other users’
actions. They may not even (perfectly) know the number of users in the system. In these cases, the
users must act based on the belief they have about the missing information, and mechanism design
or learning based schemes – to elicit or estimate the missing information – can be used to form and
update the beliefs. Learning based techniques can be particularly useful when the number of users is
large and it is expensive to keep track of each single user in the network and to exchange information.
In this context, users are assumed to be aware of the environment and to dynamically adapt to it,
learning from outcomes of past decisions. Finally, if the number of users is very large, mean-field
learning techniques [116] may provide a suitable framework to model and analyze the interaction
among them.
Appendix A
Proofs Chapter 6
A.1 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The unique NE of the game (6.9) is ai = θi
ci
, i ∈ N . Hence, the expected social welfare is
U(a) =
n∑
i=1
E

θi ln

ai n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)

− ci [ai + ni]10

 = n∑
i=1
θi ln

ai n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− aj)

− θi
ai
E
[
[ai + ni]
1
0
]
where, considering ni ∼ U [−i i],
E
[
[ai + ni]
1
0
]
=


(ai + i)
2
4i
if ai < i
ai if i ≤ ai ≤ 1− i
−a2i + 2(i + 1)ai + 2i − 
2
i − 1
4i
if ai > 1− i
Therefore
∂U(a)
∂ak
=


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ak
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− ak
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2
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2
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4ka
2
k
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θk
ak
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θk
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−
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1− ak
+ θk
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2
4ka
2
k
if ak > 1− k
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∂2U(a)
∂a2k
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∂2U(a)
∂ak∂aj
= 0 , ∀ j 6= k
∂2U(a)
∂a2k
is negative. For ak < k and k ≤ ak ≤ 1− k this is trivial, for ak > 1− k we have
∂2U(a)
∂a2k
=
−2kθkak (1− ak)
2 − 2k
∑
i 6=k θia
3
k + (1− k)
2 θk (1− ak)
2ka
3
k (1− ak)
2 <
<
−2k
∑
i 6=k θia
3
k + (1− k)
2 θk (1− ak)
2ka
3
k (1− ak)
2 <
−2 (1− k)
3∑
i 6=k θi + k (1− k)
2 θk (1− ak)
2a3k (1− ak)
2 < 0
where the second and third inequalities are valid because θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1 − k (as we will see, the
optimal transmission probability ak is higher than 1− k if and only if
θk∑n
i=1 θi
is higher than 1− k)
and k  1 respectively. Hence, the Hessian of U(a) is negative definite (it is a diagonal matrix with
strictly negative diagonal entries), so U(a) is concave. The global maximizer of U(a) can be obtained
with the first order condition.
For ak < k we obtain the condition
θka
3
k −
(
θk + 4k
n∑
i=1
θi
)
a2k +
(
4kθk − 
2
kθk
)
ak + 
2
kθk = 0 (A.1)
The solution of Eq. (A.1) exists and is unique assuming θk∑n
i=1 θi
< k. In fact the left hand side is
a continuous function, decreasing in ak (its derivative with respect to ak corresponds to the second
derivative of U(a) with respect to ak), equal to
2kθk
0+
> 0 for ak → 0+ and to
k
∑
i θi − θk
k (1− k)
< 0 for
ak → 
−
k .
For k ≤ ak ≤ 1− k we obtain the condition
ak =
θk∑n
i=1 θi
→ ck =
n∑
i=1
θi
For ak > 1− k we obtain the condition
−θka
3
k +
(
θk − 4k
n∑
i=1
θi
)
a2k +
(
4kθk + (1− k)
2 θk
)
ak − (1− k)
2 θk = 0 (A.2)
The solution of Eq. (A.2) exists and is unique assuming θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− k. In fact the left hand side
is a continuous function, decreasing in ak (its derivative with respect to ak corresponds to the second
derivative of U(a) with respect to ak), equal to θk − (1− k)
∑n
i=1 θi
2k + (1− k)
> 0 for ak → (1− k)+ and
to
−
∑
i 6=k θi
0+
< 0 for ak → 1−.
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Finally, notice that the solutions found are consistent with the case considered and
ak < k ⇔
θk∑n
i=1 θi
< k
k ≤ ak ≤ 1− k ⇔ k ≤
θk∑n
i=1 θi
≤ 1− k
ak > 1− k ⇔
θk∑n
i=1 θi
> 1− k
A.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Given the intervention rule a˜k and rk = 1
a˜k
, ∀ k, and the NE action profile a = a˜, the
intervention level for user i is equal to
f Ii (a˜i) =
[
1
a˜i
([a˜i + ni]
1
0 − a˜i)
]1
0
Consequently, the expected throughput of a generic user i and the social welfare are
T Ii (a˜) = E

a˜i (1− f Ii (a˜i)) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− a˜j)

 = a˜i (1− E [f Ii (a˜i)]) n∏
j=1,j 6=i
(1− a˜j)
U(a˜) =
n∑
i=1
θi lnTi(a˜) =
n∑
i=1
θi ln
(
a˜i − a˜iE
[
f Ii (a˜i)
])
+
n∑
i=1

 n∑
j=1,j 6=i
θj

 ln (1− a˜i)
Now we want check if U(a˜) is concave analyzing its Hessian. To do so, we first compute the
average intervention level E
[
f Ii (a˜i)
]
, then we calculate ∂U(a˜)
∂a˜i
and finally we compute ∂
2U(a˜)
∂a˜2i
and
∂2U(a˜)
∂a˜i∂a˜j
, i 6= j. Notice that, to do so, we should calculate each function in three different cases: for
a˜i < i, for i ≤ a˜i ≤ 1 − i, and for a˜i > 1 − i. However, to avoid a heavy notation, we do not
take into consideration the case a˜i > 1− i. In fact this case is not interesting because, since i  1,
the best target action for user i is close to 1 if and only if there are few users in the network and the
conditions are strongly asymmetric (i.e., θi  θj , ∀ j 6= i). On the contrary, we are interested in the
case a˜i < i because the best a˜i scales with the number of users. Thus, if the network is crowded, a˜i
may become close to 0.
If a˜i + ni < 0 then f Ii (a˜i) = 0. If a˜i + ni ≥ 0 then f Ii (a˜i) =
1
a˜i
[ni]
a˜i
0 . Hence, we obtain
E
[
f Ii (a˜i)
]
=


1
2ia˜i
∫ a˜i
0 x∂x+
1
2i
∫ i
a˜i
∂x =
2i − a˜i
4i
if a˜i < i
1
2ia˜i
∫ i
0 x∂x =
i
4a˜i
if a˜i ≥ i
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Therefore
∂U(a˜)
∂a˜i
=


2θi (i + a˜i)
2ia˜i + a˜
2
i
−
∑
j 6=i θj
1− a˜i
if a˜i < i
θi
a˜i −
i
4
−
∑
j 6=i θj
1− a˜i
if a˜i ≥ i
∂2U(a˜)
∂a˜2i
=


2θi
(
−22i − 2ia˜i − a˜
2
i
)
(
2ia˜i + a˜2i
)2 −
∑
j 6=i θj
(1− ai)
2 if a˜i < i
−θi(
a˜i −
i
4
)2 −
∑
j 6=i θj
(1− a˜i)
2 if a˜i ≥ i
∂2U
∂ai∂aj
= 0 , ∀ i 6= j
∂2U(a˜)
∂a˜2i
< 0. Hence, the Hessian of U(a˜) is negative definite (it is a diagonal matrix with strictly
negative diagonal entries), so U(a˜) is concave. The global maximizer of U(a˜) can be obtained with
the first order condition, i.e., imposing ∂U(a˜)
∂a˜i
= 0. Notice that ∂U(a˜)
∂a˜i
is continuous, decreasing
(because ∂2U(a˜)
∂a˜2i
< 0), and tends to +∞ for a˜i → 0+ and to −∞ for a˜i → 1−. Thus, there exists one
and only one a˜i such that ∂U(a˜)∂a˜i = 0.
Imposing ∂U(a˜)
∂a˜i
= 0 for a˜i < i, we obtain
−θi − n∑
j=1
θj

 a˜2i +

2θi − 2i n∑
j=1
θj

 a˜i + 2iθi = 0
Imposing ∂U(a˜)
∂a˜i
= 0 for a˜i ≥ i, we obtain
a˜i =
4θi + i
∑n
j=1,j 6=i θj
4
∑n
j=1 θj
This results is compatible with the condition a˜i ≥ i if and only if
i ≤
4θi
4
∑n
j=1 θj −
∑n
j=1,j 6=i θj
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof.
E
[
[ai + ni]
1
0
]
=


(ai + i)
2
4i
if ai ≤ i
ai if i < ai ≤ 1− i
−a2i + 2(i + 1)ai + 2i − 
2
i − 1
4i
if ai > 1− i
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Ui(a) =


θi ln
[
ai
∏
j 6=i(1− aj)
]
− ci
(ai + i)
2
4i
if ai < i
θi ln
[
ai
∏
j 6=i(1− aj)
]
− ciai if i ≤ ai ≤ 1− i
θi ln
[
ai
∏
j 6=i(1− aj)
]
− ci
−a2i + 2(i + 1)ai + 2i − 
2
i − 1
4i
if ai > 1− i
∂Ui(a)
∂ai
=


θi
ai
− 2ci
ai + i
4i
if ai < i
θi
ai
− ci if i ≤ ai ≤ 1− i
θi
ai
− ci
−ai + i + 1
2i
if ai > 1− i
To compute the best response function of user i, we impose the first derivative of U(a) equal to 0
and we analyse the concavity of U(a), with respect to ai.
∂Ui(a)
∂ai
= 0 −→ ai =


−i
2
+
1
2
√
2i +
8iθi
ci
if θi
ci
< i
θi
ci
if i ≤
θi
ci
≤ 1− i
i + 1
1
+
1
2
√
(i + 1)2 −
8iθi
ci
if 1
2
<
θi
ci
< 1− i
∂2Ui(a)
∂a2i
=


−
θi
a2i
−
ci
2i
if ai < i
θi
a2i
if i ≤ ai ≤ 1− i
−
θi
a2i
+
ci
2i
if ai > 1− i
∂2Ui(a)
∂a2i
< 0 for ai ∈
[
0, max
(√
2iθi
ci
, 1− i
)]
and in max
(√
2iθi
ci
, 1− i
)
there is a
change in the concavity. If 1
2
<
θi
ci
≤ 1− i then, after the change of concavity, the function reaches
a local minimum in ai =
i + 1
2
+
1
2
√
(i + 1)2 −
8iθi
ci
and then restarts to increase. Hence, in
this case there are 2 local maxima: ai =
θi
ci
and ai = 1. Comparing the 2 maxima we obtain
Ui(
θi
ci
, a−i) ≥ Ui(1, a−1)⇐⇒
θi
ci
ln
θi
ci
−
θi
ci
≥
i
4
− 1.
Summarizing:
Case 1) if θi
ci
< i then there is one local maximum which is the global maximum: ai =
−i
2
+
1
2
√
2i +
8iθi
ci
Case 2) If i ≤ θi
ci
≤
1
2
then there is one local maximum which is the global maximum: ai =
θi
ci
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Case 3) If 1
2
<
θi
ci
≤ 1− i and
θi
ci
ln
θi
ci
−
θi
ci
≥
i
4
− 1 then there are two local maxima and the global
one is ai =
θi
ci
Case 4) If 1
2
<
θi
ci
≤ 1− i and
θi
ci
ln
θi
ci
−
θi
ci
<
i
4
− 1 then there are two local maxima and the global
one is ai = 1
Case 5) if θi
ci
> 1− i then the function is increasing and the maximum is obtained for ai = 1
A.4 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Considering that users adopt the NE action profile (6.13), we want to maximize U(a) with
respect to ak, ∀k ∈ N . The optimal ak must be lower than 1, therefore we can consider only the first
three cases listed at the end of Appendix A.3.
We obtain:
∂U(a)
∂ak
=


θk
ak
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− ak
+
θkk
2a2k
if ak < k
θk
ak
−
∑
i 6=k θi
1− ak
if k ≤ ak ≤ ak,5
∂U(a)
∂ai
= 0 −→ ai =


ak,4 if ak < k
θk∑
i 6=k θi
if k ≤ ak ≤ ak,5
∂2U(a)
∂a2k
=


−θk
a2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− ak)2
−
θkk
a3k
if ak < k
−θk
a2k
−
∑
i 6=k θi
(1− ak)2
if k ≤ ak ≤ ak,5
d2G(a)
dakdpi
= 0 , i 6= k
The Hessian of U(a) is negative definite in [0, ak,5]. U(a) is a continuous and concave function
in [0, ak,5], increasing in ak = 0. However, its first partial derivative is not continuous in ak = k.
In particular, if there exists a user k such that ∂G(a)
∂ak
6= 0 in [0, ak,5], then either (1) ∂U(a)
∂ak
> 0
for ak < k and
∂U(a)
∂ak
< 0 for ak > k, or (2) U(a) increases in ak until reaching a maximum in
ak = ak,5. Finally, the global maximum is located where partial derivatives are equal to 0 or, in case
this condition is not satisfied for some users k, in ak = k if
∂G(a)
∂ak
> 0 for ak < k and
∂G(a)
∂ak
< 0
for ak > k, or in ak,5 otherwise; i.e.,
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ak =


ak,4 if ak,4 < k
k if ak,4 ≥ k and
θk∑
i θi
≤ k
θk∑
i θi
if k ≤
θk∑
i θi
≤
1
2
or
θk∑
i θi
∈ C (k)
ak,5 otherwise
which is equivalent to Eq. (6.14).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We study i’s utility, U Ii (a), varying i’s action, ai. To do so, we first analyze the average
intervention level E := E
[[
ri
(
[ai + ni]
1
0 − ai − i
)]1
0
]
, for ri → +∞.
If ai < ai, the term that multiplies ri is always negative (notice that [ai + ni]10 ≤ ai + i) and,
consequently, the intervention level is always equal to 0 and E = 0.
If ai > ai + 2i, the term that multiplies ri is always positive (notice that [ai + ni]10 ≥ ai − i)
and, consequently, the intervention level is always equal to 1 and E = 1.
If ai ≤ ai ≤ ai + 2i, the intervention might be 0 or 1, depending on the value of the estimation
error ni. Notice that, in this case, ai + ni ≥ 0. Thus, whenever ni is higher than ai + i − ai, the
intervention is 1, and the average intervention level is equal to
E =
1
2i
∫ i
ai+i−ai
∂x =
1
2i
(ai − ai)
Hence, we obtain
Ui(a) =


θi ln ai + θi ln
[∏
j 6=i (1− aj)
]
if ai < ai
θi ln
[
ai
(
1−
1
2i
(ai − ai)
)]
+ θi ln
[∏
j 6=i (1− aj)
]
if ai ≤ ai ≤ ai + 2i
−∞ if ai > ai + 2i
To predict the best action for user i, we study the trend of Ui(a) varying ai in the interval
[0, ai + 2i). To do so, we calculate
∂Ui(a)
∂ai
and ∂
2Ui(a)
∂a2i
. and we study their sign.
∂Ui(a)
∂ai
=


θi
ai
if ai < ai
θi
1 + 12iai −
1
i
ai(
1 + 12iai
)
ai −
1
2i
a2i
if ai ≤ ai ≤ ai + 2i
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∂2Ui(a)
∂a2i
=


−
θi
a2i
if ai < ai
θi
1
i
(ai − ai)− 1 +
ai
22
i
(ai − ai)−
a2i
22
i
−
a2i
42
i[(
1 + 12iai
)
ai −
1
2i
a2i
]2 if ai ≤ ai ≤ ai + 2i
∂2Ui(a)
∂a2i
< 0 for ai ≤ ai ≤ ai + 2i. In fact, for ai ≤ ai ≤ ai + i
1
i
(ai − ai)− 1 +
ai
22i
(ai − ai)−
a2i
22i
−
a2i
42i
≤ 1− 1 + 0
a2i
22i
−
a2i
42i
≤ 0
For ai + i ≤ ai ≤ ai + 2i
1
i
(ai − ai)− 1 +
ai
22i
(ai − ai)−
a2i
22i
−
a2i
42i
≤ 2− 1−
ai
2i
−
a2i
22i
≤ 1−
ai + i
2i
−
(ai + i)
2
22i
=
= 1−
1
2
−
ai
2i
−
a2i + 2aii + 
2
i
22i
= −
ai
2i
−
a2i
22i
−
ai
i
≤ 0
Thus, ∂Ui(a)
∂ai
is decreasing in [ai, ai + 2i]. Since
∂Ui(a)
∂ai
> 0 in [0, ai, ), a necessary and
sufficient condition such that ai is a global maximum is that
∂Ui(a)
∂ai
≤ 0 for ai → a+i . Imposing
such a condition we obtain ai ≥ 2i, which concludes the proof.
Appendix B
Proofs Chapter 7
B.1 Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. We prove⇒ by contradiction.
Let D = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ,X,Φ〉 be a maximum efficiency device (remember that we focus only on
incentive compatible devices). Suppose 3 is not valid, i.e., there exists a type profile t˜ such that the
non-optimal action profile z 6= gM (t˜) is suggested with positive probability µt˜(z) > 0. Then
EU(f, g,D) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)
∑
a∈A
µt(a)
∑
x∈X
Φt,a,a(x)U(a, t, x) = V +W+
+ µt˜(z)
∑
x∈X
Φhatt,z,z(x)U(z, t˜, x) < V +W + µt˜(z)U(g
M (t˜), t˜, x∗) ≤ EU ben
where
V =
∑
t∈T,t6=t˜
pi(t)
∑
a∈A
µt(a)
∑
x∈X
Φt,a,a(x)U(a, t, x)
W = pi(t˜)
∑
a∈A,a6=z
µt(a)
∑
x∈X
Φt,a,a(x)U(a, t˜, x)
which contradicts the fact that D is a maximum efficiency device.
Now suppose 4 is not valid, i.e., that Φ′a = Φt,gM (t),a does not sustain without intervention gM (t)
in Γt. If Φ′a does not sustain gM (t) in Γt, then there exists a user i and an action ai 6= gMi (t) such
that user i prefers to adopt ai when told to use gMi (t), i.e., the strategy gi(ti, gMi (t)) = ai allows user
i to obtain a higher utility with respect to the obedient strategy g∗i ; this contradicts the fact that the
device is incentive compatible. If Φ′a sustains gM (t) in Γt “with intervention”, then there exists t˜ and
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x˜ 6= x∗ such that Φt˜,gM (t˜),gM (t˜)(x˜) > 0. Then
EU(f, g,D) =
∑
t∈T
pi(t)
∑
x∈X
Φt,gM (t),gM (t)(x)U(g
M (t), t, x) = V +W+
+ pi(t˜)Φt,gM (t),gM (t)(x˜)U(g
M (t), t, x˜) < V +W + pi(t˜)Φt,gM (t),gM (t)(x˜)U(g
M (t), t, x∗) ≤ EU ben
where
V =
∑
t∈T,t6=t˜
pi(t)
∑
x∈X
Φt,gM (t),gM (t)(x)U(g
M (t), t, x)
W = pi(t˜)
∑
x∈X,x 6=x˜
Φt,gM (t),gM (t)(x)U(g
M (t), t, x)
which contradicts the fact that D is a maximum efficiency device.
Finally, if 1 is not satisfied then 4 can not be satisfied either (because gM (t) is not sustainable
without intervention), thus we obtain a contradiction. If 2 is not satisfied then either 3 is not satisfied
or the device is not incentive compatible (because, given 3, 2 is a particular case of the incentive-
compatibility constraints), thus, in both cases, we obtain a contradiction.
⇐ It is straightforward to verify that if 1 − 4 are satisfied the resulting mechanism is incentive
compatible and the utility of the designer is equal to the benchmark optimum (7.1).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. LetD = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ,X,Φ〉 be an optimal device (remember that we focus only on incentive
compatible devices). The expected utility of user i having type ti can be written as
EUi(f, g, ti,D) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi[t | ti]Vi(t) , Vi(t) =
∑
a∈A
µt(a)
∑
x∈X
Φt,a,a(x)Ui(a, t, x)
Denote by amini (t) the minimum possible action suggested to user i when the type profile is t,
i.e., amini (t) = min {ai ∈ Ai : µt(ai, a−i) > 0, a−i ∈ A−i}. We define the following intervals
Ii(t) =
[
amini , min
{
amini (t) , g
NE0
i (t)
}]
, i = {1, . . . , n}
and we use the notation I(t) and I−i(t) in the usual way.
We define the function `i(a−i) in the domain I−i(t) as follows:
`i(a−i) = {ai ∈ Ii(t) such that Ui (a, t, x∗) = Vi(t)}
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The function `i is a non-empty set-valued function from I−i(t) to the power set of Ii(t). In fact,
∀ a′−i(t) ∈ I−i(t),
Ui
(
amini , a
′
−i, t, x
∗
)
= 0 ≤ Vi(t) ≤
∑
a∈A
µt(a)Ui(a, t, x
∗) ≤
∑
a∈A
µt(a)Ui(ai, a
′
−i(t), t, x
∗) (B.1)
The second inequality of Eq. (B.1) is valid because i’s utility is non increasing with respect to the
intervention level, i.e., Ui (a, t, x) ≤ Ui (a, t, x∗), ∀ a, t, x. The last inequality of Eq. (B.1) is valid
because i’s utility is non increasing in the actions of the other users and, from the definition of the set
I−i(t), a
′
−i(t) ≤ a−i, ∀ a
′
−i ∈ I−i(t). Eq. (B.1) and the continuity of i’s utility imply that an action
a˜i(t) ∈ Ii(t) satisfying Ui (a, t, x∗) = Vi(t) exists, ∀ a−i ∈ I−i(t). Moreover, by definition `i(a−i)
has a closed graph (i.e., the graph of `i(a−i) is a closed subset of I(t)) and, since i’s utility is non
decreasing in
[
amini g
NE0
i (t)
]
, `i(a−i) is convex, ∀ a−i ∈ I−i(t).
We define the function `(a) = (`1(a−1), · · · , `n(a−n)), ∀ a ∈ I(t). The function ` is defined
from the non-empty, compact and convex set I(t) to the power set of I(t). Thanks to the properties of
`i, ` has a closed graph and `(a) is non-empty and convex. Therefore we can apply Kakutani fixed-
point theorem [51] to affirm that a fixed point exists, i.e., there exists an action profile a˜(t) ∈ I(t) such
that Ui (a˜, t, x∗) = Vi(t), ∀ i ∈ N . Notice that a˜(t) < gNE
0
(t), therefore a˜(t) is sustainable without
intervention in Γt, and we denote by Φ′a the intervention rule that sustains without intervention a˜(t)
in Γt.
Finally, the original optimal device D = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ,X,Φ〉 can be substituted with the device
D˜ = 〈(Ti), (Ai), µ˜,X, Φ˜〉 in which, ∀ t, µ˜(t) = a˜(t) and Φ˜t,a˜(t),a = Φ′a. With the new device
D˜ the users are obedient (because the restriction of the intervention rule, Φ′a, sustains a˜(t)) and
honest (because the utilities they obtain for each combination of reports are the same as in the initial
device D that sustains the honest and obedient strategy profile). More specifically, D˜ sustains without
intervention the honest and obedient strategy profile. Moreover, in the equilibrium path the users’
expected utilities using D˜ coincide with the users’ expected utilities using D; thus, also the designer’s
utility (which is a function of users’ utilities) remains the same, and this implies that D˜ is optimal.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 16
Proof.
EUi(g, ti) = Et−i [Ui(g(t), ti)] = gi(ti)
tiEt−i [(C − λ)] = gi(ti)
ti



C − gi(ti)− n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Etj [gj(tj)]




∂ lnEUi(g, ti)
∂gi(ti)
=
ti
gi(ti)
−
1
C − gi(ti)−
∑n
j=1,j 6=iEtj [gj(tj)]
∂2 lnEUi(g, ti)
∂g2i (ti)
= −
ti
g2i (ti)
−
1(
C − gi(ti)−
∑n
j=1,j 6=iEtj [gj(tj)]
)2 < 0
Imposing that the first derivative is equal to 0, we obtain that the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
gBNE must satisfy, ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ l = 1, . . . , v,
(1 + τl) g
BNE
i (τl) + τl
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
v∑
k=1
pi(τk)g
BNE
j (τk) = Cτl (B.2)
The system of equations defined by (B.2) can be written as a matrix equation of the form
AgBNE = b
where
gBNE =


gBNE1
.
.
.
gBNEn

 , gBNEi =


gBNEi (τ1)
.
.
.
gBNEi (τv)

 , b =


bˆ
.
.
.
bˆ

 , bˆ =


Cτ1
.
.
.
Cτv

 ,
A =


Λ τ ·P · · · τ ·P
τ ·P Λ · · · τ ·P
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
τ ·P τ ·P · · · Λ

 ,
Λ = diag (1 + τ1, . . . , 1 + τv) , τ =


τ1
.
.
.
τv

 , P =
[
pi(τ1) . . . pi(τv)
]
Finally, we want to analytically compute the inverse of the matrixA. We can writeA as
A =


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P

+


I
.
.
.
I

 ·
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
(B.3)
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where I is the identity matrix in Rm×m.
The matrix inversion Lemma states that
(E+BCD)−1 = E−1 −E−1B
(
C
−1 +DE−1B
)−1
DE
−1 (B.4)
Applying the matrix inversion Lemma toA−1 we obtain
A
−1 =


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
−


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
·


I
.
.
.
I

 ·


I
−1 +
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1 
I
.
.
.
I


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y


−1
·
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
(B.5)
First, we calculate
(Λ− τ ·P)−1 = Λ−1 −Λ−1 · τ ·
(
−1 +P ·Λ−1 · τ
)−1
·P ·Λ−1
= Λ−1 −Λ−1 · τ ·
1
−1 +
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
·P ·Λ−1
= Λ−1 −Λ−1 · τ · β ·P ·Λ−1 (B.6)
where β = 1
−1 +
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
.
Now we calculate Y−1. We rewriteY as
Y = I+
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1 
I
.
.
.
I


= I+
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
.
.
.
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1

 ·


I
.
.
.
I


= I+ n · τ ·P ·
(
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
)
= I+ τ ·
[
n ·
(
1−PΛ−1τβ
)]
·PΛ−1
= I+ τ ·
n
1−
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
·PΛ−1 (B.7)
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Applying the matrix inversion Lemma toY−1 we obtain
Y
−1 = I−1 − I−1τ ·
(
1−
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
n
+P ·Λ−1 · I−1 · τ
)−1
·P ·Λ−1 · I−1
= I− τ ·

 1
1−
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
n
+
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi

 ·P ·Λ−1
= I−
n
1 + (n− 1)
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
· τPΛ−1 (B.8)
Finally, we can calculate A−1 as
A
−1 =


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
−


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
·


I
.
.
.
I

 ·
=
(
I−
n
1 + (n− 1)
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
· τPΛ−1
)
·
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
=


B
.
.
.
B

−


C . . . C
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
C . . . C

 (B.9)
where
B = Λ−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
C =
(
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
)
·
(
I−
n
1 + (n− 1)
∑v
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
· τPΛ−1
)
· τP ·
(
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
)
B.4 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. For a generic user i, we want to prove that a˜i is the best action given that the other users adopt
a˜−i. We study the sign of the derivative of the logarithm of i’s utility with respect to i’s action
∂ lnU Ii (ai, a˜−i, ti, x)
∂ai
=


ti
ai
−
1
C −
∑
k 6=i a˜k − ai
ai < a˜i
ti
ai
−
1 + ci
C −
∑
k 6=i a˜k − ai − ci(ai − a˜i)
a˜i < ai < a˜i +
x
ci
ti
ai
−
1
C −
∑
k 6=i a˜k − ai − x
ai > a˜i +
x
ci
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We denote by aBRi (a−i) the best response function of user i, i.e., i’s action that maximizes i’s
utility when the action vector of the other users is a−i. Since the users’ utilities satisfy the assumptions
A4-A6 of Subsection 7.4.1, U
I
i (ai, a˜−i, ti, x)
∂ai
≥ 0 for ai < a˜i. In fact U Ii (a, ti, x) is increasing with
respect to ai in
[
0, aBRi (a˜−i)
)
and a˜i ≤ aNE
0
i = a
BR
i (a
NE0
−i ) ≤ a
BR
i (a˜−i), where the first inequality
is an assumption of the Lemma and the last inequality is valid because of the submodularity of the
game.
Imposing the condition ∂U
I
i (ai, a˜−i, ti, x)
∂ai
≤ 0 in a˜i < ai < a˜i +
x
ci
, we find
ci ≥
ti
(
C −
∑n
k=1,k 6=i a˜k − ai
)
− ai
ti (ai − a˜i) + ai
(B.10)
The right hand side term of (B.10) is decreasing in ai, therefore the condition is valid in a˜i < ai <
a˜i +
x
ci
if and only if it is valid in a˜i, obtaining
ci ≥
ti (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)− a˜i
a˜i
Notice that the condition on ci is a necessary condition for a˜i to be a NE. In fact if it is not satisfied
then U Ii (ai, a˜−i, ti, x) is strictly increasing in a˜i and, for the continuity of U Ii (ai, a˜−i, ti, x) with
respect to ai, we can find an action aˆi > a˜i such that U Ii (aˆi, a˜−i, ti, x) > U Ii (a˜i, a˜−i, ti, x).
Finally, imposing the condition ∂U
I
i (ai, a˜−i, ti, x)
∂ai
≤ 0 in ai > a˜i +
x
ci
, we find
x ≥
ci [ti (C −
∑n
k=1 a˜k)− a˜i]
1 + ti(1 + ci)
Notice that, given the condition on ci, this last condition is sufficient for a˜i to be a global maxi-
mizer. In fact in this way U Ii (ai, a˜−i, ti, x) becomes quasi-concave in ai: increasing for ai < a˜i and
decreasing for ai > a˜i.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. Conditions 1, 3 and 4 of Proposition 13 are satisfied. It remains to verify that 2 is satisfied,
i.e., ∀ ti, tˆi ∈ T1,
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i)a
ti
i
(
C −
n∑
k=1
ak
)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
pi(t−i)aˆ
ti
i
(
C −
n∑
k=1
aˆk
)
(B.11)
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where, ∀j 6= i,
ai =
tiC
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + ti
, aj =
tjC
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + ti
, aˆi =
tˆiC
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + tˆi
, aˆj =
tjC
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + tˆi
(B.12)
In particular, Eq. (B.11) is valid if, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i,
atii
(
C −
n∑
k=1
ak
)
≥ aˆtii
(
C −
n∑
k=1
aˆk
)
(B.13)
Substituting Eq. (B.12) into Eq. (B.13) we obtain:
(
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + tˆi
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + ti
)ti+1(
ti
tˆi
)ti
≥ 1 (B.14)
We use the notation b = n+
∑
k 6=i tk, and y =
tˆi
ti
. We want to find the condition on ti and y such
that
h(y) =
(
b+ tiy
b+ ti
)ti+1
y−ti ≥ 1
Notice that h(1) = 1. We take the derivative of h with respect to y
h′(y) = tiy
−ti−1
(
b+ tiy
b+ ti
)ti ( y − b
b+ ti
)
h′(y) ≥ 0⇔ y ≥ b⇔ tˆi
ti
≥ n+
∑
k 6=i tk.
f( tˆi
ti
) is decreasing in tˆi until tˆi = ti
(
n+
∑
k 6=i tk
)
, then it is increasing. This implies that
for tˆi < ti Eq. (B.13) is satisfied, i.e., user i has no incentive to report a lower type. However, if
tˆi → t
+
i , since h′(1) < 0, then user i has an incentive to communicate a higher type (this result is
linked to Proposition 14). In fact Eq. (B.13) is not satisfied ∀ t−i ∈ T−i, and therefore Eq. (B.12)
is unsatisfied. Since the function h( tˆi
ti
) increases for tˆi > ti
(
n+
∑
k 6=i tk
)
, the only way for Eq.
(B.13) to be satisfied is that the function f(y) will eventually reach the value 1 for a value xth = τ th
ti
and all the types higher than ti are higher than the threshold value τ th. Notice that it is sufficient that
this condition is verified by the type that follows ti. Substituting ti with τl and tˆi with τl+1 into Eq.
(B.14) we obtain Eq. (7.10).
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 19
Proof. First, we demonstrate that Eq. (7.11) describes a convex problem if τv ≤ n. The constraints
describe a convex set. We can rewrite the objective function in the following way
f(a) = − ln
[(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)∑
t∈T
pi(t)
n∏
i=1
a
ti
n
i
]
= − ln
[(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)
n∏
i=1
v∑
l=1
pi(τl)a
τl
n
i
]
=
= − ln
(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)
−
n∑
i=1
ln
v∑
l=1
pi(τl)a
τl
n
i
We calculate the partial derivatives of f(a)
∂f(a)
∂aj
=
1
C −
∑n
i=1 ai
−
∑v
l=1 pi(τl)
τl
n
a
τl
n
−1
i∑v
l=1 pi(τl)a
τl
n
i
∂2f(a)
∂a2j
=
1
(C −
∑n
i=1 ai)
2 −
(∑v
l=1 pi(τl)
τl
n
(
τl
n
− 1
)
a
τl
n
−2
i
)(∑v
l=1 pi(τl)a
τl
n
i
)
−
(∑v
l=1 pi(τl)
τl
n
a
τl
n
−1
i
)2
(∑v
l=1 pi(τl)a
τl
n
i
)2
∂2f(a)
∂aj∂ak
=
1
(C −
∑n
i=1 ai)
2
We have ∂
2f(a)
∂a2j
≥
∂2f(a)
∂aj∂ak
≥ 0, where the first inequality is valid if τv ≤ n.
Before concluding, we state and prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 8. The matrix
H =


α1 β . . . β
β α2 . . . β
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
β β . . . αn


where αi ≥ β ≥ 0, ∀ i = {1, 2, · · · , n}, is positive semidefinite. If the first inequality is strict, it is
also positive definite.
Proof.
H = β


1 1 . . . 1
1 1 . . . 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 1 . . . 1

+


α1 − β 0 . . . 0
0 α2 − β . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . αn − β


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Therefore
wT ·H · w = (α1 − β)w
2
1 + · · ·+ (αn − β)w
2
n + β
(
n∑
i=1
wi
)2
wT ·H · w ≥ 0 ∀w if αi ≥ β ≥ 0 ∀ i. wT ·H · w > 0 ∀w 6= 0 if αi > β ≥ 0 ∀ i.
Applying Lemma 8 to the Hessian of the function f(a) we obtain that the Hessian is positive
semidefinite, therefore the function f(a) is convex.
As for the optimality of the communication-free incentive compatible device D, we have
maxaEt

 n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (a, ti,Φ(r,m, a))

 ≤ maxaEt

 n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (a, ti, x
∗)

 =
= max
a
(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)+
Et

 n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
atii

 = max
a
(
C −
n∑
i=1
ai
)
Et
[
n∏
i=1
a
ti
n
i
]
Thus, if D sustains a, D is an optimal communication-free incentive compatible device.
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